by Christopher Deliso in Skopje
Although it has been proposed since 1994, the Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria (AMBO) oil pipeline still does not exist. Pipeline backers blame several issues for this, including: stonewalling on country signings because of the Macedonia name issue (in 1998-99); a continuing wait on a clear means of supply from the Caspian; the shoddy state of refineries in Albania- two are closed, the third barely functional.
The main reason, however, is that the American priority had been building the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline linking the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas. This pipeline avoided competing Russian and Iranian routes, in order to bolster the position of US ally Turkey. For a long time it didn’t seem this would be done, but now that it is, attention can return to the Balkans- perhaps.
As 2003 nears, the West has little interest in the Balkans. The region has become somewhat of a headache, like a child in need of babysitting. An American military source recently proclaimed that the West would need to remain there for at least another ten years, or until the squabbling, corrupt countries can get their acts together.
NATO, of course, has other priorities. It recently reduced a 700-strong force in Macedonia to 450. This mostly decentralized force will stay on until Spring, when the really contentious work- disarming mistrustful and isolationist Albanian villagers- must be done. At that time, an EU force (which France especially has been backing) may well take over.
Since the Balkans have waned in importance after September 11th, NATO again does not really mind. Besides dealing with expansion efforts in Eastern Europe, there is a new-found interest in mediating Georgian internal disputes, and of course NATO countries (at least) will no doubt be involved in sweeping up after the US’ next war on Iraq. The Balkans can be left to the side for a moment.
The one thing that might really change this equation- though it is still years away- would be the construction of the AMBO oil pipeline. This 900 km pipeline would cost $1.3 billion and have a target capacity of 35 million tons per year. The AMBO would begin in Bourgas, Bulgaria, and terminate in Vlore, Albania, by way of Macedonia. It’s advantageous in that it traverses the entire Balkan peninsula- eliminating completely the danger of an oil spill in the Aegean. This danger was driven home last weekend by a near-disaster off the coast of Attica, in which a Libyan tanker burst into flames. Greek firefighters were able to put out the blaze before anyone was hurt or environmental damage caused. But the threat is still there.
This issue is significant because of a “rival” pipeline, between Bourgas and Alexandroupoli in Greece. Shorter, Russian-supported, and this pipeline claims to be a little cheaper than AMBO. Yet although it (like AMBO) provides a necessary bypass from the congested and environmentally sensitive Bosphorus Straits, the pipeline could just displace the tanker problem to the Aegean. Greece is arguably more reliant on tourism for its economy and image than it is on oil. With the Athens Olympics only a year and a half away, can Greece really risk a disastrous oil spill in the Aegean?
But this is not the main concern for Macedonia and AMBO- just a selling point. The really interesting thing here concerns how the former’s strategic geography be changed by the presence of the latter.
Macedonia is currently top-heavy; Skopje accounts for almost half of the country’s population, and is the center of all financial, governmental and business activities. The “wild west,” centering on Tetovo, is for all intents and purposes lost to the Albanian warlords who now, remarkably, hold ministries in the government.
The major reward for them to lay down their weapons in 2001 was the much-ballyhooed Ohrid Accord, by which the country’s “oppressed” Albanian minority was given more rights. One of these was the further decentralization of the government and greater input from local government. Although this was designed mainly to placate the Albanians of Tetovo, Gostivar, Debar and Struga, there could be other effects in other parts of the country than the West.
Take Kumanovo. Located almost halfway between Skopje and Kriva Palanka, just beneath Serbia, Kumanovo is the regional capital of a geographical area that defies state borders. It is the most important city for at least 35 kilometers in all directions. It sits on a plain between mountains- to the northwest lie the mostly Albanian villages of Slupjane, Matejche and Vaksince, where the fiercest fighting of the war took place and where Albanian-friendly imported mujahedin were allegedly found. Kumanovo gets its water from the Lipkovo Dam, also in this area. The Albanian NLA cut off the supply of drinking water to the Kumanovo area by taking over Lipkovo Dam during the war.
Kumanovo itself is ethnically-mixed. Tensions in city rose during the war, but did not spill over into violence because of appeasements from cool-headed local officials. But as was seen, the city is susceptible to the activities of hostile mountain villagers. No wonder why the fiercest fighting took place here- if the NLA had managed to take control of the Kumanovo corridor, they could have come much closer to ringing Skopje from east, north and west.
From the Bulgarian border, the highway to Kumanovo goes in a fairly straight line, then veers south to Skopje and further south to Veles. From there a major part of it continues to Bitola in the south and west to Ohrid. This is what is known as “Corridor 8.”
