Adam, I am confused how we got here. As I said in a response to Dean a few minutes ago, I think a level-of-trust parameter could work. Dean explained the different options of UASs on receiving information in both PAI and From.
John > -----Original Message----- > From: Adam Roach [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: 14 March 2008 14:18 > To: Elwell, John > Cc: Dean Willis; IETF SIP List > Subject: Re: [Sip] The thing we're missing in the RFC 4474 > andDTLS-SRTPdiscussion > > On 3/13/08 7:07 PM, Elwell, John wrote: > > > > > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On > >> Behalf Of Adam Roach > >> > >> I'll reiterate my key point here at the top: we cannot > retroactively > >> change the behavior of deployed user agents. All we can do is > >> make sure > >> what we're proposing doesn't make do stupid and/or useless things. > >> > >> More inline. > >> > >> On 3/13/08 6:26 PM, Dean Willis wrote: > >> > >>> On Mar 13, 2008, at 1:58 PM, Adam Roach wrote: > >>>> On 3/13/08 11:59 AM, Dean Willis wrote: > >>>> > >>> That;s why John proposed P-AI-ID as the Caller-ID source. > >>> > >> The phone on my desk would treat that like any other unknown > >> header, and > >> ignore it. > >> > > [JRE] Many phones do recognise P-Asserted-Identity and use that in > > preference to an unsigned From URI. It is difficult to find > a solution > > that will not upset any existing deployed device, but we > can at least > > try to make it work acceptably with a sizeable population. > > > > > So we've gone from warning "don't implement internet-drafts" > to "don't > implement RFCs"? It seems folly to pull the rug out from > under existing > user agents when we've already identified at least one approach that > seems to satisfy the keying requirement without breaking existing > deployed equipment or making assertions that can't be verified by the > asserter. > > Do you have a concrete objection to my proposal to tag the > signed URI as > having a level of trust that is less than absolute? > > /a > _______________________________________________ Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for questions on current sip Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for new developments on the application of sip
