I agree with Mike here.
People are clearly tolerating a less than ideal situation in the pstn.
Many know that the mechanisms for securing the callerid (and the media)
are not 100%, but they think they are also more than 0% and are willing
to tolerate the level they get.
We ought to be pulling the percentages up, rather than down. E.g. being
able to assert that the information is accurate back to the nearest PSTN
gw is better than not.
Paul
Michael Thomas wrote:
> Elwell, John wrote:
>> Paul,
>>
>> That is not quite what I meant. I meant that for PSTN interworking there
>> is no point in trying to do anything more secure on the SIP hop than the
>> security provided by the PSTN hop and anything beyond the PSTN. Security
>> is only as good as the weakest link. So let's try to be as good, but not
>> better. In the SIP world we can try to be better.
>>
>
> Hold on a second. Doesn't SIP have the concept of redirection? That is,
> even if I use a tel: URL I might get redirected to another device which
> doesn't ever touch the PSTN?
>
> It sure seems to me that the prudent thing to do is *always* use the
> best security you can instead of trying to divine whether it's going
> to end up being on a less secure path.
>
> Mike
>
>
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