Zooko O'Whielacronx wrote: > We should think that issue through, along with the accompanying issue > of "how low a chance of success is low enough". If there are 2^50 > caps in use, and some technique can "attack all known caps at once", > then do we need to increase the size of the caps (possibly by up to 50 > bits) to make it so that the chance of success against *any* target is > still negligible? Or is it just unreasonable to think that some > adversary would spend massive amounts of computer power in order to > forge some random cap out of a large set of caps?
Obviously this depends on what caps are being used for. For what caps are *now* being used for, no one would to forge some random cap out of a very large set of caps. If caps were used for the purpose that the shared secret of a credit card is used for, *then* people would be interested in forging some random cap - but that is a new kind of cap, which could be defined with a new number of bits. _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list [email protected] http://allmydata.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev
