*Africa: China’s Laboratory for Third World Security Cooperation/ China
Brief Volume: 16 Issue: 11July *

By: David Shinn

Chinese Peacekeepers in Sudan
China’s interests and exposure in Africa have grown exponentially over the
past two decades. China became Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009 and
continues to hold the lead by a wide margin. China is the largest bilateral
funding source for infrastructure projects, nearly all of which are tied to
construction by Chinese state-owned companies using a percentage of Chinese
labor. Foreign direct investment in Africa according to China’s official
statistics totaled $32.35 billion at the end of 2014, although some
observers put the number much higher. [1] In recent years, China’s official
aid to Africa has been averaging about $2.5 billion annually (China’s
Foreign Aid, 2014). While there is no precise number for Chinese nationals
living in and visiting Africa at any given time, senior Chinese officials
usually put the figure at more than one million and some analysts say there
may be as many as two million. At the end of 2014, there were about 200,000
Chinese working in Africa on contracts and another 62,000 providing
services under aid programs. [2] Most of the other Chinese in Africa are
businesspersons, independent entrepreneurs, small traders and tourists.

Attacks on Chinese nationals in Africa are not new; it is a challenge China
has faced for more than a decade (China Brief, April 2, 2009). China’s
growing physical presence has resulted, however, with more Chinese in
harm’s way and, on occasion, as specific targets. The continuing attacks
have drawn increasing criticism from the Chinese public and caused the
government to consider additional measures to counter the problem. China’s
physical presence and investments in Africa face the same challenges as
other countries. The wake-up call came in 2011 when China evacuated almost
36,000 nationals, mostly contract workers, from Libya following the
toppling of Muammar Gadaffi’s government (SIPRI Policy Paper, June 2014).
More recently, three Chinese railway executives died during the terrorist
attack in 2015 on the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali that killed 20
persons (Caixin, January 27). In 2016, one Chinese peacekeeper was killed
and four injured during a mortar attack on a UN base in northern Mali (MFA,
June 1). Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb claimed responsibility for the
attack (Global Times, June 2).

China’s Evolving Policy on Protection

For many years, China operated on the basis that it was the responsibility
of individual African governments to protect Chinese nationals who
encountered security problems in an African country. While China continues
to follow this principle, it has learned African governments are not always
capable of providing protection. Consequently, China has looked at measures
it can take to improve security for its interests and nationals in Africa.
An official at a government-affiliated think tank recently commented that
China has unique and long-standing political interests in Africa. Its
contributions to UN peacekeeping operations and combatting piracy in the
Gulf of Aden constitute a veritable laboratory for security cooperation
with the Third World. If China’s new approach to security in Africa is
successful, it can be followed in places like Latin America. [3]

China’s policy on Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which goes beyond the
protection of Chinese nationals overseas, is also evolving. Courtney J.
Fung, professor of international relations at the University of Hong Kong,
concluded that between 2000 and 2005, China took a hard line against
intervention and in defense of state sovereignty. Between 2005 and 2008 it
offered limited endorsement of R2P in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Burundi and Darfur in Sudan. Since 2009, China has considered R2P an ally
of sovereignty but spelled out a strict interpretation of the three-pillar
strategy of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. China argues that
states bear primary protection responsibility (Pillar One). It accepts that
the role of the international community is to assist states to meet their
protection responsibilities (Pillar Two). As for Pillar Three, the use of
force through the UN Security Council is appropriate only if peaceful means
fail (USIP PeaceBrief, June 2016; SIPRI Policy Paper, June 2014).

Chinese companies historically had a high level of tolerance for political
risk in Africa. It was not unusual to find companies operating in regions
such as the Niger Delta in Nigeria and the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, where
local dissident groups warned all foreign companies to leave. This led to
the kidnapping of Chinese nationals in the Niger Delta. In 2007, nine
Chinese workers died in crossfire between Ethiopian government forces and
those of the Ogaden National Liberation Front at an oil prospection field
in eastern Ethiopia (China Daily, April 24, 2007). The Chinese company
subsequently ended its exploration activities in the Ogaden.

There has been an ongoing debate within the Chinese Ministry of Commerce on
the best way to deal with political risk in Africa. It has considered
closer collaboration with local and Western companies, cooperation with
European security initiatives and even establishing better relations with
tribal leaders. The government has also urged Chinese companies to take
greater responsibility for assessing political risk and accepting the
consequences (Journal of Cambridge Studies, 2012). China’s Vice Minister of
Commerce, Qian Keming, commented late last year that in 2010 China began to
formulate guidelines for security management of overseas Chinese-funded
enterprises and personnel, as well as emergency response mechanisms. He
noted that the attack on the Raddison Blu Hotel in Mali gave impetus to
this effort (MOFCOM, December 2, 2015).

China is also struggling with the issue of using private security companies
in Africa. The government does not support Chinese private security
companies (PSCs) going abroad. According to China’s Criminal Law, the
possession of weapons overseas, even in compliance with the laws of a
foreign nation, may result in a maximum sentence of seven years in prison.
Nevertheless, the Beijing-based Dingtai Anyuan Security Technology Research
Institute (鼎泰安元安全防范技术研究院), a PSC, has been doing business in Nigeria for
more than ten years but usually hires Western PSCs (Global Times, December
23, 2015). Another PSC, Shandong Huawei Security Group, established the
first ever joint venture with a South African company, HW Raid Private
Security, to protect Chinese assets and nationals in South Africa
(Farmitracker, December 24, 2014). A Chinese think tank representative
confirmed privately that Chinese PSCs are at an early stage of development,
have little experience in using guns and are not yet ready to provide the
kind of service required in Africa. [4]

China’s Evolving Role in UN Peacekeeping in Africa

China has assigned more peacekeepers to UN operations in Africa than any
other permanent member of the UN Security Council. It currently contributes
more than 2,600 troops, police and experts to seven of the nine missions in
Africa. Until 2013, China provided only non-combat personnel, mostly
engineers, logisticians and medics. China’s assignment of an infantry
detachment to the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to protect the
MINUSMA headquarters and living areas of the peacekeeping forces marked the
first foreign deployment of combat troops to a UN peacekeeping operation
(Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 2015).

China has significant interests in South Sudan’s oil sector. In 2015, as a
result of ongoing civil war, China evacuated more than 400 workers with the
China National Petroleum Corporation (Sudan Tribune, May 22, 2015). China
had previously agreed to send a 700-strong infantry battalion to the UN
Mission in South Sudan. This constituted the first ever combat battalion to
serve in a UN peacekeeping mission (China Brief, November 2, 2015). Equally
important, Geng Yansheng, a spokesperson in the Ministry of National
Defense, said the Chinese troops “will provide protection to the local
people and other countries’ personnel engaged in such peaceful activities
as humanitarian assistance and economic development” (China Military
Online, September 25, 2014). The UN mandate allows the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) battalion to protect local and foreign civilians, including
Chinese oil workers (UNSC Resolution 2155, May 27, 2014). This policy also
underscores that China’s evolving approach to African peacekeeping contains
a component of self-interest (Growth Research Programme, May, pp. 50–52).

In 2015, President Xi Jinping announced at the United Nations that China
will establish a permanent peacekeeping standby force of 8,000 troops and
called on the international community to increase support for African peace
and stability (Xinhua, September 29, 2015). So far, the standby force has
resulted in a proposal to keep in China one brigade of troops (about 2,500)
with engineering and medical capabilities available to the UN at all times.
China also committed helicopters to the UN mission in Sudan’s Darfur region
and $20 million a year for ten years to support a new UN Peace and
Development Trust Fund (ECFR policy brief, June).

A New Look at Counter-terrorism in Africa

As terrorist groups have expanded across Africa and Chinese nationals have
increasingly been affected by the attacks, China has taken a more
collaborative approach to counter-terrorism. The deaths over the past year
of Chinese nationals in Mali and an armed Chinese police officer at a hotel
in Mogadishu, Somalia have driven home the need to take stronger action
(China Daily, July 27, 2015). China appreciates that terrorism is no longer
just an internal threat for its nationals and interests (China Brief, June
2). The global terrorist threat may result in the use of special forces
outside China, new counter-terrorism laws, greater pressure on foreign
governments to crack down on terrorist groups, direct training and material
support to foreign governments to reign in terrorists, and participation
with other governments in anti-terrorism exercises (China Brief, January
26). At the same time, China is constrained by its long-standing principles
of non-interference and security through development (OCP Policy Center,
March 16).

