Worldwide disillusionment greeted Washington’s decision to veto the extension of the United Nations’ international peacekeeping force in Bosnia in protest at the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) which came into force on Monday. Until late last night, American and European officials were scrambling to reach a compromise in order to avert the looming deadlock, even at the 11th hour. In any case, recent developments will leave scars on transatlantic relations and shape new parameters in the distribution of roles between the US and EU in the Balkans and Southeastern Europe.
EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana has rightfully expressed his surprise and disappointment over the USA’s unexpectedly tough line on the issue of the international war crimes court. The newly born “globocourt,” which aims at discouraging any future Hitlers, provides a number of safety valves to all states around the world, including the USA. It has no retrospective power, meaning that former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for example, does not run the risk of being taken to trial for the coup led by General Augusto Pinochet nor Turkey’s Bulent Ecevit for the invasion of Cyprus. Furthermore, the tribunal only comes into force if a national court is unwilling to prosecute a suspect. President George W. Bush’s administration, however, has recently adopted a new dogma of unilateral interventionism which includes the possibility of pre-emptive strikes and is, therefore, reacting to any attempts to establish an international tribunal, deeming that this could limit its range to maneuver.
The prospect of an American pullout from the Balkans — a scenario which is formally rejected, but in fact looks increasingly realistic — places new challenges before the EU, not only because its limited defense spending undercuts its ability to respond to serious crises, but also because there are still deep divisions within the EU over the so-called second pillar of the European home — a common foreign and security policy — which are reflected in the lingering impasse over Europe’s nascent rapid deployment force. For moral as well as national security reasons, Greece has every reason to favor any measures which aim to reinforce common and autonomous European action in the area of security in the highly volatile Balkan environment.
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_columns_12684121_04/07/2002_18305
