Pranam Six Means of Proof with Reference to Order
The subsidiaries of a main rite are to be performed maintaining a particular order. Here order means a particular kind of extension or arrangement, or it takes the form of the state of one thing being first and the other later, or the relation of prior and posterior. With reference to that order, there are six means of proof. These are named as direct statement (śruti), sense (artha), text (pāṭha), position (sthāna), principal (mukhya) and procedure (pravṛtti). The discussion of these six proofs is also important. It will help us to know the nature of these six proofs and at the same time it will be useful for ascertaining the priority and posteriority of the subsidiary rites. Otherwise, some problems will arise when two or more subsidiaries of equal status will be available for performance. So, in the following pages these proofs are being examined. (A) Order by Direct Statement Among the six proofs of order, the direct statement (śruti) is a text which expresses order. The purpose of this statement is to intimate an order i.e. to show that order for which this direct statement is uttered. Some words such as ‘atha’, ‘anantaram’, the ‘ktvāc’ suffix etc. which denote order are used in such statements. Such statements are of two kinds, viz., intimating mere order and intimating things particularized by that order For example of statement expressing mere order, “vedaṃ kṛtvā vediṃ karoti” (Having prepared the grass-brush [vedaḥ] [heṇ prepares the altar [vediḥ]). This sentence does not enjoins the grass-brush, altar etc. Because these things have already been enjoined (prāpta) by another text. Here the ktvāc-suffix has been used to show the posteriority of making altar after the making of the grass-brush. This is the function of this sentence through its terms. But the sentence, “vaṣaṭkartuḥ prathamabhakṣaḥ” (The first drought [is] for the vaṣat-maker), enjoins a matter i.e., bhakṣaṇa or drinking in the case which is qualified by order. At the first stage of chanting the ‘yājyāmantra’ the word ‘vauṣaṭ’ is uttered by the hotṛ. So, the hotṛ is called the ‘vaṣaṭkartṛ’ (the maker of vauṣaṭ). His first drought is here indicated by the word ‘prathamabhakṣaḥ’. Now, the question is: How does the statement express the matter qualified by order? The purpose of this statement may be fulfilled only through enjoining the state of being the first (prāthamya) to the drought of clarified butter. So, why the draught of clarified butter is also to be enjoined by this very statement? It can be had from another statement also. The answer of the Mīmāṃsakas is that if it were so, then it would lead to the breaking of the unity of syntactical construction (ekaprasaratā). Then there would arise the fallacy of spliting of sentence (vākyabhedadoṣa). Bhakṣa or draught has not been laid down in any other place of the Veda. So, both ‘prāthamya’ and ‘bhakṣa’ are to be enjoined by the above sentence. Then the sentence, “vaṣaṭkartuḥ prathamabhakṣaḥ’ would really mean “vaṣaṭkartā bhakṣayati, vaṣaṭkartā prathamaṃ bhakṣayati ca” (The maker of vaṣaṭ drinks, and he drinks first). This leads to vākyabheda or spliting of one sentence into two, which is a fallacy. Not only that, if order (krama) be taken to have been independently laid down here, we shall have to admit that bhakṣa is uddeśya (subject) and prathama is vidheya (predicate). But a karmadhāraya compound is impossible between an uddeśya and a vidheya. If the uddeśya term and the vidheya term are joined to make a compound then the fault ‘avimṛṣṭavidheyāṃśa’ will arise. Actually, both the uddeśya and vidheya denote separate matters. So, there is the absence of power of word of expressing the same meaning (ekārthībhāvalakṣaṇasāmarthyābhāva). For this reason, there is no possibility of compound between a uddeśya and vidheya. The second chapter of the Mīmāṃsādarśana discusses about the utpattividhi. The difference of the rites and their application have been also discussed in that chapter by Jaimini. The applicatory injunction and subsidiariness of a rite have been judged in the third chapter of that book. The injunction regarding performance of rite is discussed in the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter focuses on the order of functions as after having the knowledge about rites one wants to know the order of those rites. In the context of ‘Dvādaśāhasatra’ of Veda, there is a sentence, “adhvarjur gṛhapatiṃ dikṣayitvā brahmāṇaṃ dikṣayati” (After initiating the lord of the house or sacrificer the adhvarju should initiate the brahman). Here initiation of the sacrificer, brahman etc. is enjoined. It is also said in the Veda that, “ye yajamānāste ṛtvijaḥ” (The sacrificers are the ṛtvijs in Satra sacrifice). Now, the question is: Is there any order in the act of initiation of the sacrificers, udgātṛ etc.? The opponent says that as there is no proof of order, the act of initiation also