Hi Joe,
On 8/21/2014 12:41 AM, Brian Trammell wrote:
Hi Valery,
Good points, all.
Devil's advocate position: why not deprecate FTP for all deployments
where security is at all important?
Because it remains a very useful access method, and because FTP lacks
security itself. And because we don't need to modify FTP to make it work
with security and NATs - just use passive-mode. This won't solve all
scenarios, but it will allow tcpinc to support FTP in ways that FTP can
already be used with other security protocols.
FTP + IPsec doesn't have this issue if SA is per IP (not per TCP
connection).
FTP + TLS as described in RFC4217 deals with this issue
by introducing new FPT command that allows application
to tear down TLS on control connection (see Section 5).
Passive mode is not a panacea, it will work for most scenarios
but not for all (e.g. FTP server behind NAT). I cannot estimate
whether the percentage of scenarios when it won't work
is essencial or negligible. And sometimes it is not so easy
for the user to switch FTP to passive mode (ftp often used
internally by applications without user control, e.g.
for getting updates).
My main concern here is that if user experience
any troubles with his/her current working environment
after enabling tcpinc, he/she will most probably
disable it systemwide. So, inability to seamlessly
support FTP would hurt other applications as well.
Regards,
Valery.
Joe
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