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There is growing concern over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which undermines global security. Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. national security adviser during the Jimmy Carter administration and currently counselor of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, offered his thoughts on this subject in an interview with The Asahi Shimbun. He said mishandling of the North Korea crisis could create conditions in which Japan finds itself facing overwhelming pressure to become nuclear power. To prevent such a dangerous and uncertain situation, Brzezinski underlined the necessity of a collective response to the crisis. Following are excerpts of his interview with Yoichi Nishimura, chief of the newspaper's American General Bureau in Washington, D.C.: Q:WMD have not been found in Iraq and the postwar management turns out to be anything but smooth. Currently there is a huge debate over the credibility of U.S. intelligence and the legitimacy of American global leadership. What do you think about this situation? Credibility a major assetA:American global military credibility has never been higher. American global political credibility has never been lower. And this paradox is a serious challenge to American global leadership. The lack of credibility over the issue of WMD is damaging the United States in two significant ways. First of all, it undercuts public confidence in America. Once that confidence is gone, it will be more difficult to mobilize public support for important objectives. Exactly the same is true internationally. In order to lead the world effectively, it is not enough for America to have a strategic sense of direction. Its leadership has to be viewed as legitimate, which means that it has to be focused on objectives that are shared by others. And America must be extremely cautious and responsible for what it says and what it does. One of the reasons why so many governments believed that Saddam Hussein had WMD is not that they had their own independent sources of information, but they automatically assumed that if the United States says it is so, it actually is so. Credibility is a major asset and tremendous advantage for America. Therefore, it should not be wasted. Q:British Prime Minister Tony Blair asserted that history would forgive the two leaders, even if links between terrorism and WMD never materialize, and even if WMD are never found. He claimed this is because the U.S. and British armies destroyed ``a threat that is responsible for inhuman carnage and suffering.'' What do you think? A:It is clearly the case that Saddam Hussein's regime was a criminal one and it is good that it is no longer in power from a moral point of view. But one cannot conduct foreign affairs simply on the basis of such moral imperatives. If they were to be the basis for international action, then one could undertake military attacks against a great many other governments, which have also been guilty of inhuman treatment of their people. However, the moral imperative by itself does not take into account other considerations. And the other considerations were that Iraq allegedly posed a serious threat to security and that its removal eliminated that threat. The reason for the military invasion was due to the allegation that Iraq was well-armed and that it imposed an immediate physical threat. The decision to invade was due to a combination of two factors: one is a serious security concern and, secondly, a strong emotional desire to eliminate the regime. However, we now know that militarily Iraq was not a military threat. There was a propensity to exaggerate the poor intelligence and to pretend that what we may know or we may assume is, in fact, a statement of accurate reality. And we know that it was not. Q:Haven't you said before that North Korea was a much greater threat than Iraq? A:The problem is the unchecked movement by North Korea toward the acquisition of significant nuclear capability. It is estimated that if North Korea has plutonium, it may have as many as six nuclear weapons by the end of this year. If it is capable of producing highly enriched uranium, it could produce 55 nuclear weapons a year. This is a serious development and the probability of war is certainly increasing. There is no doubt that if North Korea is permitted to be armed with nuclear weapons and is then in a position to sell them, the geo-strategic condition of the Far East will be fundamentally altered in a negative way. Q:How should we respond? A:It is essential that we give North Korea a proposition that it cannot afford to reject. It has to be a proposition, which, on one hand, is attractive, dealing with its economic problems, but at the same time is a fully verifiable arrangement to dismantle nuclear capabilities. It is also important to make it clear that North Korea would confront very serious consequences if it refuses the proposal. Unilateral pre-emptive attackAn embargo is effective only if adjoining countries, notably China, Japan, South Korea and Russia, participate. We have to make it very clear to all of these countries that if they refuse to participate in such an effort, the consequences have to be rather dramatic. Either the United States unilaterally takes pre-emptive military action or, in different ways with different impulses, Japan and, eventually maybe even South Korea, become nuclear powers. Q:Do you think there is a possibility of Japan becoming a nuclear power? A:What I'm saying is that if North Korea is not induced with positive incentives to accept full verification and a complete rollback, then the options are either an embargo in which everybody else participates or unilateral military action by the United States. If neither of those two takes place, conditions would be created in which there is overwhelming pressure for both Japan and South Korea, or just for Japan alone, to acquire nuclear weapons. It will be very difficult to predict consequences for relations with China, and it will significantly destabilize the region. In brief, we will be entering a dangerous and uncertain world. Q:The problem with a pre-emptive strike in North Korea is that it could result in massive retaliation with conventional forces, which could not be eliminated pre-emptively. A:A pre-emptive attack is obviously an extreme action and carries many risks. It is not an action that could be undertaken lightly. It could only be undertaken if there were far greater certitude as to what actually is happening in North Korea. The recent difficulties over intelligence with regards to Iraq maximize the uncertainties involved in this action. Moreover, as you indicated, it could precipitate a large-scale conventional conflict. This is why a pre-emptive attack may not be as attractive an option as an embargo. However, again, an embargo requires the participation of other states. This makes it all the more important that there be a collective response. Q:What kind of an impact will the U.S. military transformation and reconsideration of worldwide basing requirements, now under way by Secretary of Defense Ronald Rumsfeld, have on Japan's role in the American strategy? A:Japan and Europe are major allies that are an integral part of America's own security position in the world. There may be practical modifications in the way troops are deployed, what kind of troops are deployed, and for what purposes. But I don't think it entails any change in the geo-strategic and political significance of either Europe or Japan. |
