Hi, [email protected] wrote (20 Dec 2010 22:10:24 GMT) :
> Just a few comments, even thought I don't know everything about > Tails' internals. Thank you for such valuable input. > 1. First, about what you call the « post-mortem analysis ». I like the > term but I want to know whether it is a canonical term for security > experts or something that might need a bit more explanation. I think the keyword here is forensics. Could go instead of analysis. > Then, apart from the threat model, the document is not very explicit > about this issue. There might not be much to say but I think that it > should at least be mentioned in the requirements, part 2 : > - What is required for a PELD to prevent from post-mortem analysis? > - How do we think this should be provided? I agree, we should improve this. > Again in part 3, while presenting the implementation we should explain > more about what Tails does to achieve that. There is a paragraph on > host system RAM but I guess we can find more to explain, like : > - I could imagine that some LiveDistros detect the swap areas and use > them. Do we ? ;) Hints to the one who will write this part: - not using live-boot's swapon option - config/chroot_local-hooks/03-noswap - config/chroot_local-hooks/05-disable_swapon > - I could imagine that some LiveDistros read the disks and possibly > mount the available partitions automatically. Same thing. Hints to the one who will write this part: - grep nopersistent config/amnesia - probably a few GConf settings in config/chroot_local-includes/usr/share/amnesia/gconf/ > - I wonder how Tails addresses the requirements in 2.1.2, for example > this one : « The usage of encrypted removable storage devices (such > as USB sticks) should be encouraged. » > I think this whole post-mortem analysis thingie is the real difference > to put forward while talking to the Tor people ; bringing their privacy > concerns further than just the Internet connection. You can be a Tor > freak and get the same Tor configuration as Tails on your own system > but you won't get the same post-mortem analysis protection. I agree, we should insist a bit on this topic. > 2. In 3.2.3, there is : > - [cryptsetup](http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/) ensures storage > encryption using [LUKS](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LUKS) > Should we rather say 'offers' instead of 'ensures'. Agreed. > Is Tails using LUKS if not asked to do so ? It is not. Bye, -- intrigeri <[email protected]> | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr-fingerprint.asc | Who wants a world in which the guarantee that we shall not | die of starvation would entail the risk of dying of boredom ? _______________________________________________ tails-dev mailing list [email protected] https://boum.org/mailman/listinfo/tails-dev
