---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "John Ashworth" <[email protected]>
Date: 20 Jun 2016 13:52
Subject: [sudans-john-ashworth] From Conflict to Cooperation? Sudan, South
Sudan and Uganda
To: "Group" <[email protected]>
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>From Conflict to Cooperation? Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda

By Casie Copeland & Magnus Taylor
International Crisis Group 20 June 2016
________________________________

When South Sudanese leaders travelled to Khartoum in early June,
pragmatically declaring their intent to “normalise relations” with
their northern neighbors, it was a tentative sign of hope for what has
been one of the Horn of Africa’s worst war zones.

Uganda, historically a staunch ally of South Sudan, is now seeking
more constructive relations with Sudan too. The current processes –
formal and informal, public and private – tackle a wider set of
challenges that have historically inhibited good relations between the
three countries. A new understanding between the three could bring a
welcome change to the Horn’s complex balance of alliances and
animosities.

The new overtures are driven by South Sudan’s economic crisis, coupled
with Uganda’s and Sudan’s desire to protect their interests in the
country. South Sudan has large oil reserves, which are exported
through Sudan, but its production fell sharply with the eruption of
civil war in December 2013. With the civil war’s end, Juba now wants
to renegotiate the terms of its 2012 oil transfer agreement that
mandates large payments to Sudan, arguing that a new deal needs to
reflect the global downturn in prices and its own post-civil war
financial straits. While Juba wants a new arrangement with Sudan, such
a deal would come with strings attached. Donors’ reluctance to bail
out South Sudan financially, unless Juba adopts stringent transparency
and accountability measures, makes other options seem worse than a
wider deal with Sudan.

Sudan now wants to cooperate too. Its economy, though more resilient,
still suffers from the 2011 division of the country, the loss of
shared oil revenue, and, like South Sudan, obstacles to full
cross-border trade. But in return Khartoum wants South Sudan to help
end wars in Darfur and the Two Areas, South Kordofan and Blue Nile,
and stop its alleged support for Sudanese rebel groups.

Reaching agreement could be tough but conditions are more favourable
than at any time since South Sudan’s secession five years ago. If both
sides continue to work seriously on their bilateral relations, chances
will rise of resolving other interlinked conflicts, notably the
conflict in the Two Areas. A Khartoum-Juba deal would likely limit the
operational space of Sudanese rebels – especially the Sudan Peoples
Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) – and lead to new border security
arrangements.

Khartoum and Kampala’s long rivalry

The territory of southern Sudan (South Sudan since 2011) has long been
a site of mutual interventions and proxy conflict between Khartoum and
Kampala. During the 1990s, Uganda was suspicious of Islamist Sudan’s
apparent desire to expand Arab and Islamic influence southwards. To
counter the perceived Islamist threat, Uganda backed the Southern
Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) in the Sudanese civil war. Khartoum
supported Ugandan rebel groups, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), among others.

South Sudan’s 2011 independence directed its neighbours’ rivalry
toward competition for influence over the new state. Despite this,
Sudan and Uganda have shared interests in common, including unhindered
South Sudanese oil production and stability under President Salva
Kiir.

Sudan needs regular “transit fees” – a per barrel payment for use of
the northern export pipeline – to buttress its fragile post-secession
economy. Kampala’s concerns have shifted substantially from security
to economic. It wants a prosperous South Sudan to trade with,
particularly in the Equatoria region bordering Uganda. Kampala also
believes it should have influence over major strategic decisions made
in Juba; its historical support for the SPLA is reflected in a
longstanding defence cooperation agreement, which includes allowing
cross-border interventions by the Ugandan army.

When South Sudan’s civil war erupted in December 2013, Uganda deployed
troops in support of the embattled Juba government, reviving tensions
with Sudan. In response, Sudan provided limited backing to the rebel
Sudan People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO).

>From civil war to regional peace?

The potential for regional contagion following the outbreak of South
Sudan’s civil war demanded mediation from the Horn of Africa’s
regional security organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD). Though it failed to stop the war from escalating
within South Sudan in its early months, IGAD’s largely unheralded
success was to pull Uganda and Sudan (both member states) back from
more aggressive posturing and toward a resolution of the war that both
could support.

Critical to the eventual Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict
in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) in August 2015 were key
provisions negotiated at the IGAD Head of State level involving
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Ugandan President Yoweri
Museveni. These included the withdrawal of Ugandan forces – completed
in October 2015 – and the “disarmament, demobilisation and
repatriation” of any Sudanese rebel forces present in South Sudan,
which include the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army – North
(SPLM/A-N) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – which
Khartoum alleges are materially supported by Juba. The long-running
African Union mediation to end the armed conflicts in Sudan has also
engaged both these groups.

As the 2015 South Sudan peace agreement recognises, peace in the
Sudans is dependent on all three countries’ approach to regional
relations. Improved relations between Uganda and Sudan have been
reinforced by regional heads of state summits during South Sudan’s
peace process, joint efforts to resolve South Sudan’s civil war,
presidential and vice presidential visits, mutual disparagement of the
International Criminal Court and plans to create a Joint Permanent
Commission on bilateral affairs.

Precedents for Cooperation

Despite political will, the inherent complexities of the disputed
Sudan-South Sudan border and relationships on both sides make this a
fraught process with no guarantee of success. Skepticism and a degree
of distrust remain on all sides. Yet negotiators are drawing from past
agreements considered a success – notably the Chad-Sudan 2010
agreement, which precipitated the weakening of both Chadian and Darfur
rebel groups; and the arrangement between Khartoum and Juba that led
to the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) disbanding and its members
returning to the South in 2013.Elements of the former SSLA control
part of the border as part of the Juba-Khartoum deal, which served
both their interests during South Sudan’s civil war.

If Sudan and South Sudan cannot strike a new deal then the broader
regional configuration may well revert to its previous state of
instability, mutual suspicion and proxy conflict. But the emergence of
a new and pragmatic grouping could shift the regional balance of power
in the Horn of Africa with significant advantages to the regimes in
Kampala, Juba and Khartoum, and help end one of Africa’s most enduring
conflicts.

http://blog.crisisgroup.org/worldwide/2016/06/20/from-conflict-to-cooperation-sudan-south-sudan-and-uganda/
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END
______________________
John Ashworth

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