The Tragedy of Borno State: Local Dimensions of Boko Haram’s
Insurgency – By Michael Baca
Posted on December 19, 2014 by AfricanArgumentsEditor
Shekau
Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau represents a radicalisation of
Mohamed Yusuf’s original movement which directed its ire at northern
elites, primarily in Borno state.
Boko Haram has yet again made international media headlines, this time
through its alleged kidnapping of nearly 200 civilians from the
village of Gumsuri in Borno State. Much of the current commentary on
the Salafi-jihadi group frames its insurgency as a violent contest
against the Nigerian state. This depiction agrees with the narrative
put forth by Boko Haram chieftain Abubakar Shekau in his video
communiqués, which identify Boko Haram’s ultimate goal as being the
establishment of an Islamic polity on the ruins of secular Nigeria.
Boko Haram has purportedly carried out terrorist attacks in cities
throughout the country, including Lagos and Abuja, while its members
continue to target Nigerian government’s agents.
However, as with politics, all insurgencies are local. If Boko Haram’s
violent defiance of Abuja represents a national-level struggle, the
Nigerian extremist movement is also engaged in a more provincial
conflict concentrated in Borno State and seemingly driven by parochial
rivalries fueled by class, generational, and, to a lesser extent,
ethno-religious tensions. The Kanuri, Borno’s most populous ethnicity,
serve as the chief protagonist of this internecine war, dominating
both Boko Haram as well as the regional political establishment that
largely opposes it. Non-Kanuri communities in southeastern Borno also
feature prominently, especially since Nigeria’s 2013 military
offensive reportedly ejected many Boko Haram militants from the
state’s urban centers. It is this local violence that has thus far
claimed the majority of the lives lost to the Boko Haram insurgency.
Borno State consists of two distinct cultural zones. The northern and
central territories contain a Kanuri majority, with communities of
ethnic Shuwa Arabs and Fulani scattered throughout the area.
Overwhelmingly Muslim, these sub-regions have in recent decades
received a sizable number of Christian southerners, who prior to the
Boko Haram insurgency made up a key component of the commercial class.
Meanwhile, the southern third of Borno features a collection of
minority ethnicities. Although some follow Islam, many, including
those in the vicinity of the now infamous town of Chibok, practice
Christianity and/or indigenous religions.
Nestled in the foothills of the Mandara Mountains that straddle the
Nigeria-Cameroon frontier, these populations retained their autonomy
prior to the colonial era, fiercely resisting incursions by Muslim
Kanuri and Fulani slavers. Reverberations of these clashes continue to
shape ethno-religious relations in Borno, with southerners bemoaning
what they perceive as their political marginalization at the hands of
the Kanuri.
Despite their ethnicity’s dominance of the Borno government, most
Kanuri also find themselves largely disenfranchised. At the apex of
Kanuri society sits an oligarchy whose members trace their families’
initial wealth to lucrative commercial ventures during the colonial
period. Slightly less prominent are Borno’s traditional rulers,
descendants of the aristocracy that controlled the old Borno Empire
(c. 1380-1893) that once held sway over much of modern-day
northeastern Nigeria. Below these two groups lie the Kanuri commoners
(tala’a or talakawa). The vast majority of tala’a resided in the
countryside as peasants until the 1970s oil boom, when many streamed
to Borno’s capital, Maiduguri, and smaller towns in search of
employment opportunities, in part due to the stagnation of
northeastern Nigeria’s agricultural sector. Some succeeded, but many
more did not, forming instead a burgeoning, disaffected urban
underclass.
Borno’s economic dislocations threw the existing social system into
turmoil. Once revered traditional authority figures saw much of their
influence diminish while Islamic revivalist movements such as Salafism
started to gain adherents, particularly among younger generations.
Although most Salafis in Borno abstained from violence and
acknowledged the Nigerian state’s legitimacy, a substantial subset
gravitated toward the radical teachings of Mohammad Yusuf (1970-2009),
Boko Haram’s late spiritual leader. Much of Yusuf’s appeal stemmed
from his relentless criticism of a sociopolitical system that had,
from all appearances, abandoned large swathes of Borno society to
their own devices.
This revolutionary worldview placed Boko Haram on a collision course
with the Borno establishment. Tensions already existed during Boko
Haram’s nascent years in the early 2000s, when Yusuf reportedly
received support from former Borno governor (2003-2011) Ali Modu
Sheriff. Sheriff, who denies ever having links to Boko Haram, seems to
have hoped to burnish his reputation on the Kanuri street by providing
patronage to Yusuf but had no inclination to implement any of the
social reforms advocated by Boko Haram. And while Yusuf directed most
of his ire toward the Nigerian government and its northern allies, his
thinly veiled calls for economic redistribution ran counter to the
interests of the local elites. Such a dissonance strained Yusuf’s
relations with the Sheriff administration, ultimately contributing to
the July 2009 eruption in violence that left Yusuf and hundreds of
Boko Haram adherents dead.
Once Boko Haram regrouped under Shekau, Borno’s ruling class became
one of its primary targets. Boko Haram’s reputed victims include
Sheriff’s cousin and anointed political heir, the brother of Borno’s
preeminent traditional leader, and rural district heads. Some
observers still speculate that prominent Bornoan politicians played a
role in Boko Haram’s revival. While certain factions, perhaps to
weaken Sheriff, could have cynically sought to use the Salafi-jihadis,
Boko Haram’s relentless attacks on individuals tied to the
establishment suggest that what influence they might once have held
over Shekau and his followers has largely crumbled. In a region where
authority historically rested almost entirely in the hands of aged
males with considerable material wealth, the spectacle of armed Boko
Haram youths drawn primarily from the local masses overrunning hamlets
and violently dispatching members of the elite must surely have shaken
Borno’s social order to its foundation.
