On Thu, Jul 06, 2006 at 04:35:33PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > An attacker is unlikely to be able to control a large fraction of nodes > > on a darknet (he can have many nodes but they won't receive much traffic > > unless they have many connections). > > I wouldn't be surprised if a small group of con artists could get 5% of > the network's users to trust them - look at phishing. > > Incidentally, what would happen if I divided my peers into two sets - > those on my left and those on my right - and replaced my node with two > nodes, connecting the left node to my friends on the left, and the right > node to my friends on the right? Would I be able to occupy a bigger > region of the keyspace without fooling any additional people? > > Could I then start inserting nodes in the middle, perhaps creating > exactly the right Kleinberg distribution of connections between my nodes > so they wouldn't clump together? How much of the keyspace could I occupy > in this way?
Sure, but you're limited by the number of connections you have. You would have to attack the swapping algorithm, and in practice your node would get backed off because it wouldn't be able to cope with the traffic. > > Cheers, > Michael -- Matthew J Toseland - toad at amphibian.dyndns.org Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/tech/attachments/20060706/75a781ff/attachment.pgp>
