On 13/09/2007, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I think the usual explanation is that the "split" doubles the number > > of universes and the number of copies of a brain. It wouldn't make any > > difference if tomorrow we discovered a method of communicating with > > the parallel universes: you would see the other copies of you who have > > or haven't observed the atom decay but subjectively you still have a > > 50% chance of finding yourself in one or other situation if you can > > only have the experiences of one entity at a time. > > If this is true, then it undermines an argument for uploading. Some assume > that if you destructively upload, then you have a 100% chance of being the > copy. But what if the original is killed not immediately, but one second > later?
In that case, you have a 50% chance of ending up the original and 50% chance of ending up the copy. If you end up the original, you then have a 100% chance of dying, which I think of as the inability to anticipate any future experiences. My preferred way of looking at these questions is to acknowledge that there is no self persisting through time in any absolute sense, but rather a set of observer moments which are only contingently related. One instance of me considers certain other instances past selves and certain other instances future selves. The future selves' experiences are anticipated while the past selves' experiences are not even though both have equal claim to being "me". Worse, the future selves' experiences are anticipated even if they occur in the actual present or past, as in a block universe or in a simulation running backwards. If we attempt to impose the naturally evolved sense of self onto unnatural scenarios involving uploading and duplication, the result is what I have been trying to describe in terms of survival and subjective probabilities. I don't actually believe that my self somehow transfers into my upload; I know that as a matter of fact, I will die. But neither do I believe that in everyday life my self transfers into the next instantiation of my brain with every passing moment. I am willing to admit that I live only transiently and the sense of a persisting self is a kind of illusion. However, I would like that illusion to continue in the same way as long as possible, and destructive uploading will do just that. > These problems go away if you don't assume consciousness exists. Then the > question is, if I encounter someone that claims to be you, what is the > probability that I encountered your copy? I can ask the same question for myself: if I find myself thinking I am me, what is the probability that I am the copy? -- Stathis Papaioannou ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&id_secret=41463669-259d6d
