EMOTIONS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND : 1 In Indian literature, emotions are discussed in several different contexts : first, within aesthetics (*rasa*). The word *rasa* can mean juice, sap, essence, condiment or even flavour and refers to the different sentiments invoked by a work of art, for example a piece of music. Secondly, emotions are discussed within the context of the *bhakti* (devotional) movement. Here particular emphasis is placed on cultivating the emotion of love for a supreme being, e.g., Śiva. Thirdly, they are discussed in various tantric traditions. These traditions form a counterbalance to the ascetic ideal of classical philosophical texts (fourth context in which emotions are discussed) in that they encourage “living out” emotions (and desires) without forming any attachment to them. This entry focuses on the emotions in this fourth context, namely classical Indian philosophical thinking, which includes Brāhmaṇical as well as Buddhist texts, among others. While there is no equivalent for the term “emotion” in Sanskrit, the concept nevertheless plays an important role in Indian philosophy. Terms used in Sanskrit texts include *vedanā* (feeling) and *bhāva* (feeling) as well as names of individual emotions, such as *rāga* (love, attraction), *dveṣa* (hatred, aversion), *harṣa* (joy), *bhaya* (fear) and *śoka* (sorrow). One of the reasons why emotions are philosophically interesting in India and the West is their relationship with the mental phenomenon of *vijñāna* or *jñāna* which is translated as “cognition”. The relationship between emotion and cognition is important for any account of reason and rationality. While the importance of the emotions for rational deliberation and decision-making has been acknowledged in recent discussions in the philosophy of mind, the history of Western philosophy contains many views, for example those of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, which emphasize the dangerous and destructive role of the emotions. At the heart of these views lies a division of our mental lives into cognitions and feelings. 2 Cognitions are representational thoughts. They are often regarded as rational because they are capable of representing the external world and therefore they provide us with access to the external world, based on the best available evidence. So, according to this view of rationality, when I think that there is a book on the table, based on my available evidence, and there really is one, then my thought is rational. However, if I am hallucinating that there is a book on the table, my thought that there is a book might also be rational because the available evidence points towards this thought. In order to make sure that our thoughts represent reality correctly, we require an account of what counts as good evidence, which is one of the main foci of epistemology in Indian and Western philosophy. 3 The reason why many philosophers regard the emotions as an obstacle to rational thought is the influence of the non-representational feeling. The fact that feelings do not seem to have objects means, according to some views, that they can interfere with rational thought. According to these views, rational thought, which is representational and therefore object-directed, is subject to disturbing interferences from the feelings. The feelings themselves, however, are non-rational because they arise due to some physical imbalance in the body, for example through an imbalance of the various “humours”. This imbalance can negatively influence rational thought. An example is the person who acts against her better judgment because she is in the grip of some feeling. This is of course also the basis for the term “passion” as something that we “suffer”, which was discussed by many philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, e.g., Descartes, Spinoza and Hume. Since rational thought is an ideal for many philosophers and the feelings can interfere with this ideal, the natural consequence seems to be to advocate for the extinction or at least the control of the feelings and, as a consequence, of the emotions. This is what many philosophers throughout the history of philosophy have done, most notably of course the Stoics. While they often recognize that the emotions contain a cognitive, and therefore potentially rational, element, they try to uncover this element by advocating its separation from the affect. Of course, if the affect were to be purged from the emotion, the resulting cognition would cease to be an emotion. 4 The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of the emotions involves a strict division into cognition (*jñāna*) and mental phenomena that include a feeling aspect, such as love or attraction (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*). One of the main reasons for this is the acceptance of the existence of a permanent immaterial self (*ātman*) by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. According to their arguments, the *ātman* is a substance (*dravya*) which possesses several qualities (*guṇas*), such as cognition, desire, effort, aversion, pleasure and pain. This enumeration shows that there is no common Sanskrit term for the concept “emotion” in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts. One general term used is *saṃvedana* which translates as “feeling”, for example *sukha-saṃvedana* (feeling of pleasure). The important aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account