On 3/6/07, John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On 3/5/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > You seem to be equating intelligence with consciousness. Ned Block also > seems to do this in his original paper. I would prefer to reserve > "intelligence" for third person observable behaviour, which would make the > Blockhead intelligent, and "consciousness" for the internal state: it is > possible that the Blockhead is unconscious or at least differently conscious > compared to the human. > I think the argument also works for consciousness but I don't think you're right if you are suggesting that our ordinary notion of intelligence is merely third person observable behavior. (If you really were just voicing your own idiosyncratic preference for how you happen to like to use the term "intelligence" then I guess I don't really have a problem with that so long as you are clear about it.)
Our ordinary notion of intelligence involves consciousness, but this term until relatively recently was taboo in cognitive science, the implication being that if it's not third person observable it doesn't exist, or at least we should pretend that it doesn't exist. It was against such a behaviourist view that the Blockhead argument was aimed. Stathis Papaioannou ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?list_id=11983