During the war, many suggested that securing Corridor 8 was a strategic goal of the Americans and NATO- intervention, went the argument, was required neither to save Macedonia nor to give the Albanians equal rights, but merely to secure the interests of Big Oil. The Albanians had been set up to start a war to arrive at this result.
This argument- though pleasing to cynics of the West- does not seem to have happened, per se. If it had, then wouldn’t the shovels and cranes surely be working away to dig the route for AMBO?
The truth is that nothing has happened, and investors have not materialized. Since 1994, it has been a struggle for AMBO backers to get the interest of US government backers and investors. True, there was a $560,000 grant for a feasibility study provided by the TDA, but little else. Attention under the Clinton Administration was centered on the BTC. Bush’s tenure has been entirely taken up the drama of terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Suspicions rose that AMBO president Ted Ferguson, a former head of Brown and Root’s energy division, would have benefited from the appointment of Dick Cheney as vice president, since Cheney was the former president of Halliburton (which owns B&R). In Macedonia, the connection was made when Brown and Root set up shop near- you guessed it- Kumanovo and Corridor 8.
However, this branch of B&R was the civil engineering division- not energy. And, while B&R did execute the TDA feasibility study a few years ago, their future involvement in the project is not a given.
To reverse the case for suspicion, one wonders why such a well-connected bunch have not made greater strides than they have. Surely, if it were all part of a clandestine US plan, the AMBO work would again have already started? But the backers of the project are still waiting for funding. Admittedly on a larger scale, they are no different from the NGO’s or other small companies looking for grants or investments. Before selling a product, they have to sell an idea.
A crucial tangent here is the effect an oil pipeline would have on Macedonia’s strategic geography. Already, Corridor 8 features an as-yet unfinished superhighway (by Macedonian standards, at least), a gas pipeline, and contains on Kumanovo’s western periphery the headquarters of Brown and Root and NATO, as well as the giant OKTA oil refinery. Some believe that the hills south of the city also contain a clandestine American radar base.
AMBO backers affirm that a large military presence would be required to protect the pipeline. Even without one, would-be terrorists probably wouldn’t be able to find it, buried inconspicuously 6 meters underground.
Were an oil pipeline to be built, and the rest of the highway constructed, Macedonia’s north-eastern quadrant would all of a sudden assume much greater importance than it does now. Along with the Ohrid Accord’s decentralization of power, the beefed-up military presence might guarantee security for the area. The whole thing would become one big buffer zone.
However, this might involve a displacement of population. Low-lying, mostly Macedonian villages might need to be emptied to create space for the pipeline and its security corridor. Where would those people go? And, as we are finding now in Georgia with the BTC, would controversies arise over land compensation?
In one scenario, the hills bordering Serbia would be left to the Albanians to do with as they wished. The area would be largely forgotten by the state- as it is now. But the “good stuff” below would be protected. And, though Macedonian security forces have had a hard time justifying their duties for national defense purposes, they would no doubt have an easier time justifying their duties for purposes of corporate defense.
While it may be somewhat cynical to say, this is a reality in the Balkans today- corporate defense is perceived to be national defense. Tired of apparent petty nationalism, the West is only interested in ways of preventing ethnic clashes. Economic revitalization, goes the theory, ineluctably brings about happy people doing happy things. An oil pipeline, therefore, would help mend ethnic divisions- or at least help bring about economic normality in Macedonia.
These views are somewhat na�ve, however. Balkan ethnic polarization is not a simple matter of economic disparity between ethnicities, or of general pessimism that leads somehow to violence. The American sense of identity is constructed largely on economic grounds; immigrants can be a bona fide American by plugging into the system. That simple kind of identification does not hold for most of the rest of the world- and certainly not in the Balkans. This disparity has not, however stopped the Americans from believing that their view of the world is a magic and all-purpose remedy for localized world problems.
At this point, however, Macedonia needs all the help it can get. And even if the country’s national security can only be provided by reference to other, extra-national interests, at least it will be provided. Or at least for the part east of Kumanovo, Veles and Bitola.
Since the west is perhaps lost forever, does AMBO represent a long-envisioned means of preserving at least part of the Republic? There will come a day when Macedonia- through cantonization or outright loss of territory- ceases to exist. Contingency plans have therefore to be made. Is it too much to consider that AMBO could be one- not against Macedonia, but for it, as a realization of a foregone conclusion?