is that the individual emotions, such as attachment and aversion are regarded as defects (*doṣas*) [NB 1.1.18] or impurities ( *upadhā*) [VS and VSU 6.2.4]. These defects are the result of ignorance ( *mithyājñāna*) and they give rise to actions that lead to the feeling of pleasure or pain. The reason why this is regarded as negative is that the feeling of pleasure and pain is responsible for our attachment to the world and, more importantly, for our attachment to the self and therefore presents an obstacle to liberation. For this reason, any emotion is deemed to have a negative influence on the individual. However, NV 1.1.22 mentions one exception, namely the desire for eternal pleasure and absence from pain which is final liberation. While, strictly speaking, a desire is not an emotion, it usually has the same negative effect because it results in attachment to the object of desire. The desire for eternal pleasure, however, is not detrimental to liberation; in fact it is a precondition for liberation. 5 In his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, Śaṃkara makes the well-known argument that the self (*ātman*) exists because its existence is the only way to account for the idea of a subject of experience. This argument relies on the idea that the self has certain mental qualities, which are termed *manas* (mind), *buddhi* (intellect), *vijñāna* (cognition) or *citta* (consciousness), depending on what mental function is ascribed to them. Different mental functions are doubt, resolution, egoism or recollection [BSBh 2.4.6]. These mental functions, regardless of how they are referred to, have several qualities or modifications, including desire, imagination, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory, forgetfulness, shame, reflection and fear [BSBh 2.3.32] as well as love, aversion, pleasure and pain [BSBh 2.3.29]. This means that, according to Śaṃkara, the mind’s cognitive and emotional abilities are the qualities of our mental functioning which is different from the self. At the heart of Śaṃkara’s teaching lies the notion that the true knowledge of the *ātman* is knowledge that is devoid of any of the above-mentioned qualities. In this respect one can find a similarity between the Nyāya school and Śaṃkara because for both of them cognitive and emotional qualities are due to false knowledge or ignorance of the true self. This means that the removal of ignorance results in a removal of emotions as well as cognitions. However, it is clear that the emotions present the main obstacle for the realization of the true self because desire and aversion lead to attachment and clinging which cause us to neglect the search for liberation that is crucial to Vedānta teaching. So, while Śaṃkara distinguishes between what Western philosophers would call cognitions and emotions, he does not present a purely cognitive state of mind without emotions as the ideal state of mind because such a state would be impossible. By definition, any purely cognitive state of mind presupposes the existence of a mind or intellect. For Śaṃkara, however, the problem is that a mind will always have certain qualities that would be called emotive in Western philosophy, such as desire, aversion, hatred, pleasure or pain. So, as long as there are cognitions, there will also be emotions. Therefore, both must be eliminated in order for the self to attain liberation. 6 According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, the experiences of intellect, egoity, and mind, and the “raw feels” such as frustration or satisfaction—or, in other words, what conventional dualists would consider to be “inherently private”—are simply subtle reflections of primordial materiality, a primordial materiality undergoing continuous transformation by means of its constituent unfolding as spontaneous activity, reflective discerning, and determinate formulation. Thus, the modern reductive materialists’ claim that “sensations are identical with certain brain processes” would have a peculiar counterpart in the Sāṃkhya claim that “awarenesses” [Sanskrit terms omitted] are identical with certain *guṇa* modalities. (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987, p. 76) The relationship between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* in Sāṃkhya philosophy is complex: *puruṣa* as pure consciousness is characterized by inaction (*akartṛbhāva*) and pure presence (*sākṣitva*). It does not stand in any relation with *prakṛti*, which comprises the material world, including mental processes. Nevertheless, *puruṣa* forms the foundation of *prakṛti*. This means that *puruṣa* provides the meaning for all material processes. Thus *prakṛti* exists for *puruṣa* and it is only because of this that the world is not simply a collection of meaningless physical processes. In addition, the intellect as part of *prakṛti* is supposed to realize that it is not consciousness and it is to become aware of pure consciousness as the way to liberation. This means that the intellect is supposed to understand the contentless pure consciousness but of course in order to do so it would have to become contentless itself, which seems impossible. Therefore, the intellect can only achieve this in an indirect way without cognition. Instead, we require meditative or yogic exercises to understand the difference between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. 7 In the *Yogasūtras*, Patañjali provides a method for understanding the difference between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* via a series of exercises that aim at stripping away all of the disturbing influences from the mind, including what Western philosophers would classify as emotions. In fact, Patañjali argues that the mind is affected by afflictions (*kleśas*) that keep it from becoming clear about the difference between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. In YS 2.3, Patañjali lists the afflictions:
