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---------- Sent from my Nokia phone ------Original message------ From: John Ashworth <[email protected]> To: "Group" <[email protected]> Date: Wednesday, April 3, 2013 11:50:49 AM GMT-0400 Subject: [sudan-john-ashworth] Conflict dynamics in South Kordofan 1. ‘New War, Old Enemies: Conflict Dynamics in South Kordofan’ [attached] The Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan project is pleased to announce the release of a new Working Paper: ‘New War, Old Enemies: Conflict Dynamics in South Kordofan’, by Claudio Gramizzi and Jérôme Tubiana, now available for downloading at http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP29-S.Kordofan.pdf This Working Paper describes the first year of renewed war in South Kordofan (June 2011–July 2012), focusing on the conduct and dynamics of the conflict and the primary armed actors. It also identifies shared weapons and ammunition holdings based on detailed accounts of materiel seized, as well as photographs and first-hand physical inspections. While the war in South Kordofan is fundamentally a conflict between primarily (Northern) Sudanese actors for control of the state, it also has clear cross-border implications—as SAF’s air strikes in Unity state and the Southern fighters’ temporary seizure of the Hejlij oil fields attest. This paper reviews these border aspects of the conflict and its impacts on relations between Khartoum and Juba. Key findings include: The rebels appear to have made significant gains in the first year with some 30,000 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) troops and allied forces capturing a large part of the Nuba Mountains area. The involvement of a relatively small contingent (700–1,000) of experienced Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) fighters was crucial to rebel victories. Prior to and just after Southern independence, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) sent thousands of ethnic Northern SPLA soldiers to South Kordofan fully armed with small arms, heavy weapons, and tanks, providing a significant source of fighters and weapons for the rebellion. In the post-independence period, however, the Small Arms Survey has found no evidence of weapons supplies from the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) to the SPLM-N, though some political and logistical support is evident. Rebel seizures of SAF weapons and vehicles between June 2011 and April 2012 provided their most valuable military resources, allowing SPLM-N to preserve its strength and making it less reliant on military supplies from outside the country. Much of the rebel arms and ammunition obtained through capture from SAF were of older vintage, mainly Soviet-type small arms, light weapons, and their ammunition originating from Bulgaria, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. Captured Sudanese and Chinese-made weapons and ammunition were more recently produced. SAF superiority in South Kordodan is limited to its control of the skies. As in its Darfur campaign, the use of adapted Antonov cargo planes and military aircraft for bombing has not led to military advances but has succeeded in terrorizing and displacing the local population. There is strong evidence that SAF has employed cluster bombs and incendiary weapons in South Kordofan. The presence of anti-personnel landmines in the stores captured from SAF, subsequently used by SPLM-N, was also documented, while reports on the the use of chemical weapons during SAF offensives remain unverified. SPLM-N and JEM fighters are present on both sides of, and regularly cross, the border between South Kordofan and South Sudan’s Unity state. They have been also operating in areas of South Kordofan claimed by the GoSS, notably around Jaw, Hejlij, and Kharasana. But the Northern rebels are not proxies of South Sudan, as Khartoum asserts. Despite the important links between them, the SPLM-N has a distinct political and military agenda from that of the SPLA. Solving the North-South conflict will not be sufficient to solve the South Kordofan problem. The conflict in South Kordofan is, in the first place, an internal Sudanese issue rather than a mere ramification of North-South tensions. Even if South Sudan further severs its links to the SPLM-N, the war, with an increasingly national agenda, will continue to threaten both national and regional stability—just as the conflict in Darfur has survived the Chad-Sudan rapprochement. ‘New War, Old Enemies’ is the 29th Working Paper published by the Small Arms Survey’s HSBA project. All previous Working Papers and Issue Briefs are available in English and Arabic at http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org For interviews related to this publication, please contact Jonah Leff, HSBA Project Coordinator, at [email protected]. END1 2. The SPLM-N Is Ready To End The War And To Go For A National Constitutional Conference In the last two weeks, the leadership of the ruling National Congress of Sudan made a number of statements ahead of the expected negotiations between the SPLM-N and the Sudan Government. Among them are the statements of the Minister of Defense and the First Vice President, Ali Osman Taha. In both statements, they emphasized that the talks will only discuss the issues of the two areas on the basis of the CPA of 2005. It is the same National Congress leadership that refused the CPA articles that are dealing with Sudan and the two areas. They went to war refusing to implement the CPA. It is the same leadership that denounced the June 28, 2011 Agreement. We do not need to remind the National Congress that the coming negotiations are on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2046, and they are meant to resolve, in the first place, the catastrophic humanitarian situation and to reach a political settlement on the basis of the June 28, 2011 Agreement as per the UN Security Council Resolution and the Africa Union Resolutions. This attempt by the National Congress leadership is meant to undermine the UN Security Council Resolution 2046 and the African Union Resolutions and to delink resolving war issues and realizing peace without addressing the issue of democracy. And again, it meant to deal with the issues of the marginalized areas without changing the policies of the center in Khartoum and avoiding transforming the country towards democracy. We can only achieve national reconciliation by addressing the root causes of the problem. The SPLM-N is committed to the African Union Resolutions and to the UN Security Council Resolution 2046 and on the basis of those resolutions would like to present the following initiative to the National Congress leadership and to all Sudanese political forces, civil societies, and women and youth independent organizations. It is to be recalled that the June 28, 2011 Agreement stated the need for an inclusive constitutional process and therefore, the SPLM-N is ready for: 1) An immediate humanitarian cessation of hostilities in the two areas that will stop the war, open the humanitarian corridors, and cement the buffer zone between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan 2) Using the same humanitarian model, we can stop the war in Darfur and guarantee the safety of the civilian populations 3) The creation of a conducive atmosphere for the national constitutional conference by guaranteeing freedoms including freedom of organization and the press 4) Release of all political detainees and the exchange of prisoners of war 5) The convening of a national constitutional conference for all political forces and civil society members with the presence of regional and international organizations and through the AUHIP and its Chairperson, Thabo Mbeki , and the Chair of IGAD as they are the third party of the June 28, 2011 Agreement and they were also tasked by the UN Security Council to implement Resolution 2046. 6) The national constitutional conference to agree on a new constitution and to hold democratic elections with international observers. The attempt by any party to dilute UN Security Council Resolution 2046 will in fact undermine the peace process. Yasir Arman Secretary General, SPLM-N March 27, 2013 END2 ______________________ John Ashworth Sudan, South Sudan Advisor [email protected] +254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile) +211 919 695 362 (South Sudan mobile) +27 82 050 1235 (South Africa mobile) +44 750 304 1790 (UK/international) +88 216 4334 0735 (Thuraya satphone) PO Box 52002 - 00200, Nairobi, Kenya This is a personal e-mail address and the contents do not necessarily reflect the views of any organisation -- -- The content of this message does not necessarily reflect John Ashworth's views. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, John Ashworth is not the author of the content and the source is always cited. You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "sudan-john-ashworth" group. 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