On Tue, 28 Apr 2015, Andrew Cagney wrote:
> hmac.c - used to authenticate packets sent across the wire (what else?)
Turns out that ikev1_quick.c uses it for one of those PRF+ like calculations :-(
On my branch I've re-implemented hmac.c so that it is just a wrapper around
crypt_prf.c.
I've tested it and the backport of it. Looks good. And it interops with Cisco :)
For reference we've the following hmac.c calls:
ikev1_main.c: I suspect integrity of a message
ikev1_quick.c: see "5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode" a whole pile of crypto material
based on prf()
ikev1_xauth.c: I suspect integrity of a message
ikev2_parent.c: integrity using prf(key, <data-for-wire>)
ikev2_psk.c: prf(prf(Shared Secret,"Key Pad for IKEv2"), <msg octets>)
It would be nice to eliminate the wrapper, but it just gets really invasive. I
think a case-by-case driven by
the need to secure more of the keying material would be better.
I think the wrapper is fine for now, and looks like less code
duplication compared to getting rid of it.
Thanks,
Paul
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