Juha (and Francois),

What I miss in the discussion and draft is the reason why transport=tls was deprecated, namely that TLS by itself is not a transport. The transport is either TCP or SCTP, TLS is the security layer on top of that

The "TLS" value for Via transport in RFC3261 should really be read as "TLS-TCP", just like there is now TLS-SCTP defined in RFC4168. The latter does *not* define a "tls-sctp" value for the 'transport' parameter (i.e. does not extend the definition for 'transport-param'), because it is not needed: the use of TLS is solely determined by the URI scheme

"sip" ==> you MAY use TLS (but then upgrade the scheme to "sips:" in the request sent out) "sips"==> you MUST use TLS (with possible exception for last hop, i.e. sips request URI rewritten by proxy to a sip URI obtained from a registered Contact)

RFC3261 also implicitly discusses the possibility of a "first hop exception", i.e. a UAC using a "sips:" scheme but not TLS (16.6 point 4). Note that it does not consider the reverse case of using TLS without "sips:" as scheme. Some implementations may use 'transport=tls' for this case, but it is - and should remain - deprecated (i.e. ignored if received, never generated).

For received Contact and Record-Route headers, it should be mandatory to maintain state information regarding the transport that was used towards that hop, and whether TLS was used or not. These are 2 separate items. The latter is covered by the "secure" flag in RFC3261, for proxies RFC3261 assumes that "sips <==> use TLS" holds, so there is no need for separate state for proxies regarding the use of TLS.

Regards,
Jeroen



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