http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=332#more-332
 
Chronicles Online, Wednesday, September 19, 2007
 
THE PRESIDENT’S ROAD TO NOWHERE
by Srdja Trifkovic
 
Last Thursday President George W. Bush delivered a major speech on Iraq,
after weeks of carefully orchestrated White House campaign that sought to
shift the terms of debate about the war in his favor. Delivered in the stern
tone of a sub-headmaster aware of the breakdown of discipline, Mr. Bush's
speech merely confirmed what we have known for years: that he has no
strategy for ending the war, and no ability, or willingness, to devise one.
He confuses transient tactical successes of the “surge” with strategy, and
fails to grasp that military efficiency is merely the precondition for
political creativity. Four and a half years after he plunged into his Iraqi
adventure, Mr. Bush is still “staying the course”. . . to nowhere.
 
The President opened with the assertion that, in Iraq, “an ally of the
United States is fighting for its survival.” He asserted that “terrorists
and extremists who are at war with us around the world” are the same as
Prime Minister al-Maliki’s domestic foes: their goal is to “dominate the
region, and attack us here at home. If Iraq’s young democracy can turn back
these enemies, it will mean a more hopeful Middle East and a more secure
America. This ally has placed its trust in the United States. And tonight,
our moral and strategic imperatives are one.”
 
The claim that Iraq is America’s “ally” that “has placed its trust in the
United States,” is ridiculous: A comprehensive BBC/ABC News poll released
last week shows that in two key areas—security and the conditions for
political dialogue, reconstruction and economic development—more than two
thirds of Iraqis say the U.S. “surge” has made things worse. Since last
February, the number of Iraqis who think that US-led coalition forces should
leave immediately has risen sharply, from 35 to 47 percent. Furthermore, 85
percent of Iraqis “have little or no confidence” in US and allied forces. 
 
These results will make grim reading for a country that is supposed to be a
“young democracy” allied to America. In addition, sixty-one per cent of
Iraqis say they have little or no confidence in the national government, and
exactly two-thirds disapprove of Nouri al-Maliki’s handling of the job of
prime minister. As the BBC commentator has noted,
 
“The Bush administration will no doubt be deploying many statistics and
examples to argue that there have been security improvements in the last six
months, as well as some glimmers of political progress, that mean the surge
should be given more time. And administration supporters may argue that
there is bound to be a lag between actual events on the ground and public
perceptions of them. But in the war of nerves that continues in Iraq,
perceptions and public opinion are critical elements. The surge was meant to
provide a breathing space in which political progress could make headway.
This survey suggests that the public atmosphere in which any political
reconciliation must take place remains hugely challenging.”
 
In other words, Iraq’s “allied” population heartily loathes the helper no
less than the Czechs loathed their Soviet rescuers from the clutches of
“counter-revolution” in August 1968. But the notion of an “alliance” with a
predominantly Muslim country has been a Washingtonian pipe-dream for
decades. At all times at has rested on wishful thinking, ideological schemes
devoid of empirical basis, and plain ignorance of the Muslim mindset.
 
The President invoked the testimony of General David Petraeus to Congress to
assert that “conditions in Iraq are improving, that we are seizing the
initiative from the enemy and that the troop surge is working.” It was
noteworthy, however, that he had replaced the goal of “victory,” advanced in
his previous speeches, with that of “success” in his latest address. He paid
a tribute “to an Iraqi government that has decided to take on the
extremists” and should now proceed to achieving reconciliation.
 
Only one day later, however, and with no pomp, the White House issued a new
report which stated that the government of Iraq had made almost no progress
in achieving stability and reconciliation across the country’s
ethno-sectarian divide. The report suggested that in previous two months
Prime Minister al-Maliki and his team had made headway on only two of the 18
stated “benchmarks” for political progress. The assessment further validated
the findings of the National Intelligence Report announced last August and
the Government Accountability Office report published on September 4. In
addition, the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, headed
by retired Marine Gen. James Jones, determined on September 6 that the Iraqi
army “cannot yet meaningfully contribute to denying terrorists safe haven.”
All four studies flatly contradicted Mr. Bush’s claim that political
progress was being made to match military improvements.
 