does not have any order. Jaimini gives the answer: “śrutilakṣaṇam ānupūrvyaṃ tatpramāṇatvāt”[1] (The definition of śruti is the order of following in succession by virtue of its authority). It means that the order is expressed by the Veda; as sacrificial rites are based on the Veda, there order is also based on the Veda. Another doubt regarding the rites is: Is the order of performance of that initiation enjoined or not? The opponent says that rites are enjoined, but order is not enjoined; because order is not of the form of rites. The Mīmaṃsakas say that as curd is enjoined as the qualifier of action and we get the meaning, ‘One should perform a homa in which curd is used as a means’; so also order is realised as the qualifier of rites and we obtain the meaning, ‘One should perform the rite following an order.’ In the commentary we get another explanation of the above mentioned aphorism. Is initiation enjoined in the sentence, ‘adhvarjur gṛhapatim...’ and is order understood by implication (arthāpatti)? Or, Is order enjoined by śruti? This is the doubt here. The opponent claims that by the word ‘dīkṣayet’ here initiation is enjoined; because order is nothing but the meaning of sentence. From the meaning of the sentence order is understood. And this order can not surpass or violate the power of enjoining of the śruti. The siddhāntins say that as all ṛtvijs are considered as the sacrificers in the Satra sacrifice, so their initiation is also established by the rule of transfer (atideśavidhibalāt). Therefore initiation can not be repeated. Order is not obtained by implication. So, it has to be regulated. And maintaining that order initiation must be performed. This śruti is strongest among the proofs. As in the case of the six helpers of viniyogavidhi, so in the case of these six pramāṇas helping the determination of order, each preceding pramāṇa is stronger than those that follow. Śruti is stronger than the other proofs because the other proofs determine order by presuming and assuming a suitable śruti or direct statement. They are totally dependent on the śruti proof for determining an order. So, they are weaker than śruti. Jaimini said:— “karmakopo’rthaśab-dābhyāṃ śruti-viśeṣād arthaparatvāt ca”[2] (The pāṭhakrama is [set aside] by the arthakrama and śrutikarma by reason of special text and the desired object). In the description of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice we get the sentence, “aindravāyavaṃ gṛhṇāti, maitrāvaruṇaṃ gṛhṇāti, āśvinaṃ gṛhṇāti” (One should take the cups related to Indra and Vāyu; he should take the cups related to Mitra and Varuṇa; he should take the cups related to Aśvins). If here we maintain the order according to the text (pāṭhkrama), then āśvinagrahagrahaṇa or taking up of the cup of the Aśvins comes third. Accordingly, we presume a śruti such as. ‘āśvinastṛtīyo gṛhyate’ (The cup relating to the deities Aśvins is taken in the third position). But there is a direct statement viz. ‘āśvino daśamo gṛhyate’ (The cup related to Aśvins is taken in the tenth position). Hence, the tenth position is the proper order for taking the cup related to Aśvins, because śrutikrama is more powerful than pāṭhakrama, which depends on an imaginary śruti for conveying the order. It may be asked that for what reason the contradiction between śruti and artha has not been shown. The answer is that there is no real contradiction between them. The Vārtikakāra Kumārila Bhaṭṭa said, “srutyarthayor virodhas tu naivaṃ vacanasambhave | yathāśrutyeva hi nyāyyam arthasya parikalpanam ||” Here the word, ‘artha’ means purpose or necessity. So, ‘arthakrama’ means the order which is postulated according to the purpose of rites. That postulation of order is done according to śruti. So, śruti and artha do not have real contradiction. Therefore, the contradiction of śruti with pāṭha has been exemplified. (B) Order by Sense of Purpose Where order is made according to the sense of purpose, that is order by, or based or founded on sense. The following is an illustration of this order by sense (arthakrama)— In the context of Agnihotra sacrifice, there occur the sentences, “agnihotraṃ juhoti” (One should perform homa by Agnihotra.) And,— “yavāguṃ pacati ” (One should cook the rice-gruel.) in this same order. Here a question arises: Which should be performed first, agnihotrahoma or yavāgūpāka ? What will be the order of these two functions? The Mīmāṃsakas help us. They say that the rice-gruel is prepared for its utilisation in the agnihotrahoma. So, rice-gruel must be ready before the agnihotrahoma. Therefore, it is made first, then the oblation is performed. This is the order by sense of purpose. Here the order by text (pāṭhakrama) is not maintained. KR IRS 3222 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Thatha_Patty" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/thatha_patty/CAL5XZoqn9Awaerk3y9EpD5mFzLq51m5QhyGPGfS0S%2Bvd52aUEQ%40mail.gmail.com.
