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Of course, this isn't as nauseating, for example, as a completely
whitewatched, propaganda dispatch by Reuters. But, it's definitely
NWO material.
I was also thinking (after reading the paragraph at the very bottom)
that Yugoslavs might, in the long run, be in for a 'two-party system'
a la America: Kostinuca's party being the equivalent of the
democracts -- spouting supposedly progressive slogans while in
opposition, yet, always adopting a more business-like approach to
policy while in office -- and Djinkic's party, the Republicans --
reactionary and conservative in words and deeds.
David O.Q
On 29 Jun 01, at 0:17, STOP NATO: �NO PASARAN! wrote:
> STOP NATO: �NO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK
>
> 2045 GMT, 010628
> Analysis
>
> Without consulting Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica, the Serbian
> government extradited former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to
> The Hague on June 28.
>
>
>
> The move by Serbia to hand over Milosevic has exposed deep, perhaps
> unbridgeable, cracks between Serbia and the Yugoslavia federation,
> between Serbia and federation partner Montenegro, and between Serbian
> Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and Kostunica.
> There are multiple indications that Djindjic sidelined Kostunica in the
> decision to extradite Milosevic. The Yugoslav president promised the
> Serbian Socialist Party on June 28 - just before the extradition - that
> there would be no cooperation with The Hague until Yugoslavia's
> Constitutional Court had ruled on the legality of the extradition
> decree.
>
> Serb Prime Minister
> Zoran Djindjic
>
>
> Also, Belgrade's Radio B92 reported that Kostunica was not even invited
> to the meeting in which Serb officials decided to surrender Milosevic.
> Deputy Prime Minister Zarko Korac went so far as to tell the BBC that
> Kostunica and his party were "quite isolated." As of 10:25 p.m. Belgrade
> time - more than six hours after Milosevic was extradited - the Serbian
> government had yet to officially notify Kostunica of the move, according
> to Reuters, which cited a source in the president's office.
>
> Moreover, Kostunica has never been more than lukewarm on extradition.
> During his autumn 2000 presidential campaign, Kostunica rejected
> extraditions of Yugoslav citizens in general and of Milosevic
> specifically.
>
> Since taking office, Kostunica has consistently been the last Serb
> leader to agree to each step of cooperation with the International
> Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and as recently as the
> morning of June 28 insisted that if any extraditions were to occur, that
> they must adhere to the "appropriate legal framework," Beta news agency
> reported.
>
> But since the Constitutional Court froze the June 27 decree that
> "allowed" extraditions, that process would take - at a minimum - another
> two weeks. And so the Serbian government acted without him.
>
> Far from ending 10 years of political drama in the former Yugoslavia,
> Milosevic's extradition prefaces its final chapter: the final
> dissolution of Yugoslavia.
>
> The extradition occurred over the protests of Kostunica and the
> Montenegrin Socialist People's Party (SNP), the federal government's
> junior coalition partner. More important, the order came directly from
> Serbia, one of the two constituent republics of the Yugoslav federation
> - not from the federal government itself. The entire thrust to extradite
> Milosevic evaded the federal Parliament, the federal president and the
> federal courts.
>
> For the Serbian government, this was a necessary step. Milosevic's
> extradition was essential to obtain strong American support at the June
> 29 donor conference. Without the United States' participation in the
> conference, the government could never have raised the $1 billion in
> reconstruction funds it needs to survive the winter. But in paving the
> way for Serbia's economic safety, Djindjic and his allies have sealed
> Yugoslavia's fate.
>
> The extradition of Milosevic now becomes a precursor to the struggle for
> the federation's future.
>
> Serbs in the reform government favor dissolving the federation.
> Technocrats backing the reform program of Djindjic want to make a clean
> break from holdovers of the Milosevic regime. They want to govern with
> relative autonomy, begin building a viable market economy, secure
> foreign assistance and create a democratic Serbia to integrate with
> Europe.
>
> In Podgorica, Montenegrin officials for months have sought equal status
> with Serbia or all-out independence. A campaign for independence has had
> little popular support, and parties in Montenegro are divided on the
> issue. Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic is driving the campaign and
> slowly gaining voter support. Pro-independence factions in Montenegro
> want a referendum within months.
>
> A range of actors and interests is slowly tearing down the federation.
> The ultimate division of Yugoslavia into two states will redefine how
> power is projected in the Balkans. Montenegro and Serbia will become
> isolated militarily and economically, and their domestic and foreign
> policies will reflect their reliance on the international community for
> survival. Accordingly, their armed forces will demonstrate cooperation
> with neighboring militaries rather than the competition expressed under
> the federated Yugoslavia.
>
>
>
> But the battle for Yugoslavia's future is now being waged between the
> Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), which leads Yugoslavia's
> coalition government, and the SNP. The lines were drawn in the recent
> debate over a bill supporting Milosevic's extradition to The Hague: On
> June 21, SNP rejected compromise on a bill for extraditing Yugoslav
> citizens. Led by Djindjic, DOS withdrew the bill from parliamentary
> consideration and pushed through a decree, without Montenegro's consent,
> at the federal Cabinet level June 23.
>
> Djindjic's move to subvert the federal system incited a feud over the
> future direction of Yugoslavia, its reconstruction and its parliamentary
> composition. In a bid for both international funds and political power,
> Djindjic appears willing to accept the federation's disintegration.
