Hi Maxim, Early October, we were pondering setting the Tails system time from unverified-consensus in case cached-consensus is not present; long story short, we refrained to do so in a hurry at pre-release time; eventually, we did not take the time yet to investigate how safe it would be to do so, and why.
On October 9th, a commit of yours (58cc2dd) in Liberté Linux Git repository made the very move we were unsure of. So I guess this approach seemed safe enough to your eyes. May we know why? In other words, what kind of malicious party is able to feed such a consensus to the Tor client running in Liberté Linux (or Tails) at this point, in a way that this Tor client saves it to unverified-consensus? Regards, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc | If you must label the absolute, use it's proper name: Temporary. _______________________________________________ tails-dev mailing list [email protected] https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev
