Hi, adrelanos wrote (02 Jul 2013 23:04:43 GMT) : > As per "[Tails-dev] documentation contribution process too > bureaucratic?", I'd prefer just to create todo discussion page, [...] > [Using git patches for this kind of stuff, for me, takes more time than > editing like three or four such chapters.
Whatever you prefer (and that actually can be reviewed and merged without too much silly efforts), but please propose changes to the *source* of the page, not to the rendered output. One does not submit binary patches to the *compiled* Linux kernel, and there are good reasons for this :) >>> If the censorship circumvention option (implemented as bridge mode) or >>> possible future Tails detection protection option is enabled, we want >>> the network fingerprint detection resistance, at least to the extend, >>> that it beats DPI boxes at least as good as the censorship circumvention >>> tool (implemented using pluggable transports) does. >> >> OK, this paragraph can certainly be used somewhere in this document, >> but the section you're patching is about distinguishing Tails users >> from other Tor users, so I doubt censorship circumvention fits right >> in there. > Then I must have got something wrong. This was in response too: >>> What is also open to decide for you, is whether you like to improve the >>> network fingerprint (from ISP perspective) when these problems start >>> having real world impacts (censors start censoring based on Tails >>> network fingerprint) or precautionary. >> I think we're trying to be proactive about making it harder to detect >> Tails users who use bridge mode. <snip> > I think fingerprinting and distinguishing Tails users from other Tor > users is interconnected a lot. Sure. Perhaps that's a good enough reason to re-purpose the whole section. But still, one can't tell in the introduction that it's about one thing, and then talk (surprise!) about the other. See what I mean? >>> And there https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/Time_syncing >>> /#index5h1 I'd remove: >> >>> "Tails developers still need to think thoroughly of these questions: are >>> such fingerprinting possibilities a serious problem? What kind of >>> efforts and compromise should be made to prevent these?" >> >> I don't understand why. Did we decide that the "Tor restart on >> startup" thing is a non-issue? It seems contradictory with the stated >> goal of defeating DPI. > I was mostly refering to "Tails developers still need to think > thoroughly of these questions" - I think these questions are, with the > new design decision (should this become one), answered. In meaning of, > "you don't have to think through it anymore, since this has been answered". I don't think so, but perhaps I missed something. What's the answer to these questions, then? Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc _______________________________________________ tails-dev mailing list [email protected] https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev
