Congo’s political crisis after 19 December
Posted on December 21, 2016 by Koen Vlassenroot & Kris Berwouts
Protests and arrests have been centred on the Democratic Republic of
Congo’s major cities, but we should also pay attention to more rural
areas.
Credit: MONUSCO/Myriam Asmani.
Hundreds have been arrested and more than 20 killed over the past few
days in Congo’s major cities, including the capital Kinshasa. Credit:
MONUSCO/Myriam Asmani.
The formal end of President Joseph Kabila’s rule on 19 December was
long announced as a moment in which there could be outbreaks of
large-scale violence. Yet on the day things remained relatively calm
in most of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
This had much to do with the massive deployment of security forces,
which had a dramatic intimidation effect on Congo’s population.
Campaigners say over a hundred people were detained in the few days
running up to the end of Kabila’s mandate, and that a hundred more
have been arrested since.
Already in September 2016, tens of people were gunned down in the
streets of Kinshasa during huge protests against Kabila’s attempts to
extend his rule. That had acted as a clear warning by the regime that
any future expressions of dissent would provoke a similar response – a
threat that was borne out on 20 December when more than twenty
protesters are reported to have been killed in confrontations with
security forces in cities around the country.
[DR Congo in crisis: Can Kabila trust his own army?]
Recent events, including several forms of resistance and confrontation
in unexpected areas, give an indication of what might happen in the
next few days and weeks. Rather than expecting massive rallies in
Congo’s major cities, it looks like we are moving towards other, less
predictable and less controllable forms of protest.
Spontaneous demonstrations have erupted in unexpected parts of the
country, bypassing the political opposition, which seems have become
more and more irrelevant. Different parts of the Congolese population
have started refuting the legitimacy of the regime and its
representatives. And some protests have shown themselves to be at risk
of manipulation by all sorts of actors, potentially leading to a
gradual politico-military disintegration that will be hard to manage.
At the same time, the Catholic bishops are continuing their efforts to
bridge the gaps between the regime and all factions of the political
opposition. After a four-day break and various earlier unsuccessful
attempts, these talks − which are aimed at a reaching political
agreement that involves an inclusive transition process towards
elections − will resume this week.
[Africa’s least loved leader marches on]
However, the bishops’ efforts are already weakened − if not entirely
obstructed − by the appointment of new Prime Minister Samy Badibanga’s
government just minutes before midnight on 19 December. The
announcement of a new transition government was a smart move to
distract attention, but ultimately adds to already widespread
frustrations.
The opposition’s inability to mobilise large crowds on 19 December
reflects its failure to translate popular anger in Congo’s major
cities into political strength. Nonetheless, these frustrations remain
widespread, also largely driven by a deepening economic crisis. The
sharp decrease of the value of the Congolese Franc for several months
has had an enormous impact on people’s ability to buy essential goods
and is also now affecting the economic position of Congo’s small
middle-class.
This dire economic situation has had a disastrous effect on state
revenues, which are currently insufficient to cover the monthly
expenses of civil servants, including security forces. This means the
government is even less likely to participate financially in the
organisation of its own electoral process. And it will have to further
degrade electricity and water services, which will in turn add to the
population’s frustrations and feelings that state-led services are no
longer legitimate.
[Hungry for change: the economics underlying DR Congo’s political crisis]
Beyond the cities
These dynamics are most visible in Congo’s major cities, but we should
also pay attention to the quickly deteriorating situation in rural
areas, particularly but not exclusively in the east. There, a series
of small-scale armed attacks against the Congolese army as well as
increased ethnically-inspired violence highlight that the crisis is
about more than just the president’s mandate. The constitutional
crisis is also a trigger to re-express unresolved grievances.
Recently, new armed groups in the region have been instituted.
Meanwhile, others have forged new coalitions − for example between
Bafulero and Babembe armed groups in Uvira and Fizi, or a number of
Batembo groups in Kalehe. All these groups are repositioning
themselves and trying to extend their zones of influence. Their
struggles are symbolically centred on Kabila’s position, but are
rooted in claims of local authority, power and resources.
