What led IS to announce a new Boko Haram leader? Here are two clues
from its communications.
Posted on August 5, 2016 by Omar S. Mahmood
Two months ago, Islamic State changed its messaging strategy towards
Boko Haram. The recent “leadership change” seems to be part of this
plan.
Abubakar Shekau insists he is "still around" after IS announced that
Boko Haram has a new leader.
Abubakar Shekau insists he is “still around” after IS announced that
Boko Haram has a new leader.
The recent claim by Islamic State (IS) that Boko Haram has a new
leader may have come as a surprise, but the announcement was in
keeping with a pattern that has been emerging in recent messaging.
In the two months leading up to the interview in IS magazine al-Naba
presenting Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the group’s “new leader”, IS had
been showing a clear reinvigorated interest in its West African
partner.
Its statements claiming responsibility for Boko Haram attacks had
increased sharply. And the nature of some of these more recent
communications notably shifted from previous ones.
The purported change in leadership may be the culmination of these
trends, and some of the motivations for the move can be discerned from
the developments that preceded it.
The first phase
Boko Haram pledged allegiance to IS in March 2015. And in July 2015,
IS made its first statement claiming responsibility for violence
committed by the West African group. Between then and May 2016, six
short messages have been issued by IS claiming ten different Boko
Haram attacks.
These IS communications and the assaults claimed shared various
similarities. They were typically conducted by male suicide bombers,
who were proclaimed martyrs and whose names and photos were often
disseminated by IS. The incidents largely occurred in symbolic
locations such as capital cities Abuja and N’Djamena or in major urban
centres such as Maiduguri. And all the highlighted violence was
claimed to be directed at targets such as security forces, vigilantes
groups, government institutions, and Shiites; this means the majority
of Boko Haram attacks, which have resulted in significant Muslim
civilian casualties, were ignored.
IS was thus fairly discerning in the attacks for which it has claimed
responsibility. And it was also sometimes selective in how it reported
them. For example, IS’ versions of events have sometimes diverged from
local press coverage in that they ignored the fact that female suicide
bombers were used or that targets were actually civilian in nature
rather than directed at security forces.
In this period, there appears to have been a deliberate attempt by IS
media operatives to avoid highlighting more typical attack patterns.
This may be because such attacks would have less propaganda value
given that they involved the deaths of Muslim civilians.
[See: Boko Haram, Islamic State, and the underlying concerns for West Africa]
A shift in strategy?
Since the start of Ramadan in early June, there seems to have been a
shift in this pattern.
To begin with, the frequency of IS statements claiming Boko Haram
violence has increased sharply. While there were only six statements
in the first 15 months of the allegiance, the past two months have
already yielded eight.
At the same time, some of the specifics of incidents highlighted by IS
have changed too. The attacks claimed more recently have largely
occurred in smaller and more rural areas of Nigeria’s Borno state,
southern Niger, and northern Cameroon. And the focus on male suicide
bombers has decreased; most attacks have not been claimed to involve
“martyrs”, while no photos or names have been disseminated.
One thing that has remained constant, however, is the focus on attacks
against regional security forces, with Muslim civilian deaths still
ignored. This aspect seems to be a key concern for IS propagandists.
Another characteristic of the recently promoted attacks is a regional
focus. Ten of the total 15 messages (attack claims and other
publications) released by IS media operatives since June have
emphasised on violence in neighbouring countries. This may be a
deliberate attempt to highlight Boko Haram activities elsewhere in the
Lake Chad Basin and dispel notions that the group is still primarily
centred on Nigeria.
The large-scale June assault on the town of Bosso in southern Niger,
during which militants pushed joint Nigerien and Nigerian security
forces from the city, generated particularly high levels of media
content across a range of IS-affiliated outlets.
Clues behind the leadership change
Before this week’s announcement of a leadership change, IS had thus
already begun to increase its focus on Boko Haram. And the specifics
of its shift in communication could reveal some of the motivations
behind the decision to replace Abubakar Shekau, who has led the group
since 2009.
