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Washington Post
June 10, 2001

Why Is Russia Still Peddling This Old Soviet Lie?

By Mark Kramer

Mark Kramer is director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies and a
senior associate of the Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard
University.

The Soviet Union is still dead, but some Soviet fictions live on. The
Russian
government's recent statements in defense of the Soviet occupation of the
Baltics are more than just bewildering or dishonest. They are also causing
tensions that -- perhaps sooner rather than later -- will be felt in
Washington and Europe as the three Baltic nations press their cases to
become
members of an expanded NATO.

It was 60 years ago this week, on the night of June 13, 1941,that Soviet
troops began deporting tens of thousands of Latvians, Lithuanians and
Estonians to prison camps in Siberia. Within hours, men, women and children
deemed "enemies of the Soviet regime" were rounded up. Many never made it to
the gulags. They were executed on the spot.

The brutal operation was intended to consolidate Soviet rule in the Baltic
nations, which had been independent until the Soviets sent troops to occupy
them in October 1939. Annexation followed, along with puppet governments.
The
Nazi invasion of the USSR through the Baltics, which took place just a week
after the mass deportations, temporarily disrupted the Soviets' hold. But
after driving out the Germans in 1944, the Soviet army returned and
undertook
new rounds of deportations and executions, this time accusing local
residents
of Nazi collaboration. All told, the Soviet forces shipped off or executed
more than 250,000 people, according to the documented evidence.

Nearly 10 years have elapsed since the Soviet Union dissolved and the Baltic
nations regained their independence -- time enough for Russia, the successor
state, to own up to the past. But at the Russian foreign ministry, earlier
acknowledgments have given way to the same old Soviet lie: An official
statement -- issued last June after Lithuania sought compensation for the
damage done by Soviet occupation -- maintains that Lithuania and the other
Baltic republics "voluntarily" joined the Soviet Union in the face of the
Nazi threat. "The USSR sent its troops into the Baltic region only after the
leaders there requested it," the statement said. "Assertions about the
'occupation' and 'annexation' of Lithuania by the Soviet Union ignore the
political, historical, and legal realities and are therefore devoid of
merit." Russian deputy foreign minister Ivan Sergeyev reiterated that view
in
March, provoking indignation in the Baltics.

Anyone seeking to understand why Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are so intent
on joining NATO must look back at the events of 60 years ago. Memories of
the
Soviet era of domination -- and the mass deportations in particular -- are
still raw and emotional. In the mid-1990s, the Latvian government compiled a
multi-volume record to commemorate the deportations, emulating the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial in Washington. The volumes list the names of the deportees
along with basic information about them (date of birth, date deported, date
of death or release, place of imprisonment). As your eyes scan the stark
list
of names, it is hard not to be struck by the large percentage who are listed
as having died on the way to the gulag or within months of arriving.

The lasting impact of the trauma was evident to me during a recent visit to
Riga, the capital of Latvia. I spoke at length with a survivor of the
deportations, Sima Feigins, who was a 20-year-old student when Soviet troops
wearing blue berets burst into her parents' home in June 1941. She and her
mother were taken away separately from her father; Feigins never saw him
again and learned that he died of malnutrition and dysentery six months
later
at a forced-labor camp.

Feigins and her mother were packed into a boxcar with hundreds of other
Latvian deportees for the suffocating journey to a Siberian prison camp.
Some
of them, including Feigins, could speak Russian. But many who spoke Latvian
(or, in some cases, German) knew just a smattering of Russian. Feigins
recalled how the Soviet guards berated them: "You're all fascists! How dare
you not know Russian?!"

Feigins's mother quickly weakened under the strain of the camp, and by
February 1942 she was too enervated to stand. When she became severely
dehydrated, Feigins begged one of the female guards for some milk, offering
her last remaining blouse in trade. The guard snatched the blouse -- leaving
Feigins only with the overcoat she was wearing -- and, with a sneer, handed
over a thimble-sized glass. Feigins rushed the liquid back to her mother,
but
it was far too little to help. Her mother died the next day. Feigins later
had to exchange food with another prisoner to get herself another blouse.

Feigins spent the next 15 years in the camp, barely surviving a regimen that
killed many of her fellow prisoners. When she was released in May 1956, the
Soviet government provided no money for her to return to Riga. As a result,
she was forced to stay in the camp another year until she managed to contact
the man who was her fiancé at the time of her deportation, whom she had not
seen since then. He had made it back to Riga from a separate deportation
site
in Kazakhstan, and he persuaded his mother to sell her wedding ring so he
could pay for Feigins's trip back to Riga.

This tragic story of a young woman who was robbed of her parents, her health
and the prime years of her life is similar to those of many other survivors
I
interviewed during my recent trip to Latvia and on previous visits to the
Baltic states. I understood why many Baltic officials had hoped that Russia
would candidly acknowledge the horrors perpetrated by the Soviet regime.
Instead, they had to suffer the further indignity of Russian troops on their
soil until 1994, when the military grudgingly completed its withdrawal.

The Russian government's recent attempts to defend the Soviet annexation
have
brought forth statements of protest from Baltic leaders and the Baltic
Assembly, a joint advisory group set up by the three Baltic governments. The
assembly expressed regret that "Moscow has not yet offered a formal apology
for the crimes committed by the legal predecessor of the Russian Federation,
the Soviet Union, against Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. . . . Our
appeal to Russia about the past is simultaneously an appeal about the
future.
Without clearing up the past, the future will have no firm foundation."

The Russian government's stance may be motivated in part by a desire to
avoid
any liability for reparations. The Baltic governments want Moscow to pay for
the bloodshed and environmental damage of nearly 50 years of Soviet rule.
Under a law adopted last year, the Lithuanian government is obligated to
seek
reparations of $20 billion. Latvian and Estonian officials have proposed
similar amounts, but the Russian government has refused to discuss the
matter.

Important though the liability issue may be, it does not wholly explain the
recent comments by Russian officials. After all, the Russian government
could
plausibly argue that post-Soviet Russia should not be held accountable for
the crimes of the Soviet regime. The whitewashing of Soviet rule in the
Baltics is symptomatic instead of Russia's broader failure to distance
itself
from the Soviet past. It also reflects a widespread sense in Moscow that the
Baltic states are and must remain in Russia's "sphere of influence," a term
used earlier this year by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Russian government has vehemently objected to the proposed extension of
NATO into the Baltics, but Russia's own actions in misrepresenting the past
have exacerbated the problem, giving the Baltic countries greater incentive
to seek NATO protection. To be sure, the Baltic governments do not expect
Russia to attack their countries or to undertake other malevolent actions in
the near future. They are well aware of the difference between today's
Russia
and the Soviet regime under Joseph Stalin.

Nonetheless, memories of what happened in the Baltic states from 1940 to
1991
will not fade anytime soon. Russia's willingness to foment insurgencies and
engage in military operations in the former Soviet republics of Georgia,
Moldova and Tajikistan has not inspired confidence. So long as the Russian
government fails to acknowledge that the Baltic states were victims of
Soviet
rule and not voluntary participants in their occupation, suspicions of
Moscow's ultimate intentions will persist.

Because the Baltic states are so small, they know they must make strenuous
efforts to qualify for NATO membership. All three are now solid democracies
and are working toward eventual membership in the European Union. To bring
their armies up to NATO standards, they have established a Baltic Defense
College in Tartu, Estonia, under the command of a Danish general, a Baltic
peacekeeping battalion (part of which has served in Bosnia-Herzegovina), a
joint Baltic naval force, and a Baltic air surveillance and control network.
Public sentiment in Lithuania about the prospect of joining NATO has been
mixed, but any reservations would likely fade if the Western governments
held
out a realistic chance of entry.

In the West, however, many officials are concerned about antagonizing
Russia.
These concerns are perfectly legitimate, but there are ways of handling the
problem without giving Russia a de facto veto over the process. The United
States and its allies should stress that the debate over membership for the
Baltic countries is a sign of fundamental changes under way in NATO.
Although
NATO will remain a military alliance, that role will increasingly be
overshadowed by its status as a political community of democratic states --
a
community that Russia, too, might someday aspire to join.

If NATO fails to take in the Baltic states, it will create a new dividing
line in Europe. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet
Union brought hope that the divisions of the past could be overcome. A
decade
later, there is still a chance that this goal can be realized. Although the
tragic experiences of 60 years ago cannot be undone, the admission of the
Baltic states -- and perhaps eventually Russia -- into NATO will demonstrate
that the Western allies will not abandon the new democracies of Europe to an
unknown fate.

Miroslav Antic,
http://www.antic.org/


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