Governance in Africa – a strong case for power-sharing and collective
action – By Keith Somerville
Posted on November 11,
2013<http://africanarguments.org/2013/11/11/review-governance-in-africa-a-strong-case-for-power-sharing-and-collective-action-by-keith-somerville/>by
AfricanArgumentsEditor<http://africanarguments.org/author/africanargumentseditor/>

*David Booth and Diana Cammack, Governance for Development in Africa:
Solving Collective Action Problems
<http://www.zedbooks.co.uk/paperback/governance-for-development-in-africa>,
London: Zed, 2013, pp.160, £16.99*

This excellent and commendably succinct book – developed from ODI’s Africa
Power and Politics <http://www.odi.org.uk/node/16031> programme – is a
breath of fresh air in the debate on governance in Africa. From the start
it argues clearly for a reappraisal of ideas of good governance which have
provided the foundations for much of the western world’s approach to
development in Africa.

Not only do they correctly point to the fact that ideas of good governance
have been based far too much on the political systems of the North, but
that even in taking a potentially inappropriate model they do so from an
“a-historical view.” This view, argue Booth and Cammack, “takes
insufficient notice of the fact that Western states did not become economic
powerhouses (from the 1750s onwards) and that China and the Asian Tigers
did not grow their economies in the twentieth century, by adopting good
governance institutions.”

They also identify a key structural problem of African societies when it
comes to the sort of economic development advocated by Western governments,
financial institutions and African elites - the lack of a capitalist,
entrepreneurial middle class, and other socially homogenous classes, able
to take collective political or economic action. Rather, the business class
or community is still in the process of formation, and is not “independent
of state patronage”.

In the extraverted, gatekeeper-dominated political and economic systems
that dominate in Africa, “politics is a more lucrative and reliable source
of livelihood than productive investment”, far from creating good
governance in an open, participatory and collective manner, multi-partyism
has strengthened “the tendency for policy-making to be driven by the needs
of constructing and maintaining a supportive client base by allocating
benefits in a discretionary way.”

Export earnings and domestically generated profit are not invested to
achieve greater growth and economic transformation, but either for building
and maintaining patronage networks or are salted away in investments and
foreign banks.

The growth in political participation has led to more active client
networks and shifting alliances of patron and clients – the ever-changing
political alliances in Kenya between 2007 and 2013 being an excellent
example.  This perpetuates the use of both public and private investment
resources for projects linked with patronage and elite wealth accumulation,
rather than efficient, sustainable economic development.

What is the answer? The authors do not have a miracle cure, but using
examples drawn from an examination of health policy and maternal care in
Rwanda, suggest that aspects of both decentralization and power-sharing
that encourage collective action and the development of coherent policy
frameworks are  better ways forward.  These offer more chance of
sustainable development and service delivery than other models which rely
on governments or other institutions as principal agents for development,
service delivery and aid provision. These methods allow no control over the
principal agents or those chosen to implement policy, no basis for
collective action involving national and local levels or between service
providers and those receiving services.

The authors point out that there has too often been an assumption that
African leaders and also their citizens have a simple and “uncomplicated
commitment to improving governance and the provision of public goods.” This
is not so and African political systems have been unable to encourage
collective action in systems tainted by corruption.

The authors suggest that power-sharing – used with some success, though not
necessarily in a traditional, Western systems or electoral democracy – has
been relatively successful in Rwanda and even Burundi (countries in the
past beset by communal conflict and attempted genocide).  They acknowledge
the downsides to power-sharing in terms of democracy, but contend that at
this stage of development what is important for Rwanda’s development is
“the remarkable level of policy stability and coherence” that has been
achieved.

They argue in favour of “locally anchored” solutions “tailored to the
specific details of the context (not generic, one-size-fits-all, remedies)”
that “make efficient use of whatever already exists locally to serve such
purposes.”  They might have used the example of Somaliland’s political
institution-building, which uses traditional and clan networks in an
innovative and collective way, to illustrate a participatory and
accountable system based on local conditions and practices free
from Western prescription.

Booth and Cammack are also absolutely right in their cautious approach to
Africa’s growth spurt, eschewing the popular ‘Africa Rising’ motif.  They
emphasise that growth alone through increased export income “is not
bringing widespread productivity gains or leading to structural change” and
that while smallholder agriculture (employing the bulk of the population)
remains untransformed, growth will be neither broad nor deep.
Transformation of and investment in smallholder production is vital to
increase output and provide more employment and prevent economic and
political marginalization of rural areas.

Until the issue of policy coherence and the development of collective
action are tackled, then progress is going to be negligible in terms of
development, living standards and the creation of systems of governance
with local foundations rather than transplanted systems with no local
roots. To the aid community, they suggest working more effectively at arms
length rather than attempting to deliver stuff in the way outsiders see as
appropriate.

*Keith Somerville is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of
Commonwealth Studies, University of London; teaches in the School of
Politics ad International Relations at the University of Kent; and is
editor of Africa – News and Analysis.*
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