On the one hand, there are some indications that some in Boko Haram
objected to the relationship with IS from the start, and since the
pledge, Shekau has overseen many attacks that IS has chosen not to
promote – even during its recent increase of statements.
These assaults have included those committed by female suicide bombers
– a trend that has generally declined but continued – along with
violence against civilians and mosques. Furthermore, a US army
official recently said that Shekau faced internal dissent over his
refusal to adhere to an IS directive to halt the use of child suicide
bombers.
By contrast, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the man announced as the new
leader, clearly stated in his al-Naba interview that attacks against
Muslim civilians, mosques, and markets will not be a staple of his
leadership – he said he would focus more on Christian targets – though
he remained silent on the issue of female suicide bombers.
The announcement therefore was likely to have been partly motivated by
a desire to replace Shekau – who has quickly responded to the
interview, insisting that he is still in charge – with a figure whose
attack methodology may better facilitate IS propaganda.
On the other hand, however, there may also be wider strategies at play
too. In addition to concerns about Boko Haram’s attack patterns under
Shekau, another reason behind IS’ increased messaging and leadership
change may be to challenge the broader narrative regarding the status
of the Islamic State’s West Africa Province.
Since its admission into IS in March 2015, Boko Haram has lost the
vast majority of its territory in the face of a renewed push by
Nigerian security forces following the election of President Muhammadu
Buhari.
[See: Boko Haram is not “defeated” but Buhari’s strategy is working]
The effects of this have been seen on many fronts. The group’s attack
radius has shrunk amid an overall decline in large-scale violence.
There have been rumblings of food shortages. Low morale has reportedly
led to surrenders. And some displaced people have been repatriated to
areas formerly under militant control.
In this sense, reinvigorated IS involvement in Boko Haram over the
past two months may be aimed at presenting a contrasting story to this
tale of decline, one in which the group is still capable of
confronting and defeating conventional security forces. This narrative
has been enhanced by the visual depictions of the “spoils of war” –
such as weapons, ammunition, and vehicles – as well as of fallen
soldiers in IS publications.
And in his interview, al-Barnawi acknowledged that while the group has
lost territory, this should not be considered a defeat and that it
will return to a stronger position. Contrasting with the recent
accounts about the group, this sort of messaging helps present Boko
Haram as an entity on the rise and may aid in recruitment and support
as regional armies gear up for another offensive to push militants
from the Lake Chad region following the Bosso attack.
There are still unanswered questions regarding the extent of the
practical ties between Boko Haram and Islamic State. But the recent
increase in messaging and the announced leadership change indicate, at
a minimum, that IS has a high level of interest in the activities and
fate of its West African partner.
The main aspect of their collaboration may continue to be
communicational rather than operational, but recent events emphasise
the significance of these kinds of ties and the fact that changes in
their nature are likely to portend forthcoming strategic shifts too.
Omar S. Mahmood is an analyst focused on the Lake Chad and Horn of
Africa regions. Follow him on Twitter at @omarsmahmood.
If you enjoyed this post, please consider leaving a comment or
subscribing to the RSS feed to have future articles delivered to your
feed reader.
This entry was posted in African Politics Now, The Nigeria Forum.
Bookmark the permalink.
One thought on “What led IS to announce a new Boko Haram leader? Here
are two clues from its communications.”
Rex Tyrano says:
August 5, 2016 at 2:40 pm
They had to name a new leader because the old leader is going to
be Hillary’s ambassador to BLM
--
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected]
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/d/forum/southsudankob
View this message at
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/southsudankob/topic-id/message-id
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"South Sudan Info - The Kob" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/SouthSudanKob.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/SouthSudanKob/CAJb14orDnuvM9%3D-4FPqX%3D-0ind_ZMWN0eUX-TcvCNGLm81Nbrg%40mail.gmail.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
