http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/feb2008/kle1-f27.shtml
  The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism by Naomi Klein, Allen 
Lane: 2007—Part 1  By Nick Beams
27 February 2008 
This is the first of a two-part review of Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine: The 
Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Part two will be posted on February 28.
Since its release last September, Naomi Klein’s latest book has been climbing 
best seller lists around the world. This response is the product, not merely of 
an undoubtedly well-organised promotional campaign along with significant 
exposure in the mass media, but of a significant shift to the left in broad 
sections of the world’s population.
In every country there is widening and deepening hostility to the free market 
program that has prevailed over the past two decades, and growing opposition to 
the official political establishment that has promoted it.
According to Klein, her book is a “challenge to the central and most cherished 
claim in the official story—that the triumph of deregulated capitalism has been 
born of freedom, that unfettered markets go hand in hand with democracy. 
Instead, I will show that this fundamental form of capitalism has consistently 
been midwifed by the most brutal forms of coercion” [p. 18].
This theme has undoubtedly struck a chord. But escalating opposition to the 
prevailing order inevitably raises the question: What is to be done? How can 
anger at the depredations of the “free market” be translated into an 
alternative program?
Herein lies the political significance of Klein’s book. Her central argument is 
that it is not necessary to overturn the capitalist profit system—indeed that 
would represent simply another version of the “fundamentalism” that 
characterises “free market doctrines”. On the contrary, another way can be 
found, based on returning to the so-called Keynesian measures—government 
intervention and regulation—that were employed during the post-World War II 
boom.
“I am not arguing that all forms of market systems are inherently violent,” she 
writes in the introduction. “It is eminently possible to have a market-based 
economy that requires no such brutality and demands no such ideological purity. 
A free market in consumer products can coexist with free public health care, 
with public schools, with a large segment of the economy—like a national oil 
company—held in state hands. It is possible to require corporations to pay 
decent wages, to respect the rights of workers to form unions, and for 
governments to tax and redistribute wealth so that the sharp inequalities that 
mark the corporatist state are reduced. Markets need not be fundamentalist.
“Keynes proposed exactly that kind of mixed, regulated economy after the Great 
Depression, a revolution in public policy that created the New Deal and 
transformations like it round the world. It was exactly that system of 
compromises, checks and balances that Friedman’s counterrevolution was launched 
to methodically dismantle in country after country” [p. 20].
Just as Keynes saw himself as a saviour of capitalism—he famously advised 
President Roosevelt in 1933 to take up his policies lest “orthodoxy” (the free 
market) and revolution “fight it out”—so Klein’s critique is not aimed at 
overturning the capitalist profit system. Like Keynes, she wants to save it 
from itself, by curbing its worst excesses.
Klein, of course, has the right to adopt any political stand she chooses. But 
her opposition to Marxism and its method of analysis means that she continually 
holds back from a deeper analysis of the global economy, lest it raise 
questions that would challenge her political standpoint, and the social 
interests it represents.
Klein begins by pointing to what she maintains is contemporary capitalism’s 
“core tactical nostrum”—what she calls the “shock doctrine”, as articulated by 
Milton Friedman. Friedman observed that “only a crisis—actual or 
perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are 
taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic 
function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and 
available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable” [p. 
6].
But Klein can provide no real explanation as to how the “free market” doctrines 
of Friedman and his Chicago School, regarded as the writings of near-cranks in 
the 1950s and 1960s, were elevated in the 1970s, leading to Friedman being 
awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1976.
For Klein, the application of Friedman’s shock doctrines is the outcome of a 
50-year campaign for total corporate liberation. “Though always cloaked in the 
language of math and science, Friedman’s vision coincided precisely with the 
interests of large multinationals, which by nature hungered for vast new 
unregulated markets” [p. 57].
In fact, this is far from the case. During the war, and in its immediate 
aftermath, there was a significant shift by large sections of big business 
towards supporting government intervention and economic regulation. Not only 
did they accommodate themselves to regulatory mechanisms, they often played a 
key role in setting them up.
The attitude of key sections of American business was summed up in a speech by 
William Benton, founder of a business lobby group, the Committee for Economic 
Development (CED), delivered in 1949:
“The historic attitude of business has been to use government if it could, and 
abuse it if it couldn’t. Philosophically, business was committed to the 
doctrine that, ‘the government is best which governs least.’ The emerging CED 
attitude has been that ‘government has a positive and permanent role in 
achieving the common objectives of high employment and production and high and 
rising standards of living for people in all walks of life.’ ... The greatest 
single achievement of CED ... may turn out to be the clarification it has been 
developing on the role of government in the economy. ... This is our present 
answer to the European brands of socialism. Long may it thrive” [cited in 
Robert M. Collins, The Business Response to Keynes, 1929-1964, Columbia 
University Press, 1981, p. 206].
Twenty years later, Nixon summed up the attitude of large sections of the 
corporate elite with his famous remark that “we’re all Keynesians now.” As far 
as Friedman was concerned, however, Nixon had carried out “socialist” measures.
