---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Jean-Francois Darcq <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, Jun 5, 2015 at 6:51 AM
Subject: Fwd: Khartoum's role in arming the rebels in South Sudan: A new
report from Conflict Armament Research (June 2015) provides conclusive
evidence
To: Elisabeth Janaina <[email protected]>



---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, Jun 2, 2015 at 11:17 PM
Subject: Khartoum's role in arming the rebels in South Sudan: A new report
from Conflict Armament Research (June 2015) provides conclusive evidence
To: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>


*Conflict Armament Research, June 2015 | DISPATCH FROM THE FIELD*

WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION AIRDROPPED TO SPLA-in OPPOSITION FORCES IN SOUTH
SUDAN

Equipment captured by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Jonglei State
in November 2014

http://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Weapons_and_ammunition_airdropped_to_SPLA-iO_forces_in_South_Sudan.pdf

*[ ER---*

Excerpts from this highly authoritative and amply researched report, which
provides overwhelming evidence of Khartoum’s material support for the *SPLA-in
Opposition (SPLA-iO),* follow a brief reprise of what military resources
senior security and military officials of the Khartoum regime committed to
provide to the *SPLA-iO* in a *meeting of August 31, 2014*. The upshot of
today’s report from *Conflict Armament Research* is that Khartoum—through
the airlifting of arms and ammunition in very substantial quantities to the
SPLA-iO—is prolonging and exacerbating the fighting in South Sudan, and
making peace negotiations all the more difficult.

This serves *Khartoum’s strategic purpose in weakening South Sudan* by
having Southerner fight Southerner—*as was the case during the long civil
war (1983 – 2005).* The leaderships of both the *Government of South Sudan* and
those claiming to represent the *SPLA-iO *have a great deal to answer for,
most significantly in refusing to find a way to make peace. But Khartoum’s
military support for the SPLA-iO makes this peace all the harder to
achieve, and keeps in the mind of *putative SPLA-iO leader Riek Machar* the
notion of military victory, which is impossible, but may not be fully clear
as such to Riek until many more tens of thousands of Southerners have died.

[image: iCLPQep87TJ4]
<http://sudanreeves.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/iCLPQep87TJ4.jpg>

*Riek Machar, putative leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army-in
Opposition*

I received leaked minutes of the August 31 meeting of senior regime
military and security officials in Khartoum
<http://sudanreeves.org/2014/10/22/new-and-exceedingly-accurate-translation-into-e/>
on
September 22, 2014 (the photographed *Arabic original text* may be found
here
<http://sudanreeves.org/2014/09/29/arabic-original-hand-written-english-translation-of-31-august-2014-meeting/>
). These minutes have now been fully confirmed as authentic
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/03/01/on-the-authenticity-of-minutes-of-the-military-and-security-meeting-held-in-the-national-defense-college-khartoum-31-august-2014-minutes-of-the-meeting-are-dated-1-september-2014/>,
at least as far as possible without a substantiated account of the “chain
of custody” for the text that came to me from a highly trusted Sudanese
source. Since such an account would obviously put at great risk the lives
of those who leaked these minutes, there should be no expectation of this
until the present regime has been deposed.

[image: page 34b]
<http://sudanreeves.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/page-34b1.jpg>

*Omar al-Bashir, the man who must be removed from power if Sudan is to have
any more hopeful future; indicted by the International Criminal Court for
multiples counts of genocide and crimes against humanit*y

I have subsequently received *three additional sets of minutes* whose
authenticity has again been authoritatively established:

June 3, 2014
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/05/28/the-minutes-of-the-security-and-military-committee-meeting-held-on-the-premises-of-the-high-academy-of-security-3-june-2014-part-1/>
(received
May 27, 2015; Arabic original text
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/05/28/minutes-of-june-6-2014-meeting-of-senior-military-and-political-officials-in-khartoum-original-arabic-text/>
)

July 1, 2014 <http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Cb> (received February 15, 2015; Arabic
original text
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/02/17/arabic-text-of-minutes-from-1-july-2014-meeting-of-senior-military-and-security-officials-in-khartoum-including-president-omar-al-bashir/>
)

September 10, 2014
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/04/04/newly-leaked-minutes-another-high-level-meeting-of-khartoum-regime-officials-10-september-2014-stands-revealed-april-4/>
(received
April 4, 2015; Arabic original text
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/04/04/arabic-original-text-of-minutes-for-10-september-2014-meeting-of-senior-khartoum-officials/>
)

Not a shred of textual evidence, or contradiction of known facts, has been
adduced to suggest the possibility of forgery. Indeed, *Jean-Baptiste
Gallopin of Yale University*, besides providing an exhaustively detailed
account of authenticity
<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20721/machiavelli-in-the-twenty-first-century_sudanese-s>,
has also made clear just how impossible a forgery would be in light of the
time-line of events before and after the *August 31 meeting.*

One issue of particular concern in the *August 31 meeting* was a commitment
by the regime to provide *strategically significant quantities of weapons*,
as well as critical military intelligence, to the rebel forces in South
Sudan, nominally the *Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in Opposition
(SPLA/iO)* (see a fuller account at http://wp.me/p45rOG-1sZ). I focused in
particular on statements by *Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein:*

"The people of South Sudan must accept to meet us and tell us their opinion
on the drawing of the zero line and the buffer zone.  If they refuse, *we
can deal with them in a manner that suits the threat they pose to us*. I
met Riek, Dhieu and Taban and they are regretting the decision to separate
the South and we decided to return his house to him. *He requested us to
assist him and that he, has shortage in the [Military Intelligence]
personnel, operations command, and tank technicians. We must use the many
cards we have against the South in order to give them unforgettable
lesson"* (page
22 – 23 of English translation).

[image: page 27 8.13.15 PM]
<http://sudanreeves.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/page-27-8.13.15-PM2.jpg>

*Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein, indicted by the
International Criminal Court for massive crimes against humanity*

I also noted comments by other senior military and security officials (a
shake-up in the upper military ranks, reported today, has changed the title
of some of these officials; see *Sudan Tribune, May 2, 2015
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55181>*):

*General Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, [former] Deputy Chief of Joint General
Staff:*

"We must change the balance of forces in South Sudan. Riek, Taban and Dhieu
Mathok came and requested support in the areas of training in [Military
Intelligence], and especially in Tanks and artillery. They requested
armament also. They want to be given advanced weapons. *Our reply was that
we have no objection, provided that we agree on a common objective.* Then
we train and supply with the required weapons…”

*“Now they [Riek and Taban] are fighting to achieve a federal system or
self-rule for each region. I think any self-rule for Greater Upper Nile is
good for us *in terms of border security, oil resources, and trade. *Now we
have to study how to enable them [on?] a well-trained force with efficient
[Military Intelligence] and logistic staff."* (page 16)

*General (PSC) Imadadiin Adawi, [former] Chief of Joint Operations:*

"[Juba is] still supporting the two divisions of Nuba Mountains and Blue
Nile *[This is simply not true in any significant sense now, if it ever
was—more self-reinforcing mendacity within the regime, used as a means of
explaining the crushing military defeats suffered earlier in the Nuba—ER**]*.
Accordingly, *we must provide Riek forces with big support in order to wage
the war against Juba and clean the whole of Greater Upper Nile area.” *(page
14)

*General Siddig Amir, [former] Director of Military Intelligence and
Security** expressed a* willingness to invade South Sudan surreptitiously :

"The South is still supporting the rebels with the aim to change our
government in Khartoum. In order to counter that danger, *we are
pre-empting them by a plan to infiltrate and empty the refugee camps* [*in
Unity State and Blue Nile State—ER*], recruit field commanders, and train
the sons of the war affected areas to fight and defeat the rebellion *[by
the SPLA-N—ER**].*" (page 11)

*Vice President and General Bakri Hassan Saleh**:* "Recognize *Dr. Riek’s
liaison office and provide all organs necessary for their protection and
security." *(page 28)

*These were not idle threats, as revealed by the **Conflict Armament
Research, June 2015 | DISPATCH FROM THE FIELD.  The report also works to
suggest the authority of the leaked minutes of August 31. ]*

****************************

*Conflict Armament Research, June 2015 | DISPATCH FROM THE FIELD*

WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION AIRDROPPED TO SPLA-in OPPOSITION FORCES IN SOUTH
SUDAN: Equipment captured by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Jonglei
State in November 2014

http://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Weapons_and_ammunition_airdropped_to_SPLA-iO_forces_in_South_Sudan.pdf

Fighting between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the SPLA-in
Opposition (SPLA-iO) forces has been ongoing in the Greater Upper Nile
region of South Sudan since December 2013. The town of Malakal in Upper
Nile state repeatedly changed hands during the first three months of the
crisis. On *19 March 2014, the SPLA secured Malakal and* surrounding areas
and maintained full control until mid-May 2015, when the SPLA-iO launched a
new wave of offensives in Upper Nile State. *[All emphases in **bold
and bold underline* *have been added---ER]*

