Dean Willis wrote:
On Dec 8, 2008, at 1:22 PM, Jiri Kuthan wrote:
Dean Willis wrote:
On Dec 8, 2008, at 8:49 AM, Jiri Kuthan wrote:
Elwell, John wrote:
[JRE] The number of negatives will diminish, true, but it will never
approach zero, because there will always be negative cases arising
from
forking, call forwarding, problematic B2BUAs, etc..
indeed.
So it is a question
whether it will get sufficiently close to zero that the odd false
negative can safely be ignored. I am rather doubtful.
The question remains: why would like to worry about the negative case
when we know it has zero information value?? I cannot conceive anyone
would like to use such non-information and I don't see the point in
studying it then.
How would DERIVE change the behavior of the user in the positive case?
That's a policy thing. Perhaps (as an example) increase a call atempt
score
beyond a threshold that will prevent the call from falling in voicemail.
How would DERIVE change the behavior of the user in the negative case?
not at all.
Well, the Security area wonks are going to want us to have a threat
assessment. What is the risk? In what scenarios does it occur? What are
the consequences?
Given the threat assessment, we then need to understand how the solution
impacts that threat. What are the possible ranges of policy? What is the
recommended policy? How does it impact behavior in a system that uses
this solution?
Thanks, that's helpful, we will try to address it in -01. Hadriel's list
was excellent input too.
-jiri
--
Dean
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