On Fri, Aug 1, 2014 at 10:13 PM, Joe Touch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 8/1/2014 2:11 PM, Nico Williams wrote: >> >> +1. Above all: integrity protection for the entire pair of data octet >> streams. >> >> Required as an option, if not alway: confidentiality protection >> (encryption). > > > AFAICT, this is backwards. > > The data stream needs to be confidential if we're focusing on anti-tracking. > > Integrity protection is relevant only if we think info will be injected that > will be used for tracking. Do we? (I don't).
Encryption without authentication is worthless: oracles can be assumed to exist. > > Authentication is relevant to ensure we know who we're being confidential > with. Any solution that allows MITM allows tracking - the tracker can > trivially serve as the MITM. > > AFAICT, no solution we have yet addresses the real problem if we believe the > charter. What does tcpcrypt not address? What is the "real problem" that it doesn't solve? Sincerely, Watson Ladd > > Joe > > > _______________________________________________ > Tcpinc mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpinc -- "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." -- Benjamin Franklin _______________________________________________ Tcpinc mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpinc
