Burundi’s cross-ethnic opposition under threat
Posted on February 16, 2016 by Jordan Anderson
The opposition to President Nkurunziza counts both Tutsi and Hutu
amongst its number. But the cross ethnic nature of the resistance is
in danger of being undermined.
On the streets of Bujumbura, capital of Burundi. Credit: SuSanA Secretariat.
On the streets of Bujumbura, capital of Burundi. Credit: SuSanA Secretariat.
Since independence in 1962, Burundi has experienced no fewer than six
flare-ups of conflict, which have been triggered by political disputes
and turned into ethnic violence. The longest of these conflicts was
the 1993-2005 civil war, which pitted a largely Tutsi government and
army (Forces Armées du Burundi [FAB]) against largely Hutu rebel
groups.
During this period, neighbourhoods in Bujumbura became almost entirely
ethnically segregated due to targeted violence. This resulted in a
Tutsi-dominated city with Hutu enclaves.
Extremist Tutsi youth organisations acted as a key driver of anti-Hutu
violence, while claiming to be protecting Tutsis against genocide.
Meanwhile, Hutu youth formed militant ‘self-defence’ organisations to
protect their remaining neighbourhoods. The rebel force which went on
to become today’s ruling CNDD-FDD party emerged from some of the
latter groups.
After a long and bloody 12 years, the civil war finally came to an
end. And the ensuing peace accords (most famously the 2000 Arusha
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement) and new constitution strived to
move the country beyond ethnic divisions.
For instance, the 2005 constitution enshrined power-sharing between
the Tutsi (who make up 14-20% of the population) and Hutus (who make
up 80-85%) in parliament and all levels of government. Furthermore, it
called for the integration of both former soldiers and rebels, in
equal numbers, into the new military. Post-war integration also led
Bujumbura’s neighbourhoods to become ethnically mixed again, though
most areas retained (at least perceived) ethnic majorities.
Ten years of peace
This peace process facilitated ten years of relative peace for
Burundi, but in 2015, the country returned to crisis.
The origins of this current turmoil are rooted in President
Nkuruznziza’s decision to run for a third term, which opponents say
violates the constitution and Arusha Agreement. This move by the
president – who is himself a Hutu (of mixed ancestry) and former rebel
– brought large protests to the streets of the capital in April 2015.
These demonstrations were notable for including both Tutsi and Hutu.
On 13 May, following a crackdown by police and factions of the
Imbonerakure (the youth wing of the ruling CNDD-FDD), and amidst
mounting protester casualties, army officers staged a coup. However,
this attempted overthrow, which included both former FAB and former
rebels, was quickly defeated by forces loyal to Nkurunziza.
In the aftermath of the failed coup, police and Imbonerakure cracked
down on continuing protests, including through targeted arrests and
killings. This pushed many supporters of the coup, particularly from
the military, to defect to nascent rebel groups.
The escalating violence also led to the formation of neighbourhood
‘self-defence’ groups in so-called ‘protester’ areas of the capital.
These militias have carried out gun and grenade attacks against police
and ruling party targets. Attacks against three military bases in
Bujumbura on 11 December were attributed to both neighbourhood
militant groups and soldiers who defected to the rebellion. Although
both opposed to Nkurunziza, however, these groups do not necessarily
co-ordinate their operations and have in fact been antagonistic
towards each other at times.
Politicising ethnicity
Despite the cross-ethnic nature of the opposition, leading government
figures in the aftermath of the attempted coup in May immediately
presented resistance to Nkurunziza’s third term as a ‘Tutsi cause’
with most protests in ‘Tutsi areas’ of Bujumbura. This was in spite of
the fact security forces found themselves grappling with both Hutu and
Tutsi protesters.
CNDD-FDD leaders have also claimed (and are supported to an extent by
a leaked UN report) that the opposition and rebellion is backed by
Rwanda, led by Tutsi President Paul Kagame who in November accused the
Burundian government of “massacring” its people.
By this strategy of invoking ethnicity, the CNDD-FDD leadership – now
in alliance with independent MPs led by Agathon Rwasa (formerly leader
of the Hutu FNL rebel group) – seems to be attempting to polarise the
conflict along ethnic lines and thus rally the Hutu majority to
Nkurunziza’s cause.
Furthermore, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the 11 December attacks on Bujumbura military
bases were followed by reprisal killings in majority Tutsi
neighbourhoods in which police are alleged to have systemically
targeted Tutsi youth for execution while mostly sparing Hutus.