With the regime is no longer considered credible, armed groups now
present themselves as the true and legitimate authorities. They
legitimise their existence by calling upon communities’ frustrations,
linked to historical political marginalisation, and their need for
protection. These same armed groups have − despite their fragmentation
– also been able to consolidate themselves as powerbrokers in local
politics.
The current crisis, and the prospect of elections, will only provoke
new rounds of political competition. When driven or sponsored from the
outside by disgruntled politicians or radicalised opposition forces,
these armed groups could become a serious threat to local stability
once again. Paradoxically, this would not necessarily be bad news for
the regime in Kinshasa. It could simply create an additional incentive
to delay or simply cancel the elections.
Koen Vlassenroot is Professor in Political Science and Director of the
Conflict Research Group, Ghent University. He also leads the Africa
Programme of the Egmont Institute.
Kris Berwouts has worked for 25 years for different Belgian and
international NGOs focused on building peace, reconciliation, security
and democratic processes. The last years he has been working as an
independent expert on Central Africa. His book Congo’s violent peace.
Conflict and struggle since the Great African War will be published
in July 2017 by ZED Books.
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3 thoughts on “Congo’s political crisis after 19 December”
james k says:
December 22, 2016 at 9:02 pm
I doubt it whether JOSEPH KABILA is a human being.AFRICAN LEADERS
have finally turned themselves into wild animals i don’t know why.
Am very sorry for Congolese security forces who are supporting
this evil man(joseph kabila) How much is their salaries?.WHAT KIND OF
CONGO ARE THEY WANNA LEAVE FOR THEIR CHILDREN’s CHILDRENS?whether they
are doing it for MONEY,of what value is the money to them when they
are dead?
MONEY IS JUST FOR A MOMENT BUT LEGACY IS FOREVER.
LET JOSEPH ENJOY HIS EVIL MOMENT BY SHADING INOCENT BLOOD
GOD IS WATCHING
james k says:
December 22, 2016 at 9:12 pm
AFRICAN leaders please wake up and help out in the current
situation in Congo drc because those so called UN whatever they are
just there to enrich their continent and you know it.
I pit some african leaders who are sending their soldiers to help
joseph kabila instead of forcing him to stand down.SHAME
Monte McMurchy says:
December 23, 2016 at 7:49 pm
The Christmas season is the time of year where people gather in
common communal comradeship to give thanks and perhaps reflect on the
past year in terms of endeavours and related activities. Family and
friends are important as civic social relationships do matter in
today’s fast paced frenetic society where change is considered
essential.
However, I would encourage each of you living and working in DRC
to take a quiet moment and reflect on what is truly important.
Material gain in the acquisition of bright shiny goods is transitory
and illusory as true profound contentment in happiness is within each
of us who aspire to live a good life in virtue of character in ordinal
values. Please do not be seduced by the easy quick gain or be tempted
into taking the shortcut, as goals worthy of pursuit do not subscribe
to shortcuts or endeavours illusory.
DRC in 2017 will require from each and every citizen the courage
of civic civil conviction grounded within values profound and
prescriptive. The Student Citizen may be required to make choices on
which the future of your nation may well be contingent in how choice
is operationalized. Remember that values including an ethic in value
choice decision does matter and that voice in articulating in
advancing values is essential if nation cooperation is to grow in
civic civil strengthening.
Sharing with the less fortunate is critical in the enhancement of
civic civil social cohesion within society. The gross division
existing between those with wealth and those who are lacking even in
the most basic essential necessary to live is becoming increasingly
more visible. Unless remedial options to mitigate this disparity in
lifestyle are implemented by those responsible in governance the civic
civil fabric binding the nation within rule of law will be breached
and the consequences will be most dire. Respecting and aiding the
vulnerable is indeed a testament positive to a society congruent in
optimistic growth.
Appreciate that education is both a privilege and a right and for
those whom are afforded education exercise your talents and skill in a
manner strong positive and prescriptive.
DRC Publics needs now to move forward post Kabila non-violent
which must be a ‘National Transition Authority’ subject to the
‘Caretaker Convention’ charged with the responsibility of facilitating
Elections for 2017
Joseph Kabila in my opinion is no longer capable in governing
effectively in his capacity to provide any kind of social
administrative executive function in exercising leadership.
The International Community must now consider options forward for DRC.
The DRC Constitution is clear, Joseph Kabila will not enjoy a
Third Term in Public Office, and as his Constitutional Mandate expired
December 19/16, a descriptive Public Administrative solution must be
devised immediately to ensure continued civic civil social cohesion in
DRC, a nation now fragile in expressive discontent as the DRC
Political Status Quo elites have failed to serve their fellow citizens
evidenced by their exhibiting crass craven personal agendas in
attempting to secure a Ministerial Position which is merely a legal
fiction designed for personal private theft and plunder.
Due to a lack of concordance due to internal political squabbling,
DRC is still lacking a Government which for me is now beyond that of a
joke.
Innocents will suffer unless the International Community
intervenes in the suggestion of a remedy designed to lead DRC forward
into elections 2017.
There exists only one reasonable option ensuring DRC stability in
social publics.
A DRC National Transition Authority charged specifically with the
mandate of ensuring elections to standard in 2017 is feasible, doable
and reasonable when considering the exigent alternative which is that
of chaos grounded within violence.
UNTAG in Namibia, UNTAC in Cambodia and UNMIL in Liberia were for
the most part effective in the facilitation of civic civil translation
of the will of the people into governance via the electoral process.
As the DRC Constitution does not allow for a Government post
December 19/16, a Transition Authority subject to the Caretaker
Convention will provide the essential bridge in allowing the DRC
Citizen to select Leadership via the Civic Civil Electoral Process.
The Caretaker Convention places extreme limits on Executive
capacity to plunder in the negotiation of self serving contracts as
this Transition Authority has no mandate to negotiate as suggested in
the Caretaker Convention.
Required is a civic civil social public blueprint ensuring both a
census and election to standard in 2017.
Elections in 2017 will alleviate potential civic strife in DRC as
the DRC youth and those DRC citizens who live on the margins of
society [98% of DRC] want Kabila gone.
These disaffected abused citizens have no time for the ‘potemkin’
posturing being currently illustrated by the DRC Political Public
Elites who are only sourcing monies for personal gain—the Dialogue
Process being an exemplar ‘cardinal’ as the Dialogue participant
sitting fees were exorbitant.
The Citizens of DRC are ready to explode and Africa cannot afford
to have DRC disintegrate into internecine violence.
Sadly, over 10 billion USD has been expended on the two recent UN
Missions DRC [MONUC and MONUSCO] with marginal results in the
advancement of civic civil social stability.
The Caretaker Convention
Preamble:
Wednesday May 11/16 the DRC Constitutional Court decided that DRC
President Joseph Kabila, who is constitutionally forbidden in seeking
a third term as DRC President, is now by this Constitutional Court
decision able to remain in office as DRC President even if no election
takes place before his Presidential mandate expires December 2016.
This judicial ruling was decided following the request of the
ruling governing party motivated in DRC President Kabila’s failure to
commit in setting a firm date for the DRC General Election, mandated
by the DRC Constitution. This DRC General Election was to have been
conducted in November 2016, prior to the December 2016 conclusion of
Kabila’s Presidential mandate.
Wednesday’s Constitutional Court ruling was a result of a request
for clarification over President Joseph Kabila’s political public fate
if the DRC General Election is prevented for reasons not sufficient in
logistical rational ensuring that these November 2016 Elections do
proceed on schedule.
The DRC Constitutional Court grounded their legal decision on
article 70 of the constitution stating that a President remains in
office until an election decides selecting the next President. The
opposition political entities argued in favour of article 75 whereby
the President of the Senate assumes Office of President immediately
following the statutory conclusion of the incumbent President’s Term
of Office. Therefore, this individual will hold the Office of DRC
President until an election which by active civic civil social citizen
participation who will decide via the ballot their civic choice for
DRC President.
Issue salient for DRC:
My concern regarding this decision rendered by this DRC
Constitutional Court is that this judicial ruling does not take into
account what I refer to as “The Caretaker Convention” limiting the
executive powers of President Kabila, who post December 2016 will no
longer enjoy the privileges of an elected mandate. Post December 2016
will witness Kabila as DRC President who is merely that of a caretaker
who must be strictly limited in the conduct of his Presidential duties
inclusive of presidential responsibilities.
In my country Canada, Legislative Parliamentary Governance
convention requires that the Government command the confidence of the
House of Commons at all times. While constitutionally a government
retains full legal authority to govern during an election, as well as
the responsibility to ensure that necessary government activity
continues, the Government is expected to exercise judicious probative
restraint in all its executive administrative governance endeavours.
This is what is meant as the “caretaker convention”. The reasoning is,
following dissolution of Parliament, there is no elected parliament to
which the Government can be held accountable, and the Government
cannot assume that it will command confidence in the next Parliament
as this Government may be defeated.
Joseph Kabila in my judgment occupies a similar role in that his
executive presidential responsibility must considered as that of a
“caretaker” severely limiting his capacity to initiate new government
business save that of ensuring that the CENI is able to discharge
their civic civil electoral administrative responsibilities
effectively and efficiently ensuring that the DRC General Election is
conducted in a most immediate timely manner without any form of
intimidation.
The conventional restriction limiting the extent to which the
President should exercise his authority applies when the Presidency is
post mandate according to the DRC Constitution. The Caretaker
Convention also applies to the outgoing government during any
post-election transition to a successor government. The Caretaker
convention ends when a new government is sworn into Office.
This does not mean that government is barred from making decisions
or announcements, or otherwise taking action, during the caretaker
period. It can and should do so where the matter is routine and
necessary for the conduct of government business, or where it is
urgent and in the public interest – for example, responding to a
natural disaster. In certain cases where a major decision is
unavoidable during a campaign [due to an international obligation or
an emergency], consultation with the opposition parties may be
appropriate, particularly where a major decision could be
controversial or difficult for a new government to reverse.
In short, during an election, a government should restrict itself
– in matters of policy, expenditure and appointments – to activity
that is:
1. routine, or
2. non-controversial, or
3. urgent and in the public interest, or
4. reversible by a new government without undue cost or disruption, or
agreed to by opposition parties [where consultation is appropriate].
In determining what activity is necessary for continued good
government, the Government/President must inevitably exercise
judgement, weighing the need for action and potential public reaction,
given the absence of a confidence elected mandate and fully aware that
a different government/president will be elected.
The duties of Ministers must continue to be fulfilled during the
caretaker period. Officials and departmental resources continue to be
at the disposal of ministers for the purpose of departmental duties.
These duties may or may not be set out in legislation.
As is always the case between elections, ministers are obliged to
ensure that the resources of the department and portfolio – financial,
materiel and human resources – are not used for partisan purposes. In
the context of an election, they must be especially vigilant with
respect to the distinction between official government business
supported by departmental and portfolio resources, and partisan
political activities, taking care to avoid even the appearance that
departmental and portfolio resources are being used for campaign
purposes for the exclusive benefit of one political entity.
In order to fulfill their ongoing responsibilities, ministers must
provide direction to the department or portfolio as appropriate. At
the same time, in order to respect the caretaker convention as well as
the distinction between official government business and partisan
activity, in the absence of any of the exceptions enumerated above,
ministers must:
1. defer to the extent possible such matters as appointments,
policy decisions, new spending or other initiatives, announcements,
negotiations or consultations, non-routine contracts and grants and
contributions;
2. work to ensure that departmental activities are carried out in
a non-partisan, low-profile manner; and
3. avoid participating in high-profile government-related domestic
and international events, including federal/provincial/territorial
events, international visits, and the signing of treaties and
agreements.
Normal Ministerial Cabinet procedures must be followed in
fulfilling the minister’s official duties. The minister must not act
independently on any initiative that requires Executive approval.
Ministerial operations are severely curtailed during the caretaker
interregnum, with Cabinet meeting only as necessary to deal with
essential items.
