Inside Track: Kosovo at the Crossroads

 

by Steven E. Meyer

09.05.2007 

Arguably, the future of Kosovo is now at its most important juncture since the 
crisis in 1999. For the past eight years almost nothing has been accomplished 
to resolve the Kosovo issue. By and large, the fault for this can be laid at 
the doors of the major Western powers. Their lack of imagination, innovation 
and creativity in attempting to resolve the problem has been the major 
impediment. Western efforts have been arbitrary and capricious, blind to the 
realities on the ground and offering solutions that serve their own interests 
rather than those of the people in Serbia and Kosovo.

At the same time, Belgrade and Pristina have mostly talked past each other in 
anger, when they talked at all. But, for the most part they waited for the 
major powers to provide answers and assumed no concrete, meaningful initiative 
of their own. As a result, Kosovo has joined the long list of dangerous “frozen 
conflicts” and if positive action—action that can be “owned” by Belgrade and 
Pristina—is not taken soon the Kosovo issue will become “unfrozen” through 
violence.

But, all of that is about to change. Since the Kosovo issue has been moved out 
of the United Nations and to the Contact Group, there is a genuine opportunity 
for Belgrade and Pristina to agree on a compromise settlement. But the window 
of opportunity will not be open long before violence flares again and the 
conflict “re-freezes”—as it certainly will if Pristina declares independence 
unilaterally. To take advantage of the opportunity, however, it is necessary 
for both Belgrade and Pristina to recognize six hard realities—some of which 
are unpalatable to one side or the other.

Six Realities

First, the Ahtisaari Plan is dead and, despite calls by some UN members and 
political commentators to resurrect parts of it, this is very unlikely to 
happen. Events have moved well beyond Ahtisaari’s proposal to create a series 
of ethnically stove-piped communities in Kosovo. At its heart, the Ahtissari 
plan was an attempt primarily by the United States, the UK, France and Germany 
to force a settlement on both Serbs and Albanians that avoided ground reality 
and served the interests of those countries much more than the interests of 
those who live in the region. The collapse of the Ahtisaari Plan means that, if 
there is to be any hope of a permanent settlement, the United States and its 
West European allies will have to include the Serbs and Albanians as true 
partners in meaningful negotiations.

Second, U.S. influence has diminished. Although Washington may try to restore 
some of its clout in the full Contact Group, the comments of the EU and Russian 
representatives on the troika that visited Kosovo recently have effectively 
undercut the American position. Several times during the Troika’s “fact finding 
trip”, EU representative Ischinger and Russian representative Botsan-Kharchenko 
said that “nothing is impossible” and that everything is “on the table.” This 
is a positive development. The evolving position of the EU and Russia easily 
could lead to a “negotiating period” longer than the additional 120 days 
allotted by the UN Security Council. If so, Washington might be tempted to 
unilaterally “recognize” an independent Kosovo. But, this would be a very risky 
move because it could cause serious strains with European “allies” and put the 
United States at odds with the widely accepted view (especially in the EU) that 
the construction and recognition of new states requires the approval of the 
United Nations. In the wake of the debacle in Iraq, Washington cannot be seen 
to be so dismissive of international law and procedures.

Third, officially Belgrade and Pristina remained locked in a nasty, dangerous 
zero-sum game that, if it is not broken, almost certainly will hasten violence. 
All levels of power in the Albanian community insist that independence of 
Kosovo—within its current boundaries—is the only course acceptable and that 
Pristina will not back away from this position. By the same token, Belgrade 
says that the only acceptable solution is for Kosovo to remain within Serbia, 
albeit with considerable autonomy. Indeed, the new Serbian Constitution 
stipulates that Kosovo is a Serbian province. At the same time, there is a 
glimmer of hope in Belgrade because some officials have begun to suggest that 
perhaps they might be willing to back away from this hard line.

Fourth, multi-ethnicity is dead in Kosovo. By and large, survey research as 
well as anecdotal information indicates that most Serbs and Albanians do not 
want to live together in the same society or to be governed by a government 
controlled by the other ethnic group. At times multi-ethnic states have 
“worked” in Europe and at times they have not. But the general trend—despite 
some notable exceptions—over the past century has been for states in Europe to 
be controlled by a single ethnic or cultural group. The point was well 
demonstrated after World War I with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, 
German and Ottoman Empires, and since the end of the Cold War by the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. It would be 
ideal perhaps if ethnicity were not a determining factor in the construction of 
political communities in the Balkans today. But, it is a reality despite the 
wishful thinking of well-meaning but naive Western policy makers.

Fifth, a surge of new violence in and around Kosovo likely will lead to renewed 
outside military intervention. The major powers of Western Europe and the U.S. 
almost certainly will not allow the Western Balkans to spin out of control 
again. Although this will not lead to a “permanent NATO” base in Kosovo as some 
in Serbia have argued, it almost certainly will lead to a stronger Western 
military presence in the province that could last for several years. Although 
the Europeans likely would shoulder the bulk of any new military undertaking, 
it is also possible that there would be some limited number of additional U.S. 
forces deployed to Camp Bondsteel. The introduction of more troops to Kosovo 
would be designed primarily to separate warring Serbs and Albanians, but it 
also likely would set back efforts to find a permanent political and security 
solution.