China’s first counter-terrorism law took effect at the beginning of this
year (Xinhua, December 27, 2015). It authorizes “exchanges of intelligence
information, enforcement cooperation, and international financial
monitoring with foreign nations and relevant international organizations.”
It also authorizes China to assign PLA personnel and the Chinese People’s
Armed Police Force to participate in counter-terrorism missions outside the
country (Counter-Terrorism Law, December 27, 2015).

China’s most recent Africa policy paper states that it will support the
efforts of African countries and regional organizations to improve
counter-terrorism capabilities and fight terrorism, and help African
countries develop their economy and root out the causes of terrorism, with
the aim to safeguard regional security and stability and promote long-term
sustainable development in Africa. In addition, China will strengthen
counter-terrorism exchanges and cooperation with the African Union and
priority African countries (Xinhua, December 4, 2015).

During a visit to Nigeria, for example, Premier Li Keqiang promised that
China will make available information acquired by its satellites and
intelligence service to Nigeria’s security agencies and provide training of
military personnel for combating the Boko Haram terrorist organization
(Xinhua, May 18, 2014). China subsequently sold armed drones to Nigeria,
which have been used against Boko Haram (China Daily, April 21; China
Brief, June 26, 2015).

China Expands Its Naval Presence in Africa

The modern Chinese navy made only three port calls anywhere in Africa
during the 60 years from 1949 through 2009. [5] During the five years
between 2010 and 2015, PLA Navy ships made at least 38 calls at African
ports, 20 of them at Djibouti. [6] This sharp increase in PLA Navy activity
is attributed largely to China’s participation in the Gulf of Aden
anti-piracy operation that began in 2008. It became apparent that China
needed ports in the region where it could refuel and resupply. But while
the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden is essentially over, China
continues to expand its naval and military presence.

The most dramatic expression of China’s growing naval interest is its
decision to establish a permanent military facility at Djibouti, which is
scheduled for completion in 2017 by the China State Construction
Engineering Corporation. China has a long-standing policy of no foreign
military bases and is going to great lengths to describe the facility as
something less than a military base. Chinese observers call it, for
example, a logistic hub for Chinese ships to obtain replenishment and
temporary rest. Zhang Junshe, from the PLA Naval Military Studies Research
Institute, said it is “far less than a military base in its scale and
function” (Global Times, March 15; China Brief, January 26). However, most
non-Chinese observers believe this facility sounds more like a military
base. When asked why China does not proclaim global conditions have changed
and it now needs a military base, a Chinese think tank representative
responded that “continuity of Communist Party policy” does not permit a
break with the long-standing principle of no foreign military bases. [7]

Conclusion

China’s security policy in Africa is evolving slowly but inexorably toward
greater engagement and a more robust physical presence. This is
demonstrated in its global security policy changes, participation in the
anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, gradual increase in numbers of
personnel assigned to UN peacekeeping operations and the deployment of
combat troops, greater attention to cooperation with African countries on
counter-terrorism, and more frequent calls in African ports by the PLA
Navy. It is most forcefully demonstrated by the construction of a military
facility in Djibouti. While China’s military engagement in Africa lags well
behind that of the United States and France, it has now joined a small
group of nations with major security ties to the continent.

David Shinn is an adjunct professor in the Elliott School of International
Affairs at George Washington University and former U.S. ambassador to
Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. He is the co-author of China and Africa: A
Century of Engagement.

Notes

1.     China Statistical Yearbook, 2015, section 11-19. The China Global
Investment Tracker operated by the American Enterprise Institute and the
Heritage Foundation uses higher FDI figures.

2.     China Statistical Yearbook, 2015, section 11-22.

3.     Author’s conversation on May 6, 2016 at the Shanghai Institutes for
International Studies.

4.     Author’s conversation in Shanghai on May 10, 2016.

5.     David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of
Engagement. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012, p. 189.

6.     Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, Six Years at Sea . . . and
Counting. Washington: The Jamestown Foundation, June 2015, pp. 123–134.

7.     Author’s conversation in Shanghai on May 6, 2016.

-- 
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
[email protected]
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/d/forum/southsudankob
View this message at 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/southsudankob/topic-id/message-id
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout
--- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"South Sudan Info - The Kob" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/SouthSudanKob.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/SouthSudanKob/CAJb14opx5i%2BhLQNVhjRBLd1SbNGn7xm5qFwSFA8wX9tZ10c2nA%40mail.gmail.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to