> hmac.c - used to authenticate packets sent across the wire (what else?)
Turns out that ikev1_quick.c uses it for one of those PRF+ like calculations :-( On my branch I've re-implemented hmac.c so that it is just a wrapper around crypt_prf.c. For reference we've the following hmac.c calls: ikev1_main.c: I suspect integrity of a message ikev1_quick.c: see "5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode" a whole pile of crypto material based on prf() ikev1_xauth.c: I suspect integrity of a message ikev2_parent.c: integrity using prf(key, <data-for-wire>) ikev2_psk.c: prf(prf(Shared Secret,"Key Pad for IKEv2"), <msg octets>) It would be nice to eliminate the wrapper, but it just gets really invasive. I think a case-by-case driven by the need to secure more of the keying material would be better.
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