Title: Message
October 7, 2001

Target: Terrorism

How the U.S. hopes to flush out bin Laden and topple the Taliban

By ERIC MARGOLIS
Contributing Foreign Editor

 NEW YORK -- The long-awaited U.S. attack on Afghanistan appears imminent.

 In a repeat of the 1991 Gulf war, the U.S. has completed building a coalition to back its military aims, and has pressured two key nations, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, into reluctant participation in President George Bush's "crusade."

 The U.S. has two war aims. First, capture or kill Osama bin Laden, who is hiding in the mountains of Afghanistan. Second, overthrow Afghanistan's de facto government, the Taliban, and replace it with the U.S.- and Russian-backed Northern Alliance, which will open the way for American-owned oil and gas pipelines running south from Uzbekistan.

 As of this writing, the U.S. apparently lacks precise information on bin Laden's whereabouts. He may be hiding in the extensive network of caves and tunnels in the Hindu Kush mountains that he helped construct during the 1980s war against Soviet occupation. Some reports put him in the remote Wakhan Corridor, a wild, uncharted region of high, snow-capped mountains that extends northeast to the Chinese border. I know this remote area because in the early 1980s, I helped get China to deliver machineguns and mortars across Wakhan by yak trains to Afghan mujahedin forces battling the Soviet invaders.

 Washington intends to send commandos into Afghanistan, backed by 350-400 warplanes, C-130U "Spooky" gunships, and helicopter gunships flying from former Soviet bases in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Delta Force, Navy Seals, Army Rangers, Marine recon units, and light infantry from the 10th Mountain Division are slated to be used - ensuring all services get a share of the action and glory. U.S. units will work with Britain's elite SAS, whose primary mission is reconnaissance and targeting. Russia may send in its Spetsnaz commandos, and the KGB's elite Alpha assault team.

 These forces are adequate for lightning raids, but not for large-scale, sustained operations inside Afghanistan, even against the Taliban's ragtag, lightly-armed, 30,000 tribal warriors. A massive, Iraq-style bombing campaign is unlikely: medieval, famine-stricken Afghanistan offers few military targets. Bin Laden's lair, and Taliban HQs in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar will be the main targets for air and ground assaults.

 But locating bin Laden will be difficult; capturing him, far harder. Afghanistan's mountains are wild and jagged. Frequent dust storms pose major dangers to helicopter operations. Inserting helicopter-borne troops into a narrow valley is perilous, particularly if enemy forces control the high ground and can fire down at the aircraft with heavy machineguns and RPG anti-tank rockets. This writer saw heavily armored Soviet HIND helicopter gunships destroyed in this manner in the 1980s.

 BOMB ATTACK

 If bin Laden can be located but not snatched, the U.S. could attack him with still-secret bombs that can penetrate up to 30 metres of rock and earth and/or deadly fuel air explosives (FAE). These "mini-A bombs" release vaporized gasoline over a large area, then detonate. The result is huge, lethal overpressure that ruptures the lungs and other internal organs of anyone below, even those sheltered in bunkers, caves, or the basements of concrete buildings. The Russians make extensive use of FAEs against Chechen independence fighters and civilians.

 Failure to swiftly kill or capture bin Laden and his few hundred armed supporters means the U.S. may have to deploy many more troops in Afghanistan - likely from the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions - and hunt for the elusive militant. Sweep operations seeking bin Laden would expose American soldiers to clashes with Afghan fighters, accidents, and the 10 million or more mines left behind by the Soviets. The U.S. could quickly get bogged down in a chaotic, lethal Beirut- or Somalia-like situation where it is impossible to tell friend from foe.

 Washington clearly intends to put the Northern Alliance into power. But this unsavoury collection of ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks cannot hope to rule over Afghanistan's majority Pakhtuns. The last time a Tajik-led government held Kabul, in 1994-5, it refused to share power. The result was civil war. The Northern Alliance may have to rely for survival on the bayonets of U.S. and British troops.

 The Taliban's Pashtuns say they will take to the hills and wage guerrilla war against the Alliance, which is widely viewed in Afghanistan as a creature of the Russians and Americans. Deja vu. In 1983, U.S. Marines were sent to Beirut to prop up a minority regime in the midst of civil war. Hundreds of Marines died.

 Traditional warfare in Afghanistan involves bribing tribal leaders to switch sides. This is how the Taliban got into power. U.S. threats and money may induce some Pashtun tribes to ditch the Taliban and, if the U.S. is very lucky, hand over bin Laden, dead or alive. Pakistan's intelligence agency, ISI, could play a key role in getting tribes to abandon the Taliban, though its level of co-operation with America's war remains in question.

 War always has unpredictable consequences. Once combat begins, the best laid plans go awry. The U.S. must strike quickly and decisively, or risk getting bogged down in an aimless war in one of the world's least accessible nations whose reputation as a graveyard of invaders is richly deserved.


Eric can be reached by e-mail at [EMAIL PROTECTED].
Letters to the editor should be sent to [EMAIL PROTECTED].

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