But when it comes to questions of constitutional propriety we go
beyond the particular merits or otherwise of the agreements and how a
decision was reached. We are dealing instead with the practice of
government itself – the rules and norms for decision-making in our
society – and there ought to be no room for argument in discussion. If
we know what our constitutional practice is and should be then we
should always insist on its observance.
Therefore, I intend to address the character of the constitutional
conventions which appear to me to apply in this instance, that is to
say, what is regarded as appropriate behaviour by a government in the
period following the conclusion of a mandate and leading up to the
conclusion of the ensuing general election.
The Caretaker Convention:
What is known in some quarters as the “caretaker convention” is
easily described although it is nowhere written down. It is a
well-established principle of parliamentary government that once
parliament has been dissolved and an election campaign is under way
the government’s freedom of decision-making is firmly restricted and
should be confined to dealing with only routine matters of
administration – apart, of course, from any emergency situation which
may arise.
More specifically, it is said that three areas of decision-making
in particular should be avoided in this period – matters involving
considerable controversy, matters which are not urgent [that is to
say, matters which can wait for a later decision without causing
irreparable damage], and matters where a decision would unreasonably
bind the freedom of decision-making of a future government. It is
occasionally said as well that matters involving the expenditure of
very large sums of public money should also be avoided.
There are two reasons for this view, both of which would appear to
be obvious. The first is that if the President is out of mandate in
time the ordinary mechanisms for scrutinizing the government’s
behaviour – question time, a debate on the adjournment, motions for
supply, and debate generally – are not available.
Everyone knows that in a parliamentary system the power of the
executive is potentially enormous. It is the existence of these
mechanisms of “constructive obstruction” that takes the edge off that
power and assures the people that the government is being kept
responsible. But if they cannot be used there must be a compensating
reduction in the usual extent of the power of the government. The
caretaker convention addresses that issue.
An election campaign ensures the selection of a new president and
therefore the possibility that its leaders will not be able to take
responsibility for the consequences of prior decisions conducted by
the immediate past President [Kabila]. It follows that only the most
routine administrative decisions ought to be made in this period –
decisions, in short, which any government might make – again excepting
an emergency.
To conclude, it is up to the President to decide what will be
done. Conventions, customs, and practices, simply because they are not
in any way linked to legality, must always be grounded within an ethos
public political in civic civil social character.
Political public events in DRC are approaching an ‘inflection
moment’ in potential civic civil social disequilibrium negative,
ensuring DRC Public Society is set back retrograde decades, as intense
kinetic destructive forces may sharply breach any prescriptive
positive social fabric binding DRC, a nation state in a limited sense
of the term, as DRC is utterly lacking in robust independent
institutions necessary in the advancement of Governance. In DRC,
Institutions promoting Education are profoundly lacking in resources.
Institutions promoting Medical Health Care are shattered. Institutions
advancing Law inclusive of Justice have been hollowed out ensuring
that rule of law in DRC remains a legal fiction. The Public
Administrative Institution is beholden to the rent seekers which have
been structured by 50 years of benign neglect by the DRC Governing
Structure denying any enhancement of normative niceties in promotion
of a functioning effective efficient bureaucracy.
My three years in DRC as a Public Law Instructor has allowed me to
observe and bear witness to the inter-niceties existing in DRC which
are manifold as the DRC political public actors are for the greater
part playing a dangerous game notwithstanding the profound acute
frustration of the 80 million or so citizens who are suffering in
despair.
This past year as Rector, I have been privileged in being
introduced to significant individuals of power and influence who
themselves are Leaders in DRC Society.
My interactions with these DRC Elites has allowed me insight into
the DRC civic civil social zeitgeist and my impressions are
despondent, as these National Elites hold their citizens in contempt
and regard the International Community with similar contemptuous
disdain.
This ‘disdain’ is grounded within the DRC civic civil social
matrix whereby visible strength in power is revered, feared and any
weakness in the lacking of action in power is despised.
I believe DRC is on the cusp of emerging economic social greatness
as an African National State administered and subject to norms
grounded within rules ubiquitous for all Citizens, regardless of rank
in status.
