So it seems like the usual response is to ignore the fatal issues that could affect this network. 6 months on from the first set of PoC's and no one has stepped forward to fix them - they have only attempted to defend the network through pride. How is anyone meant to trust infrastructure run by people who avoid problems like this?
As usual, people keep burying their heads in the sand with nothing more than excuses. Something as simple and small as a Raspberry Pi could down the entire network. "Resilient against governments"? I don't think so! These servers no longer provide the function they once promised, and this needs to be addressed by the leading figures of the community with direct and clear responses, not excuses! I believe that Kristian is the main spokesperson? He has never once stepped forward and commented on any of the issues. Kind Regards Yakamo On Wed, 07 Nov 2018 10:13:06 +0100 Werner Koch <w...@gnupg.org> wrote: > On Tue, 6 Nov 2018 17:27, a...@datenreisen.de said: > > > I do roughly recal that such a verification process has been discussed for > > the SKS keyservers at one of the pgp-summit before, but i wonder what > > happened to the idea. However, if it that is “good enough” to be compliant > > This requires that there are no rogue keyservers in the network and that > in turn means that they are under the control of a single entity. Or > in short, let Google take care of it. > > Such verification will be a single point of failure and it would be > trivial for governments or corporations to take down a key. > > > Shalom-Salam, > > Werner > > -- > Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -- me <st...@yakamo.org> _______________________________________________ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org https://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
