intrigeri: > anonym and I have made great progress on this front, and we would like > feedback from you folks regarding the state of our current reasoning > and preferred design: > > https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5462 > https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/persistent_Tor_state/ > > In particular, the "Drawbacks of persistent Tor state" section is > important, and because of it the proposed design will require some > project-wide decision: > > https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/persistent_Tor_state/#drawbacks
Hi, I'm getting back on this to pick up your brain regarding how this might interact with a future persistent Tor configuration (#5461). This should probably be rather addressed while working on persistent Tor configuration, but I want to make sure that we are not blocking any possible solution for this while working on persistent Tor state or favor solutions that would make persistent Tor configuration easier. For the time being I don't think there's nothing to fix in your RFC regarding that. The thing is that people might need different Tor configuration depending on the place they connect from. You can do this manually already by setting up different bridges at different places. This might be needed to get connected to Tor (depending on where you are only certain bridges might be an option). You might also prefer not to use your secret private bridges when you are traveling not to provide confirmation options for your adversaries to track you. So in the end, it might be useful to provide persistent Tor configuration depending on your Tor state number, or to allow enabling your persistent Tor configuration only for some of them, etc. In the end, it feels like having the kind of Tor state number that you are proposing opens up for stronger and better possibilities for persistent Tor configuration. So, if anything, working on persistent Tor state first, and then on persistent Tor configuration seems to make sense. My 2 cents, _______________________________________________ Tails-dev mailing list [email protected] https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to [email protected].