The highlight of Mr. Bush’s speech was his announcement that 21,000 American
soldiers would be withdrawn by next summer. He failed to mention that those
troops would have to be withdrawn anyway—unless he were to extend
deployments of units due for rotation, which would be politically
disastrous. If effected, the announced withdrawal would merely bring the
number of American soldiers in Iraq back to the pre-surge level of last
January. But since the target of his speech was not so much his Democrat
opposition as the Republicans weary of the war, the President’s domestic
objective may have been attained. The promise of even partial pullout has
bought him another six months with several wavering GOP Senators, and he
needs to hold the support of only 34 of them to sustain a presidential veto
of any unwanted mandates Until next spring at least, the Democrats won’t be
able to muster enough Republican votes to break a Senate filibuster and pass
legislation that would impose a withd
rawal timetable.
 
Buying more time is meaningless in the absence of a strategy to end the
war—and Mr. Bush has none. He is staying the course to nowhere. His last
attempt at devising a coherent strategy, as presented last January, treated
the military “surge” as a tactical device to buy time for the Iraqi
government to achieve reconciliation and bridge sectarian divides. That
expectation had always been the weak link in his plan. It postulated the
favorable development of a “known unknown” that is, and has always been,
outside American control. According to Mr. Bush’s own standards, which were
established when the surge was announced, the strategy has failed: Iraq’s
collapsed society has been unable to develop institutions and mechanisms
capable of bridging ethno-sectarian divides.
 
A rare moment of technical accuracy in Mr. Bush’s address came when he said
that “the vision for a reduced American presence . . . has the support of
Iraqi leaders from all communities” and that American engagement will extend
beyond his presidency. The former has been true ever since the occupation
began. The latter is inevitable since Mr. Bush is both unwilling and unable
to contemplate a plan that would enable the United States to start
disengaging before January 2009. On current form, as per Gen. Petraeus, we
shall need five to ten years for Iraq to be stabilized enough that U.S.
forces may withdraw.
 
Iraq is with us to stay, then, and even after Bush a hasty withdrawal would
be neither prudent nor moral. American interests are threefold: to disengage
without appearing utterly defeated, to leave behind the least undesirable
status quo by separating warring factions into three self-governing units,
and to counter as much as possible the advantage gained by America’s rivals
and enemies. In particular, the creation of an anti-Shia, anti-Iranian,
nationalist Sunni-Arab entity in central and western Iraq would be the best
possible bulwark to Ahmadinejad’s intention to create a Tehran-dominated
belt that would extend over Iraq and Syria to the Hizballah-controlled
redoubt in southern Lebanon.
 
Mr. Bush has warned that if we were to be driven out of Iraq, “extremists of
all strains would be emboldened” and the country would face a humanitarian
nightmare. Of course the quagmire is of his own making—Iraq gave a boost to
al-Qaeda’s propaganda, recruitment and fundraising and provided a targeting
and training area for terrorists—but a hasty withdrawal would indeed turn
the current disaster into catastrophe. His successor will inherit the moral
obligation to the people of Iraq to make amends for his predecessor’s
criminal folly by managing disengagement in the least harmful manner
possible. In addition, an obvious humbling of America by the combined
efforts of al-Qaeda, the Badr Brigades, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army et al
would do wonders for the jihadist cause world wide.
 
The President’s reiterated vision of “a free Iraq,” “critical to the
security of the United States,” which will deny al-Qaida a safe haven,
“counter the destructive ambitions of Iran,” “an anchor of stability in the
region,” and “our partner in the fight against terror,” is unattainable.
Devising a viable disengagement strategy demands discarding the illusion
that Iraq can be a “democracy” as well as an American “ally.” Yes, said
Austrian Emperor Franz II, on being told that a certain gentleman was a
patriot, “but is he a patriot for me?” When praising democracy in Iraq and
elsewhere in the Middle East, Mr. Bush should ask himself if the project’s
actual or potential beneficiaries are democrats for us.
 
Iraq can be ruled as it had been ruled before March 2003, and as the bulk of
the Arab world is still ruled today: as an autocracy, with occasional sham
elections perhaps, but with a firm hold of the security services on the
political life always. Such an Iraq could indeed be a partner of sorts, like
the Hashemites in Amman or Hosni Mubarak are American partners. A “free
Iraq,” on the other hand—free from American military presence, and with the
ruling political elite representative of the will of the majority of its
citizens—will either disintegrate into three monolithic ethno-religious
entities, or else it will become a Shi’ite-dominated theocracy closely
allied with its neighbor across the Shat-al-Arab, with Sharia as the law of
the land.
 
 
Dr. S. Trifkovic, Foreign Affairs Editor
CHRONICLES: A Magazine of American Culture
http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?cat=4
www.trifkovic.mysite.com
 
 
 
 


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