Each party to the conflict captured military equipment during the fighting.
This *Dispatch from the Field *documents a sample recovered by the SPLA
from SPLA-iO forces in Pigi County, Jonglei State, in November 2014. The
sample, which a *Conflict Armament Research* *(CAR) *investigation team
examined in SPLA Sector II Headquarters in *Malakal on 11 December
2014*, *provides
important insights into the supply of weapons to SPLA-iO forces.*

*Notably, the weapons and ammunition documented display clear evidence of
damage sustained during airdrops to SPLA-iO units, which reportedly took
place in September–October 2014. Furthermore, the materiel is identical to
previously documented arms and ammunition airdropped by Sudan to rebels in
South Sudan in 2012, which provides strong indication of new, direct
supplies from Sudan to SPLA-iO operations.*

[image: _72489255_lank2]
<http://sudanreeves.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/72489255_lank2.jpg>

*Well armed rebel forces: how are they resupplied with weapons and
ammunition in Upper Nile, Jongeli, and Unity States---far from any overland
supply route?*

*KEY FINDINGS*

Most of the *ammunition documented had suffered heavy impact damage, which
is consistent with eyewitness reports that aircraft dropped materiel to
SPLA-iO forces in Upper Nile State* in *September–October 2014.** [note
dates that follow the August 31 meeting at which a commitment to support
the SPLA-iO was made---ER]*

The composition of the documented materiel, and *a precedent for
airdropping identical materiel to rebel forces in South Sudan in
2012, prior to the current conflict, suggests direct supply from Sudan to
SPLA-iO forces.*

Observers on the ground also report that, *throughout the month of December
2014,** aircraft dropped additional military equipment to SPLA-iO units in
Upper Nile and Jonglei States.*

*70 per cent of the 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition documented is
Sudanese-manufactured, with the majority produced in 2014.* The recent date
of manufacture is* further evidence of direct supply from Khartoum to
SPLA-iO forces.*

*The SPLA-iO used 2014-manufactured Sudanese ammunition prior to the
September-December 2014 airdrops in Jonglei **[again, following the August
31 meeting---ER]*—including in its April 2014 attack on a mosque in
Bentiu. *This
suggests more than one case of supply from Khartoum to the SPLA-iO.*

All of the 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition documented is Sudanese-manufactured and
dates from 2011-14. *The 2011 rounds are identical to ammunition supplied
by Sudan to rebel forces in South Sudan in 2012,* prior to the current
conflict—including in airdrops of materiel.

Chinese 12.7 x 108 mm *ammunition documented is identical to ammunition
supplied by Khartoum to South Sudanese rebel forces in 2012, prior to the
current conflict.*

*The serial number of a Chinese-manufactured Type 56-1 falls within the
same sequence as rifles supplied by Sudan to South Sudanese rebel forces in
2011*, prior to the current conflict.

*The types of materiel airdropped to support SPLA-iO operations in Jonglei
State mirror weapon types that Sudan has supplied* to support armed or
insurgent forces *elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa*, including in* Darfur *and
the *Central African Republic*.

[M]uch of the ammunition inspected in Malakal, captured from the Khorflus
area, was heavily damaged. *Analysis of the damage indicates* that many
items have been crushed by a heavy impact. There is no indication (such as
burning or scorching) to suggest the damage is the result of explosive
blast effects. Rather, *the small arms cartridges and tubes containing
rockets concerned appear to have suffered lateral impact damage, which is
consistent with either free-fall dropping from an aircraft or very low
altitude parachute dropping.*

*Sudanese-manufactured cartridges comprise almost 70 per cent of the 7.62 x
39 mm sample (168 of 243).* These cartridges are typical of post-2008
Sudanese manufacture and feature copper-clad steel cases, red primer seals,
and triple-entry headstamps.

*Nearly all (98 per cent) of them date from 2014, which indicates a very
short chain of custody (11 months maximum and plausibly shorter) from
production in Khartoum to delivery to SPLA-iO forces in South Sudan.*

 Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA  01063
       413-585-3326
       [email protected]

       Skype: ReevesSudan

       Website:   www.sudanreeves.org

*Compromising With Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007-2012  *
www.CompromisingWithEvil.org

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