Furthermore, even if it were the case that the imposition of Friedmanite 
measures was the culmination of a 50-year corporate campaign, one would still 
have to explain why this campaign was successful. One would need to detail the 
changes in the economic situation that rendered yesterday’s “crank” writings 
today’s official wisdom.
Klein does not provide such an explanation because it would make all too clear 
that the rise of “Friedmanism” was associated with objective processes within 
the capitalist economy, leading to the end of the post-war boom and the world 
economic crisis of the 1970s—processes that Keynesian measures proved incapable 
of reversing.

  The “free market” and state repression
  The economic boom following World War II was not the product of Keynesian 
measures but of the restructuring of the world economy organised by the United 
States, especially via the Marshall Plan. This restructuring made possible the 
extension to the rest of the world of the more productive methods associated 
with assembly-line production that had been developed in the United States. It 
engendered an increase in the rate of profit throughout the world capitalist 
economy, which became the primary factor leading to the boom, making possible 
the increased wages and social concessions of this period. In other words, 
Keynesian measures were the product, not the cause, of the post-war boom.
That is why, when profit rates began to turn down by the end of the 1960s and 
early 1970s, Keynesian measures were unable to restore the previous expansion. 
In fact, rather than alleviating economic problems, these policies, based on 
increased public spending, tended to exacerbate them.
Under condition where profits were falling, Keynesian reflationary measures saw 
major corporations increase their prices to try to counter the trend, rather 
than increasing output and employment, leading to “stagflation”—the combination 
of high and persistent unemployment and high levels of price inflation.
As a consequence, the application of Keynesian measures played a not 
inconsiderable role in providing the social base in sections of the middle 
class upon which Thatcher and Reagan—two of the chief proponents of the “free 
market”—based their respective successful election campaigns of 1979 and 1980.
Throughout her book, Klein establishes the connection between the imposition of 
the “free market” agenda and the use of violent methods of state repression, 
from Latin America, to China and the shock of the Tiananmen Square massacre, to 
Boris Yeltsin’s decision to use tanks to fire on the parliament building in 
1993, and to the NATO attack on Belgrade in 1999.
In the case of Latin America, where the Freidman agenda was first imposed in 
the 1970s, Klein emphasises the relationship between state violence and the 
economic agenda it served by criticising the human rights lobby for its refusal 
to examine the reasons behind the repression it was denouncing.
Acts of terror in Chile and Argentina were framed narrowly as “human rights 
abuses” rather than as “tools which served clear political and economic ends”. 
“[B]y by focusing purely on the crimes and not on the reasons behind them, the 
human rights movement also helped the Chicago School ideology to escape from 
the first bloody laboratory virtually unscathed.”
Amnesty International’s report on Argentina, detailing the military junta’s 
atrocities, was “a breakthrough worthy of its Nobel Prize. Yet for all its 
thoroughness, the report sheds no light on why the abuses were occurring.” The 
92-page report made “no mention of the fact that the junta was in the process 
of remaking the country along radical capitalist lines. It offered no comment 
on the deepening poverty or the dramatic reversal of programs to redistribute 
wealth, though these were the policy centerpieces of junta rule.”
If the junta’s economic project had been examined, she continues, it would have 
been clear why such extraordinary repression was necessary and why so many of 
Amnesty’s prisoners of conscience were trade unionists and social workers.
“In another major omission, Amnesty presented the conflict as one restricted to 
the local military and left-wing extremists. No other players are mentioned—not 
the US government or the CIA; not local landowners; not multinational 
corporations. Without an examination of the larger plan to impose ‘pure’ 
capitalism on Latin America, and the powerful interests behind that project, 
the acts of sadism documented in the report made no sense at all—they were just 
random, free-floating bad events, drifting in the political ether, to be 
condemned by all people of conscience but impossible to understand” 
[pp.118-120].
These points are well made. But they can be extended to Klein herself. She goes 
further than Amnesty, but like the human rights organisation calls a halt right 
at the point where further investigation should begin. If the acts of violence 
were not random events but were bound up with a definite economic agenda, then 
the question immediately arises: why then, in the mid 1970s? Why not earlier?
Klein does not choose to even pose the question, let alone probe the connection 
between the crisis of the world capitalist economy that erupted in the 1970s, 
the end of the post-war boom and the breakdown of the Keynesian program of 
economic reforms. And yet the connection is clearly visible. In September 1976, 
as the junta’s repression was being unleashed in Argentina and Milton Friedman 
was receiving the Nobel Prize, British Prime Minister James Callaghan was 
explaining to the Labour Party that the days of Keynesian spending to boost the 
economy were over.
According to Klein, the refusal of the human rights lobby to “connect the 
apparatus of state terror to the ideological project it served” can be seen, in 
the case of Amnesty, as an attempt to “remain impartial amid Cold War 
tensions”. In the case of many other groups it was a question of money, given 
the significance of the Ford Foundation in providing funds for human rights 
organisations.
One is obliged, however, to pose the same question in relation to Klein: why 
does she refuse to examine the underlying processes of the capitalist economy 
that give rise to the state terror and violence she condemns?
To be continued



       
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