Of course, Borno’s political class has not stood idly by; current
governor Kashim Shettima enthusiastically backs the Civilian Joint
Task Force (CJTF), an anti-Boko Haram group that gained prominence in
the late spring-early summer of 2013. Reportedly instrumental in
curbing Boko Haram activities in Maiduguri, the CJTF stands accused of
carrying out many of the same heavy-handed tactics allegedly employed
by Nigerian security forces, including extrajudicial killings of Boko
Haram suspects. The CJTF’s campaign touched off a spike in
intra-Kanuri violence, as vengeful Boko Haram fighters slaughtered
villagers accused of backing the CJTF and clashed with vigilante
groups.
Boko Haram has concurrently entrenched itself in the areas of southern
Borno adjacent to the Cameroon border, the aforementioned heartland of
Borno’s Christian and polytheist populations. Predictably, this
development has led to a series of massacres and large-scale
abductions, with Salafi militants’ depredations echoing the bloody
19th century incursions by Muslim raiders on Borno’s hill communities.
These attacks have been so devastating that, according to one
anthropologist familiar with the troubled territory, a mass exodus of
non-Muslims has already occurred. The sub-region, long a redoubt of
resistance to Islamic expansionism, now ironically forms one of the
centers of Boko Haram’s self-proclaimed caliphate.
While characterized by many as a national challenge, Boko Haram’s
uprising remains first and foremost a Bornoan tragedy. Beyond
inflicting a staggering level of economic damage since 2009, the
insurgency has torn the local social structure asunder; any successful
reconstruction effort would need to treat Borno as a post-civil war
environment. Boko Haram’s relentless attacks on local traditional
authorities have probably dealt an irreparable blow to the old
hierarchy, leaving behind no obvious successor around which Bornoan
society could revive itself. In addition, the violence meted out by
predominantly Muslim Kanuri militants against minority populations
could translate into enduring ethno-religious animosities.
Then there is the fate of the Borno youths who have fought for either
Boko Haram or elite-sponsored vigilante groups. Even if Nigerian
security forces succeeded in vanquishing Boko Haram’s leadership
tomorrow, Abuja would still have to contend with these militarized
young men, many of whom have in all likelihood become socially
alienated due to their wartime affiliations. Bereft of their kinship
networks and with few employment prospects, they would almost
inevitably form a recruitment pool for future violent non-state
actors. Unfortunately for the inhabitants of Borno, such grim
prospects suggest that their state will remain wracked by strife well
into the future.
Michael W. Baca is an Africa analyst. The views expressed in this
article are solely those of the author.
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5 thoughts on “The Tragedy of Borno State: Local Dimensions of Boko
Haram’s Insurgency – By Michael Baca”
Aliyu Kadir says:
December 19, 2014 at 3:30 pm
Boko harm is a useless organisation killing people in the name of
politics, what a heartless and useless organisation finance by Nigeria
former president Ibrahim Babagida because of his political ambition
and he will never taste the seat of Nigeria president before he will
die, we have all transaction of 20 billion dollar of Nigeria stolen
money given to this useless organisation called Boko Harm here in US,
therefore we here can not assit you to fight Boko Harm , your Boko
harm problem is internal and as such must be solve internal also.
dan says:
December 19, 2014 at 6:29 pm
Interesting – what is sad is the loss of cultural tradition under
the Salafists, who enforce robot-like conformity and clone-like
identity. As the southern groups have a history on that land, they
should be helped to remain on it. Also, as non-Muslims, it is more of
a shock and loss to be forced to become radical Muslims.
Oluwole Williams says:
December 20, 2014 at 3:48 pm
The views expressed in your writing are very true and sobering. Of
most concern is the socioeconomic plight of the displaced youth
particularly those of the minority non-muslim tribes of Borno state in
Northern Nigeria. Where would they go and find some normalcy of a
future life and existence? This is a very huge responsibility for all
well-meaning Nigerians to provide sacrificial leadership, dedication
to these our brethren and and a concern for their future and the
future of their children. For those who care, it is a time for us to
come together, purchase land by philanthropy and begin a deliberate
social reintegration of these people elsewhere to keep them from an
oncoming religious genocide as happened to the Jews in the holocaust
of the 1940s
Jan Hazo says:
December 21, 2014 at 7:19 am
Interesting and engaging. The writer made a fair assessment of the
background leading to the current insurgency that Abuja has
appropriated for political interests. That said, however, there is
this missing element of the ruthless political elites that have come
to dominate Nigerian political space since the return to elected
officials from 1999.
It is worthwhile to note that there were no Local Government
elections in Borno state since the 1999 elections conducted by INEC
and that condition replicated itself all over the North with minor
changes here and there. The state executives have come to dominate in
absolute terms the Local governments including whatever franchise the
people may have exercised using the residual powers of the executive
and the rampant poverty and corruption that dominated Nigerian public
life.
These factors have contributed in no small measure to the
insurgency and inability or unwillingness of the Executive at both
local and national levels to end the scourage. This is due to the lack
of any viable fallback for the people affected because even after the
insurgency may have ended, they have no visible benefit from the
economic activities dominated by the the government using oil derived
revenue with little or no sustenance means of a decent living out
that.
Martin Plaut says:
January 3, 2015 at 5:40 pm
This is a really insightful article. I just wish we had more of
this kind of information about Boko Haram.
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