Ignorance (*avidyā*), egoism (*asmitā*), attachment (*rāga*), aversion ( *dveṣa*) and adherence [to mundane existence] (*abhiniveśa*) are afflictions. [YS 2.3] These afflictions need to be removed in order to achieve liberation. Unlike in many Western accounts of the emotions, the removal of the afflictions is not supposed to lead to a form of rational thinking that is divorced from any emotion. Rather, rational thinking itself needs to be overcome, in order to achieve true liberation by separating *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*. The main reason why emotions such as attachment and aversion are regarded as afflictions is that they lead to a desire to change our circumstances and therefore to an attachment to the world. 8 A number of themes emerge from this overview: 1) The Western categories of “cognition” and “emotion” do not have equivalents in classical Indian philosophy. This is interesting because it suggests that these concepts are not psychological categories but perhaps social categories. While there has been some anthropological work done by, for example, Catherine Lutz on the differences in the categorization of specific emotions across cultures, there is the possibility that the category as a whole might not translate into all cultures (see Danziger 1997). 2) One common theme in classical Indian philosophy is that the phenomena that would be labelled as “emotions” in Western philosophy are to be eradicated because they prevent liberation. 3) None of the Indian philosophical schools aim at “emotion-free” cognitions as an end in itself. In fact, those states that would be labelled “cognitions” in Western philosophy are also to be eradicated because they also prevent liberation. ( A research paper on Brahma sutra bhashya courtesy) 17922 On Sat, 17 Sept 2022 at 07:35, Markendeya Yeddanapudi < [email protected]> wrote: > > > -- > *Mar**The Rivers of Emotions-Geography* > > > > For all of us, rivers mean, the flows of water. But breathing is the basis > of emotions. We > breathe,smell,sense,perceive,understand,interact,act,help,identify,develop > identifications, all from the ocean of emotions-the troposphere. The angle > of the Sun’s ray or the latitude, determines the Thermodynamic situation of > the place. The latitude determines the particular flora and fauna. They > interact with each other, via breathing, smelling, sensing, perceiving and > by exhaling their perceptions in smells which create the macro emotional > and hormonal habits. > > The equatorial evergreen forests must be creating gigantic flows of > emotion laden airflows or the rivers of emotions, mixing with the great > ocean-the troposphere. If the waters of the various rivers flow into the > seas, the emotions flow into the ocean of air-the troposphere, the great > ocean of emotions.Every climatic region must be causing rivers of > particular emotions. > > The emotions shall be studied on the basis of Biocentrism and they shall > not be narrowed and suffocated by anthropocentrism, which means simply, > concentrating on the humans only. We need to get back our macro bearings to > feel our macro identity, to identify the rivers of emotions in the > troposphere. It means that there is a gigantic macro flow of emotional > perception and understanding. The emotions shall not be contaminated by any > technology, as no machine can feel like an organism. Machines are designed > to be mechanical and not emotional. > > In free, lush and thick nature, the air creates positive emotions. An > organism wants to be very near another organism, propelled by breathing > love. Lovers hug each other, want to breathe together, feel together, and > simply destroy the physical distance between each other. When the airflow > becomes the flow of love, one would want to embrace the planet earth, by > hugging the trees, animals, by swimming, and by doing everything to be part > of nature. One develops love for the soil bacteria. > > Today technology has robbed us of our emotional relations. We kiss the > cell phones and computers and cannot tolerate another human physical > presence. We through more and more machine barriers, to block the other > human beings. We no longer can feel nature and always thirst for the latest > and new machine, which we discord after sometime as machines are not > emotional. We hanker for the latest and the new. We suffer from discontent, > which our hormones transport continuously to every cell and breathe out the > discontent which the other organisms breathe. > > It is for the Universities to free humanity from the technological trance, > and take the Biosphere home, the emotions. They have to first add to their > libraries free nature also, opening the way for perception via inhalation > of emotion messages and exhalation of emotion responses. > > YM > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Thatha_Patty" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/thatha_patty/CAL5XZook4PKzn88G6y%2BWGbB83%2B%3DReFACkVEWfHdqDmiYGWcoRA%40mail.gmail.com.
