On 04/07/07, Heartland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Right, but Heartland disagrees, and the post was aimed at him and > others who believe that "a copy isn't really you". Stathis, I don't subscribe to your assertion that a person after gradual replacement of atoms in his brain is a copy.
Yes, I'm aware of that, and my question was, if I were to assert that after gradual replacement of a certain proportion of atoms a person is no longer the same person, what counterargument would you use? You can't argue that it's false because you feel yourself to be the same person despite atom replacement, since that argument also applies in the case of process interruption. -- Stathis Papaioannou ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&id_secret=10835325-8a30fd
