Hello
>2. In 3.2.3, there is : > > - [cryptsetup](http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/) ensures storage > encryption using [LUKS](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LUKS) please consider loop-aes its far more secure that the others mentioned. tim -------- Original-Nachricht -------- > Datum: Mon, 20 Dec 2010 14:10:24 -0800 > Von: [email protected] > An: [email protected] > Betreff: Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] Specification and security design document > > El Tue, 14 Dec 2010 10:28:44 -0800 > [email protected] escribió: > > From: intrigeri <[email protected]> > > To: [email protected] > > Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 10:28:04 -0800 > > Enc: unencrypted > > Sig: No signature > > > > Hi, > > > > I've starting working on our specification and security design > > document, based on good old Incognito's one: > > > > https://amnesia.boum.org/contribute/design/draft/ > > > > Help, critics and comments are of course welcome. > > > > Bye, > > Hi, > > I just read the draft and it's great. Just a few comments, even thought > I don't know everything about Tails' internals. > > 1. First, about what you call the « post-mortem analysis ». I like the > term but I want to know whether it is a canonical term for security > experts or something that might need a bit more explanation. > > Then, apart from the threat model, the document is not very explicit > about this issue. There might not be much to say but I think that it > should at least be mentioned in the requirements, part 2 : > - What is required for a PELD to prevent from post-mortem analysis? > - How do we think this should be provided? > > Again in part 3, while presenting the implementation we should explain > more about what Tails does to achieve that. There is a paragraph on > host system RAM but I guess we can find more to explain, like : > - I could imagine that some LiveDistros detect the swap areas and use > them. Do we ? ;) > - I could imagine that some LiveDistros read the disks and possibly > mount the available partitions automatically. Same thing. > - I wonder how Tails addresses the requirements in 2.1.2, for example > this one : « The usage of encrypted removable storage devices (such > as USB sticks) should be encouraged. » > > I think this whole post-mortem analysis thingie is the real difference > to put forward while talking to the Tor people ; bringing their privacy > concerns further than just the Internet connection. You can be a Tor > freak and get the same Tor configuration as Tails on your own system > but you won't get the same post-mortem analysis protection. > > 2. In 3.2.3, there is : > > - [cryptsetup](http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/) ensures storage > encryption using [LUKS](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LUKS) > > Should we rather say 'offers' instead of 'ensures'. Is Tails using LUKS > if not asked to do so ? > > 3. You'll find attached to this mail a very small amount of aesthetics > and language fixes. I'm not sure whether there is a native English > speaker in the team but, well, we would a review at some point. > > Cheers, > > -- > sajolida > > > > > -- -- GMX DSL Doppel-Flat ab 19,99 Euro/mtl.! Jetzt auch mit gratis Notebook-Flat! http://portal.gmx.net/de/go/dsl _______________________________________________ tails-dev mailing list [email protected] https://boum.org/mailman/listinfo/tails-dev
