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2045 GMT, 010628
Analysis
Without consulting Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica, the Serbian
government extradited former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to
The Hague on June 28.
The move by Serbia to hand over Milosevic has exposed deep, perhaps
unbridgeable, cracks between Serbia and the Yugoslavia federation,
between Serbia and federation partner Montenegro, and between Serbian
Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and Kostunica.
There are multiple indications that Djindjic sidelined Kostunica in the
decision to extradite Milosevic. The Yugoslav president promised the
Serbian Socialist Party on June 28 - just before the extradition - that
there would be no cooperation with The Hague until Yugoslavia's
Constitutional Court had ruled on the legality of the extradition
decree.
Serb Prime Minister
Zoran Djindjic
Also, Belgrade's Radio B92 reported that Kostunica was not even invited
to the meeting in which Serb officials decided to surrender Milosevic.
Deputy Prime Minister Zarko Korac went so far as to tell the BBC that
Kostunica and his party were "quite isolated." As of 10:25 p.m. Belgrade
time - more than six hours after Milosevic was extradited - the Serbian
government had yet to officially notify Kostunica of the move, according
to Reuters, which cited a source in the president's office.
Moreover, Kostunica has never been more than lukewarm on extradition.
During his autumn 2000 presidential campaign, Kostunica rejected
extraditions of Yugoslav citizens in general and of Milosevic
specifically.
Since taking office, Kostunica has consistently been the last Serb
leader to agree to each step of cooperation with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and as recently as the
morning of June 28 insisted that if any extraditions were to occur, that
they must adhere to the "appropriate legal framework," Beta news agency
reported.
But since the Constitutional Court froze the June 27 decree that
"allowed" extraditions, that process would take - at a minimum - another
two weeks. And so the Serbian government acted without him.
Far from ending 10 years of political drama in the former Yugoslavia,
Milosevic's extradition prefaces its final chapter: the final
dissolution of Yugoslavia.
The extradition occurred over the protests of Kostunica and the
Montenegrin Socialist People's Party (SNP), the federal government's
junior coalition partner. More important, the order came directly from
Serbia, one of the two constituent republics of the Yugoslav federation
- not from the federal government itself. The entire thrust to extradite
Milosevic evaded the federal Parliament, the federal president and the
federal courts.
For the Serbian government, this was a necessary step. Milosevic's
extradition was essential to obtain strong American support at the June
29 donor conference. Without the United States' participation in the
conference, the government could never have raised the $1 billion in
reconstruction funds it needs to survive the winter. But in paving the
way for Serbia's economic safety, Djindjic and his allies have sealed
Yugoslavia's fate.
The extradition of Milosevic now becomes a precursor to the struggle for
the federation's future.
Serbs in the reform government favor dissolving the federation.
Technocrats backing the reform program of Djindjic want to make a clean
break from holdovers of the Milosevic regime. They want to govern with
relative autonomy, begin building a viable market economy, secure
foreign assistance and create a democratic Serbia to integrate with
Europe.
In Podgorica, Montenegrin officials for months have sought equal status
with Serbia or all-out independence. A campaign for independence has had
little popular support, and parties in Montenegro are divided on the
issue. Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic is driving the campaign and
slowly gaining voter support. Pro-independence factions in Montenegro
want a referendum within months.
A range of actors and interests is slowly tearing down the federation.
The ultimate division of Yugoslavia into two states will redefine how
power is projected in the Balkans. Montenegro and Serbia will become
isolated militarily and economically, and their domestic and foreign
policies will reflect their reliance on the international community for
survival. Accordingly, their armed forces will demonstrate cooperation
with neighboring militaries rather than the competition expressed under
the federated Yugoslavia.
But the battle for Yugoslavia's future is now being waged between the
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), which leads Yugoslavia's
coalition government, and the SNP. The lines were drawn in the recent
debate over a bill supporting Milosevic's extradition to The Hague: On
June 21, SNP rejected compromise on a bill for extraditing Yugoslav
citizens. Led by Djindjic, DOS withdrew the bill from parliamentary
consideration and pushed through a decree, without Montenegro's consent,
at the federal Cabinet level June 23.
Djindjic's move to subvert the federal system incited a feud over the
future direction of Yugoslavia, its reconstruction and its parliamentary
composition. In a bid for both international funds and political power,
Djindjic appears willing to accept the federation's disintegration.
There is now little to prevent the system's collapse in coming months.
The event would mark the final fracture of the formerly united Yugoslav
state - a fragile entity knitted together after World War I but ripped
apart by bloody ethnic rivalries during the 1990s.
The breakup has financial ramifications for the United States and
European Union, which will find it easier to stimulate regional
development as the Serbian and Montenegrin shadow economies become
severed.
Montenegro has insulated its economy from Serbia since abandoning the
dinar currency standard last year. But corruption is endemic to the two
systems, and responsible leadership and training are needed to
counteract it. Donor nations can better enforce and reward two exclusive
programs for combating corruption whereas federal officers could hamper
the process.
Serbia and Montenegro are likely to become isolated debtor nations.
Without access to Montenegro's coast, Serbia's economy will become more
a liability than an asset to Europe. Lack of microeconomic starters and
devastated infrastructure will make Serbia the slower of the two to
develop. Montenegro's economy has an effective head start on Serbia and
will likely draw more investors.
An independent Serbia and Montenegro will be unable to counter NATO
hegemony in the Balkans. Serbia will maintain a land army but forfeit
its navy for lack of a coast and for focusing defense spending on ground
forces. Montenegro's Bar port will become a key facility for NATO
operations and training.
Both militaries will supplement rather than lead Balkan armies already
committed to the Partnership for Peace. And they will be weaker than the
neighboring army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO will retain a
coordinative role among the Balkan armies and become the strongest
military instrument. Russia will also lose a fair-weather ally when
Yugoslavia falls, and this will further isolate Russia from the politics
of the region.
The separate militaries will also be vulnerable to any resurgence of
Albanian guerrillas. Without multilateral aid and intervention, Serbia
will not be able to counter aggression from inside the Presevo Valley.
Similarly, Montenegro will need foreign intervention to push insurgents
out of its borders. As NATO and the United Nations train and rearm
Kosovar Albanians under the aegis of a civil protection corps, the
threat of future ethnic Albanian assaults on former Yugoslav territory
is practical.
Serbs and Montenegrins are both rallying behind the federation's
breakup. Factions insisting on a united Yugoslavia can be found among
the elite of the old Milosevic regime. These factions, which include
many indicted war criminals, object to the extradition of Yugoslav
citizens as an affront to national sovereignty. Satisfied with
Milosevic's pending extradition, the international community is silent
on the issue of disintegration.
Stuck between nationalists and reformers is Kostunica. He wants a
strong, democratic Yugoslavia, but he must concede to U.S. extradition
demands in order to help Yugoslavia recover economically. Doing so,
however, compromises his credentials as a nationalist. Surrendering
Yugoslav citizens in order to ensure economic aid undermines the
federation's sovereignty, which Kostunica defended regularly during his
presidential campaign.
Djindjic is also taking advantage of Yugoslavia's cooperation with The
Hague, and by extension the United States, to whittle away at
Kostunica's popularity.
Serbs in the Djindjic camp wanted to trade Milosevic for cash. The
United States in particular has threatened to block funding without
Yugoslavia's good faith efforts to extradite accused war criminals by
June 29.
The extradition issue has become a trigger for debate over the
federation's future. The SNP coalition for weeks has been calling for a
referendum on the federation. In the past, when Serbian political will
and the international community demanded a federated Yugoslavia,
threatening to pull out was a useful weapon for Montenegrins. Only days
ago, SNP President Predrag Bulatovic was insisting that a referendum on
relations between the two republics was crucial.
But the tables are turning on Bulatovic as Serb enthusiasm for
dissolving the federation grows.
Serb Justice Minister Vladan Batic recently suggested the federal system
is not functional. Federal Interior Minister Zoran Zivkovic also spoke
candidly to Belgrade's AIMPress on the federation's irrelevance. And
Slobodan Orlic, Yugoslavia's information secretary, told state
Television of Kragujevac that the federal structure needs
reconsideration.
Bulatovic, who unwittingly put on the instigator's hat in his dispute
with Djindjic is now backpedaling from referendum demands. The DOS may
get its way on disintegration while blaming Montenegrins for the
fallout.
Nationalists are also jumping into the fray. Milosevic's cronies are
cynical about the federation's powers and will consider withdrawing from
the government. Officers in the Socialist Party of Serbia, the former
party of Milosevic, claim extralegal measures on extradition violate the
federal constitution, according to Belgrade's I*Net News. They also
accuse Djindjic of running a government by decree.
Neither Djindjic nor Kostunica have stated publicly their positions, but
both are soon likely to announce support for revising the federation's
status. Disintegration - now a tentative outcome - will become only more
certain in coming weeks as Kostunica and Djindjic choose a path for
Yugoslavia.
Trapped between dueling political agendas, Kostunica will try to bargain
for a strong Yugoslav federation but to little effect. Djindjic and the
DOS will bargain instead for the separation of the two republics as a
means of protecting both their own power and Serbia's economic
viability.
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