> On 6 Nov 2018, at 20:09, Mike <st...@yakamo.org> wrote: > > I don't think "resilient" can be used any more in relation to sks-keyservers > as they drop offline on and off and even one malicious individual could take > the whole network down if motivated enough.
Individual servers drop on and offline but the network as a whole is more robust. It is easy to take down the entire network of course, but this is very noisy. It is very hard to selectively prevent only a particular revocation from being served by the keyservers. Most other methods of distributing keys allow for selective blocking of one domain or even one address. A _______________________________________________ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org https://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
