2.6.32-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------ From: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]> commit 4906e50b37e6f6c264e7ee4237343eb2b7f8d16d upstream. While password processing we can get out of options array bound if the next character after array is delimiter. The patch adds a check if we reach the end. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -799,8 +799,7 @@ static int cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname, struct smb_vol *vol) { - char *value; - char *data; + char *value, *data, *end; unsigned int temp_len, i, j; char separator[2]; short int override_uid = -1; @@ -843,6 +842,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, if (!options) return 1; + end = options + strlen(options); if (strncmp(options, "sep=", 4) == 0) { if (options[4] != 0) { separator[0] = options[4]; @@ -907,6 +907,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, the only illegal character in a password is null */ if ((value[temp_len] == 0) && + (value + temp_len < end) && (value[temp_len+1] == separator[0])) { /* reinsert comma */ value[temp_len] = separator[0]; _______________________________________________ stable mailing list [email protected] http://linux.kernel.org/mailman/listinfo/stable
