-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Matthew Toseland wrote: > An attacker is unlikely to be able to control a large fraction of nodes > on a darknet (he can have many nodes but they won't receive much traffic > unless they have many connections).
I wouldn't be surprised if a small group of con artists could get 5% of the network's users to trust them - look at phishing. Incidentally, what would happen if I divided my peers into two sets - those on my left and those on my right - and replaced my node with two nodes, connecting the left node to my friends on the left, and the right node to my friends on the right? Would I be able to occupy a bigger region of the keyspace without fooling any additional people? Could I then start inserting nodes in the middle, perhaps creating exactly the right Kleinberg distribution of connections between my nodes so they wouldn't clump together? How much of the keyspace could I occupy in this way? Cheers, Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFErS3Eyua14OQlJ3sRAhfuAKDOcDbWh7ar3YifaiuI19XgWiUBbACeMt7j GfUs0Fg79JuYue7EEKM+efU= =yHd+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