> There is now little to prevent the system's collapse in coming months.
>
> The event would mark the final fracture of the formerly united Yugoslav
> state - a fragile entity knitted together after World War I but ripped
> apart by bloody ethnic rivalries during the 1990s.
>
> The breakup has financial ramifications for the United States and
> European Union, which will find it easier to stimulate regional
> development as the Serbian and Montenegrin shadow economies become
> severed.
>
> Montenegro has insulated its economy from Serbia since abandoning the
> dinar currency standard last year. But corruption is endemic to the two
> systems, and responsible leadership and training are needed to
> counteract it. Donor nations can better enforce and reward two exclusive
> programs for combating corruption whereas federal officers could hamper
> the process.
>
> Serbia and Montenegro are likely to become isolated debtor nations.
> Without access to Montenegro's coast, Serbia's economy will become more
> a liability than an asset to Europe. Lack of microeconomic starters and
> devastated infrastructure will make Serbia the slower of the two to
> develop. Montenegro's economy has an effective head start on Serbia and
> will likely draw more investors.
>
> An independent Serbia and Montenegro will be unable to counter NATO
> hegemony in the Balkans. Serbia will maintain a land army but forfeit
> its navy for lack of a coast and for focusing defense spending on ground
> forces. Montenegro's Bar port will become a key facility for NATO
> operations and training.
>
> Both militaries will supplement rather than lead Balkan armies already
> committed to the Partnership for Peace. And they will be weaker than the
> neighboring army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO will retain a
> coordinative role among the Balkan armies and become the strongest
> military instrument. Russia will also lose a fair-weather ally when
> Yugoslavia falls, and this will further isolate Russia from the politics
> of the region.
>
> The separate militaries will also be vulnerable to any resurgence of
> Albanian guerrillas. Without multilateral aid and intervention, Serbia
> will not be able to counter aggression from inside the Presevo Valley.
> Similarly, Montenegro will need foreign intervention to push insurgents
> out of its borders. As NATO and the United Nations train and rearm
> Kosovar Albanians under the aegis of a civil protection corps, the
> threat of future ethnic Albanian assaults on former Yugoslav territory
> is practical.
>
> Serbs and Montenegrins are both rallying behind the federation's
> breakup. Factions insisting on a united Yugoslavia can be found among
> the elite of the old Milosevic regime. These factions, which include
> many indicted war criminals, object to the extradition of Yugoslav
> citizens as an affront to national sovereignty. Satisfied with
> Milosevic's pending extradition, the international community is silent
> on the issue of disintegration.
>
> Stuck between nationalists and reformers is Kostunica. He wants a
> strong, democratic Yugoslavia, but he must concede to U.S. extradition
> demands in order to help Yugoslavia recover economically. Doing so,
> however, compromises his credentials as a nationalist. Surrendering
> Yugoslav citizens in order to ensure economic aid undermines the
> federation's sovereignty, which Kostunica defended regularly during his
> presidential campaign.
>
> Djindjic is also taking advantage of Yugoslavia's cooperation with The
> Hague, and by extension the United States, to whittle away at
> Kostunica's popularity.
>
> Serbs in the Djindjic camp wanted to trade Milosevic for cash. The
> United States in particular has threatened to block funding without
> Yugoslavia's good faith efforts to extradite accused war criminals by
> June 29.
>
> The extradition issue has become a trigger for debate over the
> federation's future. The SNP coalition for weeks has been calling for a
> referendum on the federation. In the past, when Serbian political will
> and the international community demanded a federated Yugoslavia,
> threatening to pull out was a useful weapon for Montenegrins. Only days
> ago, SNP President Predrag Bulatovic was insisting that a referendum on
> relations between the two republics was crucial.
>
> But the tables are turning on Bulatovic as Serb enthusiasm for
> dissolving the federation grows.
>
> Serb Justice Minister Vladan Batic recently suggested the federal system
> is not functional. Federal Interior Minister Zoran Zivkovic also spoke
> candidly to Belgrade's AIMPress on the federation's irrelevance. And
> Slobodan Orlic, Yugoslavia's information secretary, told state
> Television of Kragujevac that the federal structure needs
> reconsideration.
>
> Bulatovic, who unwittingly put on the instigator's hat in his dispute
> with Djindjic is now backpedaling from referendum demands. The DOS may
> get its way on disintegration while blaming Montenegrins for the
> fallout.
>
> Nationalists are also jumping into the fray. Milosevic's cronies are
> cynical about the federation's powers and will consider withdrawing from
> the government. Officers in the Socialist Party of Serbia, the former
> party of Milosevic, claim extralegal measures on extradition violate the
> federal constitution, according to Belgrade's I*Net News. They also
> accuse Djindjic of running a government by decree.
>
> Neither Djindjic nor Kostunica have stated publicly their positions, but
> both are soon likely to announce support for revising the federation's
> status. Disintegration - now a tentative outcome - will become only more
> certain in coming weeks as Kostunica and Djindjic choose a path for
> Yugoslavia.
>
> Trapped between dueling political agendas, Kostunica will try to bargain
> for a strong Yugoslav federation but to little effect. Djindjic and the
> DOS will bargain instead for the separation of the two republics as a
> means of protecting both their own power and Serbia's economic
> viability.
>
>
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