Why Tunisia is not Egypt – By Mourad Teyeb
July 8, 2013
Following recent events in Egypt, in Tunisia there have been some
calls, mostly from minor opposition groups and individuals, to rebel
against the country’s governing Troika. Many in the country are now
wondering whether the recent Egyptian scenario is applicable to
Tunisia.
For me, as for many analysts, the opposite is true: Tunisia has
already witnessed at least two coup attempts in the last couple of
years – 9 April 2012 and 6 February 2013, the day of Chokri Belaid’s
assassination.
Both attempts were aborted for two reasons:
The Islamists in power and their CPR and Takattol allies, thanks
to their popularity on the ground and due to the support of LPR groups
(Revolution Protection Leagues, pro-Ennahdha) succeeded in containing
the events and even turning them to their benefit
The army in Tunisia has avoided any direct or indirect
interference in politics.
Through a big effort made by former Interior minister, and present PM,
Ali Larayedh in purging the security services from corrupt and highly
dangerous officials, the governing Troika in Tunisia succeeded in
neutralising a vital player: the police. The government now enjoys the
support of both the army and the police (which Morsi and his
government failed to achieve).
“Inclusive”, rather than majoritarian, political order
Ennahdha, the leading Islamist party, chose from the beginning to
share the power with two serious and recognised secular, left-wing
political parties. On many occasions, Ennahdha agreed to deal with
their opponents, even those who overtly and fiercely rejected any role
Islamists could play in the country. The biggest and most powerful
opposition party, Nidaa Tunis, was created during the rule of the
Troika. Although they have always stood on opposing extremes, and
despite the tension that marked their relationships, neither Ennahdha
nor Nidaa publicly adopted policies that exclude one another.
Ennahdha also made remarkable political and ideological concessions,
mainly regarding the Constitution (now being debated by the
Constituent Assembly). It voted against Sharia Law in the constitution
and against the criminalization of the normalization of ties with
Israel. And the Troika agreed to “neutralise” key ministries when
appointing the Larayedh cabinet.
Through these measures, the Tunisian government managed to reduce
potential criticism over ‘despotism’, but it also succeeded in
involving the largest political actors in the debate and decisions
over democratic transition.
And with the Constitution draft today ready to be voted on by the NCA,
the Troika succeeded in involving the Tunisian people in the
democratic decision-making process and convincing the international
community of its sustainability.
Unlike Tunisia, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) failed to
involve their competitors in the democratic process. This made it easy
for their opponents to unite against them, to mobilize the streets
and, thus, gave an alibi to the army in its intervention.
While the opposition in Tunisia has always been divided over political
issues that have appeared during the past two years, Morsi’s regime
united the opposition and Fuloul and was often isolated despite
support of the millions who voted for him in the May 2012 elections.
And with a big part of his cabinet coming from outside the MB, he
finished by facing an angry street and a very strong SCAF alone.
An improving situation on the ground
The economic situation in Tunisia has improved during 2013. Tourists
are back and investors are flooding in from Turkey, the Gulf
countries, the UK, US and France – the country’s most important
economic partner.
That was not the case in Egypt, where little was achieved on the
ground for many reasons linked both to Morsi’s performance and to the
so-called “counter-revolution” forces and the corrupt heavy businesses
and politicians who survived from the Mubarak era.
People in Egypt and Tunisia are already vulnerable to influence from
popular politics over the objectives of their respective Revolutions –
mainly the reduction of poverty and job creation. Nothing will
guarantee their patience better than palpable achievements on the
ground.
In Tunisia, net progress has been achieved over security, consumer
prices and investment. The period of national school and university
exams went smoothly and government decisions on prices ahead of
Ramadan were welcomed by the people.
This has not been the case in Egypt. The challenge was admittedly much
greater and more complex than in Tunisia – partly, at least, because
of the population numbers.
When the opposition was resurrected against his rule, helped by
enormous media propaganda, Mohamed Morsi appeared to have no concrete
defence. His insistence on legacy and legitimacy did not convince many
Egyptians, nor his “ex-allies”, such as the EU and the US government.
Tunisia’s successful PR
The ruling Islamist party in Tunisia multiplied efforts, including
successful PR actions, to convince the Europeans and the Americans
that they are a moderate party and that they are the biggest defenders
of democracy.
Only last week, PM Larayedh was in Brussels and Germany. Many Western
leaders have visited Tunisia in the last past year-and-a-half – the
most recent being France’s François Hollande. And a lot of
high-profile business, political and social events have been organised
in the country, with a remarkable participation from the traditional
defenders of Liberalism and Secularism.
On May 31, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted
Rached Ghannouchi, co-founder and president of Tunisia’s Ennahdha
Party, for a special address on the future of Tunisian Democracy.
Direct contact and exchange visits of high-ranked officials has helped
Tunisia diffuse a positive image of its democratic transition and the
2013 World Social Forum (held in Tunis) communicated an image of a
stable, modern and prosperous Tunisia.
Morsi and the MB claim to be pro-democracy, too. But they were so
caught in every-day problems (without resolving any of them) that they
forgot to express their intentions and explain their strategies to
their Western partners and the wider international community.
Unlike Egyptians, Tunisians have historically been pro-peace and
stability. They are today so keen to see the transition period over
that they seem very unlikely to respond to the voices calling them to
‘rebel’.
Finally, whether Tunisia will witness similar rebellion or not will
be, to my mind, decided to a large extent by the outcomes of the
Egyptian “Coup”.
Ordinary Tunisians have always rejected all forms of violence, those
perpetrated both by Islamist and secular groups and individuals.
People’s reactions to Ansar Al-Sharia events last May confirm that and
recent calls by the Popular Front (a coalition of left-wing radical
groups) for demonstrations and sit-ins over the last two weeks were a
failure.
With events in Egypt turning to deadly clashes, Tunisians will think
very hard before supporting any action against the democratic process
in their country.
Mourad Teyeb is a Tunisian journalist.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"South Sudan Info - The Kob" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/SouthSudanKob/CAJb14or%2B24rCrSAv2SguDKkTBhTv0ZZVnJFwW66K53PF7LNXbA%40mail.gmail.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