Sixth, in the final analysis, the Kosovo issue is primarily about ethnic, 
territorial sovereignty. It has been erroneously argued—mostly by officials and 
scholars from outside the region—that territorial sovereignty is passé. As 
their argument goes: The entire region someday will (hopefully) be part of the 
European Union and, when it is, traditional state or territorial sovereignty 
will be far less important. Moreover, they argue, focusing on such a 
traditional conception of sovereignty will only delay the accession of the 
countries in the Western Balkans to the EU. Sadly, this reasoning misses the 
fundamental point. With the establishment of the EU and the end of a thousand 
years of violent nationalism based on state sovereignty, traditional state 
sovereignty has become much less of an issue in Northern and Western Europe. 
But the Western Balkans is in a different place. There, issues of state 
sovereignty have not been worked out and they need to be resolved before the 
countries of that area can hope to move to a different understanding of 
sovereignty. Moreover, most people in the Western Balkans understand that EU 
membership and, especially, the full benefits of that membership still are a 
long way off—if it happens at all—and they are going to have to rely on 
national prerogatives and regional associations for many years to come.

A Way Forward

If these six realities are deemed accurate and accepted by the political 
leadership in Serbia and Kosovo, and it is possible for them to bargain in good 
faith and come to agreement on four basic points they could—in time—construct a 
permanent settlement on the future of Kosovo.

First, both sides need to accept the fact that a negotiated partition, with 
attendant border adjustments, can provide the basis for an equitable—not 
perfect—division of territory. Although partition has been discussed throughout 
Serbia by officials and scholars, it has not been sanctioned officially in 
Belgrade. The Albanian side adamantly has rejected any consideration of 
partition, but Pristina needs to reconsider this position or risk violence and 
the unilateral declaration of independence by Serbs north of the Ibar River.

Logically, partition—and a new border—would be established along the Ibar 
River, with the northern part remaining with Serbia and the southern part 
becoming an independent Albanian state. This is no one’s first choice, but it 
can work if Belgrade and Pristina accept the rationale of ethnic territoriality 
and the right of the other side to territorial sovereignty. There is not now 
and there never has been anything sacred about borders—especially in Europe (as 
well as the United States). Borders have changed in Europe for 2000 years for a 
variety of reasons and the spate of border changes throughout Central Europe 
and the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War demonstrates that the 
configuration of states can change peacefully—if there is the political will to 
do so.

Second, partition and border changes alone will not be enough. Certainly, it 
will be necessary to get past a period of painful adjustment, including some 
violence by “rejectionists” on both sides. Moreover, there are many Serb holy 
and historic sites and Serbs south of the Ibar and some Albanians north of the 
river. As part of any negotiated settlement that accepts partition, the United 
States, Russia and the EU, perhaps through the UN, need to guarantee the safety 
of the sites, Serb access to them and the minority populations in both ethnic 
communities that chose to remain on the “wrong side” of the border—to include 
sanctions against the governments that do not protect their minorities from 
harm or discrimination. For those Serbs and Albanians who cannot remain where 
they are now and chose to leave, the UN needs to establish a substantial fund 
to relocate them to other political communities.

Third, an innovative settlement needs to go even further to consider a broader 
realignment in the Western Balkans. Specifically, the most likely candidate is 
the Republika Srpska. There is little doubt that most the leaders and citizens 
of the RS do not want to be part of Bosnia and, if they had their way, they 
would have left Bosnia many years ago, either to become independent or part of 
Serbia. There also is little doubt that Bosnia is a “forced” state—one that was 
arbitrarily willed into existence by the United States and the major powers of 
Western Europe and has “failed” to live up to its patrons’ hopes and 
expectations.

Consequently, Banja Luka and Belgrade should have the right to discuss whether 
the RS and Serbia should be linked and under what circumstances, so long as 
those circumstances are validated in a democratic vote by the people of the RS. 
Although this same logic could be applied to the relationship of the Presevo 
Valley with an independent Kosovo, it cannot be stretched to apply to western 
Macedonia, where the Ohrid Agreement, has—at least for now—“settled” the ethnic 
issue, or to Sandjak or Vojvodina, where there is no major agitation for 
independence from Serbia.

Finally, once the political and security underpinnings of an agreement have 
been reached, negotiations should begin immediately between Belgrade and 
Pristina on economic cooperation. Despite some encouraging economic news in 
Serbia, most important indicators in Kosovo and Serbia proper are not good, 
especially with respect to unemployment, per capita income, foreign debt and 
trade. Consequently, irrespective of whether a political and security 
settlement can be reached, a poor regional economy almost certainly would sow 
the seeds of new instability in Kosovo, Serbia and beyond.

The key to economic growth and prosperity is multilayered. First, it would be 
necessary for Belgrade and Pristina to identify specific areas that need 
serious attention and genuine potential and agree on a bipartisan plan of 
development (for example, hydroelectric power in Kosovo, the Trepca mines along 
the border between Serbia and Kosovo, and agricultural programs in southern 
Serbia and Kosovo). Once Belgrade and Pristina have identified likely areas of 
economic cooperation, then—and only then—it would be possible to approach the 
EU for technical and financial support. Although the Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe (established in 1999) has been a relatively weak instrument 
thus far, it is possible that Working Table 2 on economic development could 
provide a useful vehicle to establish productive programs between Serbia and 
Kosovo.

Steven E. Meyer is professor of National Security Studies in the Industrial 
College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University in Washington, 
DC. The views expressed here are those of the author alone.

http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=15444

Other Articles by Steven E. Meyer:

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03.30.07

The Risks of an <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=13934>  
Imposed Settlement

The Kosovo issue is far from resolved, and acceptance and imposition of the 
Settlement Plan by the Security Council could lead to renewed violence and 
instability, and have repercussions far beyond the Western Balkans.

                        
                

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