On Wed, 20 Oct 1999, Chris Calabrese wrote:
> Authentication/encryption services don't have to be directly provided
> by the logging system itself, but the logging system must have enough
> intimate contact to guarantee that logs are only going to where
> they're supposed to and that logs came from where they were supposed
> to.
Hence something pluggable is preferrable, true. Nevertheless, if you run
unauthenticated over some other service that does authentication,
*forcing* hashing/encryption is probably a bad idea. After all, there's a
ton of applications that - for some reason - does not need security et
junk..
> Also, the logging system has to be part of the system's "Trusted
> Computing Base" or the log system itself can be attacked. If the
> authentication/encryption element is separate, than this piece has to
> be in the "Trusted Computing Base" too.
I'd rather see -one- piece that does encryption/authenication with peers
than -every- piece doing that part myself.
Kriss
--- .... --..-- -.-- --- ..- .-. . .- -.. -- --- .-. ... . --..-- . .... ..--..
Kriss Andsten <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> telnet slartibartfast.vogon.se 4243
