On 30/06/07, Heartland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Objective observers care only about the type of a person and whether it's intantiated, not about the fate of its instances (because, frankly, they're not aware of the difference between the type and an instance). But since I know better, I would be sad about dead instances. The point is whether I'm sad/upset or not about a fact not does change that fact.
Most people would be upset by the prospect of their death, and if death is interruption of brain processes, they should be upset by this. However, it is your definition of death which is at issue. If someone chose to objectively define death as replacement of a certain proportion of the matter in a person's brain, what argument would you use against this definition? -- Stathis Papaioannou ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&id_secret=9939388-6c0916
