-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 intrigeri: > What's the design for giving Anon-Connection-Wizard (and thus the > desktop user) limited privileges on Tor? In other words, is it > designed with OnionGrater in mind, and with a threat model in > which the user who runs the GUI is not trusted? (I'm mainly asking > because of the upcoming switch to Wayland and our strong desire to > support a11y technologies, various input methods, etc., that all > require running such a Tor config app as the desktop user.)
Hi intrigeri! Thank you very much for your interest! anon-connection-wizard will write and read /etc/torrc.d/anon-connection-wizard , which requires root privileges. I am not sure if I can circumvent this. Do you have any idea on this problem, intrigeri? If anon-connection-wizard is running as a plugin like anonym's proposal, does this problem still exist? Thank you very much! Best, iry -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJZqPiDAAoJEKFLTbxtzdU8JH0P/j+fuJh2c3PXr/mjh9/TmOE2 bbnccSaCpBKpvQ1ZLuiImaS/W3yHXaMvHbMllK5porKhnfyJP8WmIpvo40Fvo5hg WICQMgqNwUvqJLm6xHDMmrh90Fv7dXVoNJXMlgxTsNnSH3ExrV6lPJ90pGXYxYeU 1mKdy8N8rKppk0tRTxUGFigHHMOZYKSU+XTvSYvdeTkwGSFUwAAVytXAaGOVt1Zt 7Q/w8I6fzDlFFQhQHNyRcylNYxpChmIQYXwRWh1k3CbYME+79z4TKp2uOoZoeVQB 3q2qR24idev+ug0Bs/AdZpjAEx8qorFtkheAfUmAVm6XgjeemvVnJvoqPZltt7Ti Znj/MfSucCEIf5cAhkh8rVsxL2lDUsa4ukFFOt9KSan3PkxoIZJB4XaGvhBmUo9Z tigS0OYPZrVo4dx4FBsdtAjp4oznZ+YVtm5GitZ4C9FxUBUNzGa+wzzcrMgfGFgt RwCbvwUBhgXrHFY++QjWZgk0Tl9zAJMrh5G/1f/ZilRE94qzOmAT4ogouhhpeFzO c6e85w9q8jHr7UH03cJw9N/M8W1xEUOFkvCKE1R5oU3cb0ktS2t2fEeWpYJpWPDK obIoHZUzfEn5a/a88HMB0mVVevjT7vf9PZJGNjlib57SsN8Gac628NRAwud2llbF Mvej/4urF/+dqQBSOS/B =3zdj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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