A DRC State reflecting strong the rule of law in process and in
procedure I believe will create a political public cascading effect in
Sub-Saharan Africa inordinate in the calming of ‘ad hoc’ extremism in
rent seeking governance.
The Government of Canada is now reaffirming to the International
Community at Large a re-commitment to engaging in International
Peacekeeping Missions.
Therefore, in keeping with the values engrained within
International Peacekeeping, I recommend the Western Democracies issue
a Statement expressing strong support in the respecting of rule of law
by President Kabila evinced in his adherence to the DRC Constitution,
whereby, on December 19/16, one hopes he will vacate Office as DRC
President.
A Public Statement by the International Community will illustrate
clarion that democratic values without ‘fear or favour’ in rule of law
matters as ‘practice’ and not merely as ‘fiction’.
The Western Democracies can make a profound difference in DRC
social publics.
The Western Democracies ought to display in ‘publics’ that
Principles of Governance subject to Rule of Law is not merely a
talisman deployed for show when participating in International Forums.
Conviction to principles does matter, as other African Nations
will be watching closely in how International Partners respect their
own talk when engaging in post conflict development respecting other
Nations States.
The Peoples of DRC will be watching too, as many innocent lives
are in balance.
Why is DRC most challenged in elements social civic civil
political publics culminating now in Joseph Kabila’s express intent in
not respecting the DRC Constitution inclusive in rule of law which
places time limits in executive term of office length?
My muse as to why current DRC civic civil public politics is
roiled and astringent in utter lack of civic civil social cohesive
capacity in performance and strengthening of public institutions can
be traced to the moment of Congo Independence from Belgium in June 30,
1960.
I remain convinced that the circumstances surrounding the 1961
assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba witnessed the
commencement and root of many of the present day problems afflicting
DRC—–an African Nation State so rich rife in human capital potential
and promise, yet most unactualized in social civic economic and public
political specific ‘gravity’.
Something about Lumumba’s social civic public trajectory and the
manner of his death offended global public opinion among both the
elites and non elites, and has continued to attract and generate
attention within the United Nations, and in Belgium and in the United
States, and even in DRC itself. Many political public and social civic
actors—–black Africans and white internationals created and
instrumentalized Lumumba’s downfall.
A review of the Congo’s politics in 1960 both integrates and
suggests for me the perspectives of at least four primary competing
public civic actors.
1. the Congo’s inexperienced politicians who lacked absolute
comprehension as to how to govern and why governance exists
2. a normative righteous presumptive yet most flawed United
Nations exemplified by the then Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold who
at times displayed an idealized form in absolute lack in prescriptive
sound reasoned judgement when confronting crisis
3. an entrenched Belgian bureaucracy determined to hold on to and
maintain past imperial prerogatives regardless of collateralized
national Congo enmity directed to this soon to be vestigial
colonialist ‘dictat’ in a land no longer Belgium sovereign
4. an arrogant and destructive United States which under CIA aegis
elected to project ‘cold war’ leitmotiv into Congo social civics
without regard to potential social civic strife.
This most arresting complex multi-dimensional tale of greed and
power has intersecting narrative lines and an international array of
participant actors. These diverse political public styles and variance
in social civic conventions of propriety do require an explanation as
well as a profound reflective consideration with the reward being a
fuller complete and more profound understanding of a momentous event
in African social civic public political topography.
The Congo in 1960 illustrates manifest the roots of empire, and
also the exercise and deployment of power without mercy. The social
public ruin of Lumumba displays in purest form the vicious character
of society without sovereignty, and illustrates the deepest problems
of political ethics. Today, DRC institutions of social civic
governance are still entailed and encumbered within the antecedents of
this past break down in social public civics. President Joseph
Kabila’s refusal to respect and comply with the DRC Constitution is
merely the resultant of Congo’s ongoing civic civil social
disequilibrium which commenced on the day of Congo Independence, June
30,1960.
Since Wednesday December 14/16, I am back home in Toronto, Canada
on Christmas Leave with my return back to DRC mid January.
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