Over a hundred people were likely killed in this attack, many of whom
were subsequently buried in mass graves by security forces. Witnesses
during this and other operations alleged that police and Imbonerakure
asked residents “Where is Kagame to save you?” and accused Hutus who
remained in ‘protester’ neighbourhoods of sympathising with
anti-government rebels.
Fear has gripped those who remain in these neighbourhoods, with many
inhabitants painting over their house numbers in the hope of avoiding
targeted reprisals.
Growing ethnic divisions
These reprisal killings and attempts to ethnically homogenise
Bujumbura’s neighbourhoods – with ‘protester’ neighbourhoods
containing only Tutsis and ‘loyalist’ neighbourhoods receiving their
Hutu outflow – represent the greatest threat to the currently
cross-ethnic nature of Burundi’s opposition.
This ethnic homogenising would leave only Tutsi recruits available to
youth self-defence militant groups and the umbrella organisation
attempting to unite them, the Resistance for the Rule of Law
(RED-Tabara). RED-Tabara is suspected of being behind recent grenade
and mortar attacks against police, Imbonerakure, and government
targets in the capital.
For its own purposes, Nkurunziza’s government is likely to make use of
Burundi’s aforementioned history of extremist Tutsi youth
organisations to portray RED-Tabara as a Tutsi, anti-Hutu
organisation. This may be helped by RED-Tabara’s alleged links to the
predominantly Tutsi MSD party, which the government has historically
made (largely unsubstantiated) accusations against of being linked to
Tutsi extremists.
Moreover, armed groups such as RED-Tabara may in fact be at risk of
radicalisation; MSD youth already reportedly distribute pamphlets
claiming that a genocide of Tutsis is underway, playing into old fears
of Hutu youth and extremist narratives.
Meanwhile, many Hutu youth who follow Agathon Rwasa have also left the
opposition since he joined Nkurunziza’s government after the July
elections. This, coupled with Burundi’s history of Tutsi youth
violence and the homogenising of opposition militant recruits, will
likely add credibility to the government’s portrayal of RED-Tabara and
other armed opposition groups as Tutsi organisations.
This perception of armed opposition groups could drive the
radicalisation of predominantly Hutu militia and youth groups. The
Imbonerakure is already divided into several largely autonomous
factions, and the youth groups associated with the (predominantly
Hutu) FNL party – many of whom previously took part in the protests –
are divided over Nkurunziza’s third term and Rwasa’s alliance with
him. The widespread belief that their youth and neighbourhoods are
being targeted by Tutsi militants is likely to re-activate these Hutu
groups back into their original role as local ‘self-defence’ forces.
The outlook for future violence
The ethnic polarisation of Burundi’s conflict (away from the current
cross-ethnic opposition) and increase of violence driven by extremist
youth militants on both sides could increase the scope of
ethnically-targeted killings such as the alleged reprisal attacks on
11 December.
This situation might have echoes of Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, but there
are key differences that make similar mass killings less likely. For
instance, the government has not engaged in a sustained country-wide
campaign of hate speech targeting Tutsis, nor are the Imbonerakure
sufficiently unified throughout the country to carry out such
atrocities at short notice.
However, fighting between increasingly mono-ethnic and autonomous
youth militant groups could push Burundi back in the direction of its
own history of ethnic violence. During the previous civil war, around
300,000 people were killed across 12 years, with many of them being
civilians targeted for their ethnicity.
Ultimately though, it seems that the question of whether Burundi’s
present conflict remains political or whether it becomes
ethnically-driven will be answered on the streets of Bujumbura –
streets that increasingly house only either Hutus or Tutsis.
Jordan Anderson is the lead Burundi and African Great Lakes analyst
for IHS Country Risk and IHS Jane’s, focusing on political and
security risks in the region.
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One thought on “Burundi’s cross-ethnic opposition under threat”
Izere Izobukiza says:
February 17, 2016 at 9:15 am
Good analysis. Of course it is impossible to mention all the
facets of Burundi conflict, but one part I believe is misunderstood is
the role of the government in brainwashing the population with a
controlled narrative on the state media (the only active in the
country).
The comparison with Rwanda often implies that the situation in
Burundi is less explosive but the same tactics of pitting an ethnic
group against another will invariably produce the same effects.
Whether 300,000 dead in Burundi is less alarming than 1,000,000 in
Rwanda is a comparison no one should have to make.
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