Hello, On 07.11.2018 18:17, Tobias Mueller wrote: > That said, I think we can store revocations in the CT logs s.t. we can > at least have integrity protection and non-equivocation for those. Both > properties which we currently do not have when fetching them from the > key server.
Mozilla experimented with storing release hashes of Firefox in CT logs: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Binary_Transparency They used Merkle tree so the amount of data stored is small (just the tree head) compared to the OpenPGP revocation. Kind regards, Wiktor -- https://metacode.biz/@wiktor _______________________________________________ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org https://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
