Iraq after Saddam - the next Yugoslavia?
Online commentary: Will the model for post-Saddam Iraq be post-war Japan or Yugoslavia after 1992? A former US Ambassador argues that too little is being done to ensure that the right choices are made after a war
Robert L
Barry
Sunday February
9, 2003
The
Observer
Following Colin Powell's
presentation to the UN Security Council, war with Iraq seems virtually
inevitable. This could be done without a new Security Council resolution - but
the United States and the United Kingdom would own the problem of what to do
with Iraq on the morning after Saddam goes. Our publics are not prepared to take
on this burden, and more time is needed to develop support for a large scale
multilateral effort at nation-building.
The central question concerning post-Saddam Iraq is whether we will be
looking at Yugoslavia in 1992 or Japan in 1945. Based on my years in post-war
Bosnia, the Yugoslav parallel seems compelling. There are strong separatist
movements in both countries. Both have neighbours which would pull it in
different directions, both are awash in arms, and bloody reprisals will likely
take place in Iraq as they have in the former Yugoslavia. Political parties care
more about gaining control of resources and state industries than about
introducing democracy. Corruption and a weak justice system discourage foreign
investment. The military and police and judiciary need to be rebuilt from the
ground up. And outside help is urgently needed to repair war damage and
deteriorated infrastructure.
In the former Yugoslavia we have dealt with these problems through a major
effort at nation-building, involving tens of thousands of peacekeeping troops,
thousands of civilian experts from the UN, NATO, the EU, OSCE, the World Bank,
the IMF and more than 50 nations around the world. Yet a decade later the job is
far from done, despite the expenditure of somewhere close to $100 billion. There
is little sign that serious preparations are under way to deal with post-Saddam
Iraq.
The first question to face on the morning after is who is in charge. If Jim
Hoagland of the Washington Post is correct, President Bush has decided to assign
responsibility to the US Department of Defense, with US Central Command
commander General Tommy Franks in command, assisted by a civilian political
adviser.
If the past is any guide, the US Defense Department will be eager to get out
of the business of running Iraq, especially since the one thing all Iraqi exile
groups oppose is a US military government. The idea of a UN civil administration
has been mentioned, but no planning for this, or even UN relief operations, can
begin without the backing of the Security Council. A UN administration would
also be unpopular with many Iraqis and would be slow to mobilize and expensive
to maintain. Another option is the appointment of a High Representative of the
international community, drawn from among the "coalition of the willing". Lord
Paddy Ashdown, who fills this role in Bosnia, has learned that this model
fosters dependence, is very expensive, and is difficult to end.
Another urgent question concerns the size of the occupation force and the
duration of their mandate. Most reporting points to the need for some
75,000-100,000 troops. The US and the UK could not sustain a force of this size,
given the need to rotate units to their home bases and maintain readiness
elsewhere. So a new coalition of the willing would have to be created to
maintain the peace - or the US and UK standing armies would have to be increased
significantly to meet the demand. Based on NATO's experience in Bosnia and
Kosovo, peacekeepers will have to remain on the ground for at least five years.
On the morning after Saddam goes, there will be an immediate need for
large-scale international assistance, to rebuild and provide relief. The costs
of rebuilding the infrastructure, even in the absence of major war damage, are
likely to be huge. A donors' conference, such as followed the victory over the
Taliban in Afghanistan, is the usual first resort of the international
community. But the Afghan donors' conference was notable for pledges that were
never redeemed, and given resentment in Europe over US and British policies in
Iraq, a major contribution by the EU would be a surprise.
If war comes, it will not be about oil, but what to do with the oil fields
which will be occupied in the opening days of war will be a major headache.
Rival Kurdish groups and the Turks may come to blows over the rich fields around
Kirkuk, an area which Saddam has "cleansed" of its original Kurdish and Turkmen
population. Much has been made of the possibility of using Iraqi oil revenues to
finance rebuilding the economy, but increasing production or even restoring
production will be slow, and will depend on foreign investment. Who will decide
what to do about Iraq's billions in external debts, for example to Russia and
France?
Faced with these alternatives and given the US Defense Department's distaste
for nation building, a possible "exit strategy" would be to toss the ball to
Iraqis as soon as decently possible. This was the course the US aimed at in
Bosnia, believing that elections within a year would enable NATO forces to
withdraw. As we learned to our regret, premature elections aggravated the
problem.
In some quarters in Washington talk of finding a secular authority figure,
possibly a general who might emerge as an early defector from Saddam, has
replaced talk about a democratic Iraq inside its current borders. This would be
a short-sighted solution.
Secretary Powell made the case that Saddam Hussein is in material breach of
Security Council Resolution 1441, and that inspections are not the answer. But
turning to the our publics and the international community on the morning after
Saddam goes with a request for help in cleaning up the mess left behind will not
be good for Iraq, the Middle East or the transatlantic relationship.
Giving diplomacy more time will produce a Security Council resolution, even
if not unanimous, which will be needed to mobilize the support of governments
for a major effort at nation-building in Iraq. That time can be well used to win
the support of our own publics for taking on a burden larger than war.
Robert L Barry, a retired US Ambassador, headed the OSCE mission to
Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1998 to 2001 and is a member of the board of the British
American Security Information Council.
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