--- Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 09/09/07, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > Your dilemma: after you upload, does the original human them become a > > > > p-zombie, or are there two copies of your consciousness? Is it > necessary > > > to > > > > kill the human body for your consciousness to transfer? > > > > > > I have the same problem in ordinary life, since the matter in my brain > > > from a year ago has almost all dispersed into the biosphere. Even the > > > configuration [of] matter in my current brain, and the information it > > > represents, only approximates that of my erstwhile self. It's just > > > convenient that my past selves naturally disintegrate, so that I don't > > > encounter them and fight it out to see which is the "real" me. We've > > > all been through the equivalent of destructive uploading. > > > > So your answer is yes? > > No, it is not necessary to destroy the original. If you do destroy the > original you have a 100% chance of ending up as the copy, while if you > don't you have a 50% chance of ending up as the copy. It's like > probability if the MWI of QM is correct.
No, you are thinking in the present, where there can be only one copy of a brain. When technology for uploading exists, you have a 100% chance of becoming the original and a 100% chance of becoming the copy. > > > > So if your brain is a Turing machine in language L1 and the program is > > recompiled to run in language L2, then the consciousness transfers? But > if > > the two machines implement the same function but the process of writing > the > > second program is not specified, then the consciousness does not transfer > > because it is undecidable in general to determine if two programs are > > equivalent? > > It depends on what you mean by "implements the same function". A black > box that emulates the behaviour of a neuron and can be used to replace > neurons one by one, as per Hans Moravec, will result in no alteration > to consciousness (as shown in David Chalmers' "fading qualia" paper: > http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html), so total replacement by these > black boxes will result in no change to consciousness. It doesn't > matter what is inside the black box, as long as it is functionally > equivalent to the biological tissue. On the other hand... I mean "implements the same function" in that identical inputs result in identical outputs. I don't insist on a 1-1 mapping of machine states as Chalmers does. I doubt it makes a difference, though. Also, Chalmers argues that a machine copy of your brain must be conscious. But he has the same instinct to believe in consciousness as everyone else. My claim is broader: that either a machine can be conscious or that consciousness does not exist. > What is the difference between really being conscious and only > thinking that I am conscious? Nothing. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&id_secret=39985876-d99aeb
